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1 Actually, there are several labour supply elasticities, depending on whether one is talking about the response to a change in the after-tax wage that is
expected to be only temporary or, alternatively, long-lived, and depending on whether the change is or is not accompanied by changes in non-labour
income (i.e. government transfers). These issues will be central to the later discussion. 
The Tax–Transfer System and 
Labour Supply
Michael P Keane*
7.0 Introduction
This chapter provides a survey of the male labour supply
literature, while also asking what that literature implies for
the design of the tax system. Much of the labour supply
literature is concerned with how peoples’ decisions about
whether and how much to work are influenced by taxes on
labour income and government transfers. To begin, it is
important to have a clear understanding of why these
labour supply decisions matter for the design of the tax
system. So, by way of motivation, I’ll start with a brief and
very informal summary of the ‘optimal taxation’ literature,
pioneered by Mirrlees (1971). Loosely speaking, this
literature implies that welfare costs of taxation are smaller,
and the optimal tax rate on labour income higher, if labour
supply is relatively unresponsive to tax rates.
I will then give an overview of the male labour supply
literature, which, according to conventional wisdom,
generally concludes that labour supply is fairly insensitive to
tax rates. This, in turn, implies that the welfare losses from
taxation are in fact small. However, I will argue: (i) that the
literature is not really so uniform as the conventional wisdom
suggests (i.e. quite a few well-executed papers do find that
labour supply is responsive to wages/taxes and that welfare
costs of taxation are high), and (ii) much of the literature that
does find labour supply is unresponsive to after-tax wages is
not actually relevant for the setting of tax policy. This is
because much of this literature has ignored human capital. I
will argue that once one accounts for the effects of income
taxation on the incentive to accumulate human capital, one
finds evidence that labour supply is much more sensitive to
income taxation than previously thought—implying that
optimal tax rates are correspondingly lower.
7.1 The Literature on ‘Optimal
Taxation’: Basic Ideas
The optimal tax literature starts with two key problems:
1. The government needs to raise a certain amount of
revenue to pay for public goods (such as education,
health care and defence forces), unemployment
insurance, income support for the poor, and other
programs.
2. The use of income taxation to raise this revenue
causes people to work less. This leads to a decline in
overall economic output (and generates what
economists call an efficiency or welfare loss).
There is clearly a tradeoff between the desirable 
aspects of taxation listed in point one—that is, taxes
provide more funds to pay for desirable programs—versus
the undesirable effect listed in point two, which is the
decline in overall economic activity. A familiar metaphor to
describe the problem is the economic ‘pie’. We can view
government programs such as education, health care and
income support as providing people with more of a ‘fair
go’, leading to a more equal division of the economic pie.
But as we attempt to split the pie more evenly it tends to
shrink. That is, as we raise income taxes, people know their
share of the pie is less tied to how much they work, and
hence their incentive to work is reduced. So we face a
tradeoff between achieving a more even division of the pie
versus achieving a larger pie.
The optimal tax literature, pioneered by Mirrlees (1971),
develops mathematical models of this tradeoff, and uses
them to derive optimal levels of taxation and government
spending. The basic conclusion of this literature is that the
optimal tax rate depends on the severity of the shrinking
pie problem. That, in turn, depends on how much people
reduce their labour supply, or work effort, if you tax them.
This is what economists call the ‘labour supply elasticity’.
Economists define the ‘labour supply elasticity’ as the
percentage reduction in a person’s labour supply (i.e. hours
of work or effort) if their after-tax wage is reduced by 1 per
cent1. Labour supply is ‘inelastic’ if this labour supply
elasticity is small. In this case, people won’t work very much
less if the income tax rate is increased, so the shrinking pie
problem is not very serious. Thus, the basic solution of the
optimal tax literature is that government should tax people
more if their labour supply is ‘inelastic’—this is equivalent to
the simple statement that it is optimal to tax people more if
they won’t reduce their work effort much when you do so.
A concrete example will demonstrate what this means.
Suppose we want to choose the marginal tax rate for the
top income bracket. To simplify matters, let’s assume that
this bracket is sufficiently high that government (or society)
places no value whatsoever on an extra dollar of income for
people in this bracket. The government’s only goal is to
raise as much revenue from people in the highest bracket
as possible. In this case, Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2009)
give the following simple formula for the revenue
maximising top bracket tax rate:
(1)
Here, τ is the tax rate applied to the top bracket. The
parameter e is the labour supply elasticity (i.e. the per cent
increase in work for a 1 per cent increase in after-tax wage
w(1 – τ), where w is the pre-tax wage). Finally, a is called the
‘Pareto’ parameter. It is an (inverse) measure of the amount
of income dispersion within the top bracket. I’ll say more
about a below. For now, it is sufficient to know that
estimates of a are generally in the range of 1.6 to 2.0 (for
a wide range of countries), and there is not much
controversy about the value of this parameter.
Brewer, Saez and Shepard (2008) report a value of 1.67
for the United Kingdom, so I’ll use that value to illustrate
the influence of the labour supply elasticity e on the optimal
tax rate:
Now, let’s look at what this implies for the optimal tax rate
for different values of the labour supply elasticity e:
Table 7.1 reveals quite strikingly how sensitive the
optimal top bracket tax rate is to the labour supply elasticity.
For instance, if the elasticity is only 0.2, which means a 1 per
cent reduction in the after-tax wage rate would only reduce
labour supply by 0.2 per cent, then the optimal top rate is a
very high 75 per cent. In contrast, if the elasticity is 2.0,
which means a 1 per cent reduction in the after-tax wage
rate would reduce labour supply by a substantial 2 per cent,
the optimal top rate is only 23 per cent.
What may appear puzzling for the non-economist
about Table 7.1 is why, given the assumptions I’ve made,
the optimal tax rate is not simply 100 per cent? As I
indicated earlier, I am assuming that the government (or
society) places no value on additional income for people in
the top bracket, and its only goal is to raise as much
revenue from people in the top bracket as possible. So why
not tax them at 100 per cent?
The answer illustrates the shrinking pie problem quite
clearly: if income in excess of the level at which the top
bracket begins is taxed at 100 per cent then no-one would
have any incentive to earn income above that level. As a
result, revenue collection on the 100 per cent tax would (in
theory) be zero. So even if revenue collection is the only
goal, the optimal tax is less than 100 per cent. The one
exception, as we see in Table 7.1, is if the labour supply
elasticity is zero (i.e. labour supply is totally inelastic). This
would arise if, for reasons that are unrelated to income
itself, high wage people still choose to earn in excess of the
top bracket threshold because, for example, they enjoy the
work, or they gauge success by earnings relative to peers
(even if it doesn’t translate into extra take-home pay).2
Now, let’s discuss the ‘Pareto’ parameter a in more
detail. The definition of this parameter is a = zm/(zm – z),
where z is the level of income where the top bracket starts,
and zm is the average income of people in the top bracket.
For example, if the top bracket starts at $500,000, and the
average income of people in that bracket is $1,000,000,
then a = 1,000,000/(1,000,000 – 500,000) = 2. In contrast,
if average income in the top bracket were $2,000,000
(implying more dispersion or less equality) we would have 
a = 2/(2 – 0.5) = 1.33. Thus, we see how a decreases as the
degree of dispersion (or inequality) in income increases.3
Note from equation (1) that as a decreases the optimal 
tax rate increases (because a decrease in a makes the
denominator smaller).
Notice that for a flat rate tax system without brackets,
i.e. a single flat rate tax on all income starting at $0, we
would have z = 0. Then we would just have a = zm/zm = 1.
If the government’s goal is purely revenue maximisation,
then equation (1) becomes simply4:
Given this formula, Table 7.2 reports the optimal flat rate
tax rates for different values of the labour supply elasticity
e. Increasing tax rates to levels above those listed in Table
7.2 would actually reduce government revenue, because
the shrinking pie problem becomes so severe.
As in Table 7.1, we see that the optimal tax rate
increases sharply as e decreases (i.e. as labour supply
becomes less responsive to after-tax wages). For instance, if
the elasticity is only 0.5, which means a 1 per cent
reduction in the after-tax wage rate would only reduce
labour supply by 0.5 per cent, then the optimal tax rate is a
very high 67 per cent. But if the elasticity is 2.0, which
means a 1 per cent reduction in the after-tax wage rate
would reduce labour supply by a substantial 2 per cent, the
optimal tax rate is only 33 per cent.
Notice that, because a is now smaller (a = 1.0 vs 1.67),
the tax rates in Table 7.2 are generally higher than those in
Table 7.1. This may seem surprising, given that we are now
talking about a flat rate tax, as opposed to a top bracket
(2)
Table 7.1 Optimal Top Bracket Tax Rates for Different
Labour Supply Elasticities
Elasticity (e) Tax rate (τ) (%)
2.0 23
1.0 37
0.5 54
0.2 75
0.1 86
0.0 100
Note: These rates assume the government places essentially no value on
giving extra income to the top earners.
(3)
2 We can also consider the case where the government (or society) does place some value on extra income for people in the top bracket. Suppose this value is
g dollars for each extra dollar of income. g is less than 1 if the society has egalitarian preferences. In that case, and assuming for simplicity that all government
revenue is used for redistribution (i.e. there is no minimum tax level needed to provide essential services), Brewer, Saez and Shepard (2008) show that 
(1) becomes T = (1 – g)/(1 – g + a·e). Thus, we see that for g > 0 the tax rates in Table 7.1 would be reduced. Table 7.1, of course, corresponds to g = 0.
3 In other words, the thicker the right tail of the income distribution, the smaller is a.
4 It is also easy to derive (3) directly. Just assume that ln(h) = e· ln(w(1 – τ)), so e is the labour supply elasticity. Then we have that h = [w(1 – τ))]e. Let R denote
tax revenue. We have R = (wh)τ = w[w(1 – τ))]e·τ. It is instructive to look at the derivative of R with respect to τ, which is dR/dτ = w[w(1 – τ))]e – ew2[w(1 –
τ))]e–1·τ. This first term, which is positive, is the mechanical effect of the tax increase holding labour supply fixed. The second term, which is negative, is the
loss in revenue due to reduced labour supply. Setting this derivative equal to zero and solving for the revenue maximising τ gives equation (3). 
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tax. It should be recalled, however, that the models in the
optimal tax literature assume that taxes are used largely to
finance income inequality-reducing transfers. Under the flat
rate scheme in Table 7.2, low-to-middle income taxpayers
pay higher taxes, but also receive larger transfers.
It also is worth emphasising that the tax rates in Table 7.2
are revenue maximising rates, not welfare maximising rates.
That is, they are only optimal under the extreme assumption
that the government places no value on an extra dollar of
private income, and seeks only to maximise revenue. This
assumption is presumably a better approximation to reality
with regard to the top bracket rate (Table 7.1) than in the
case of a flat rate (Table 7.2). Thus, the figures in Table 7.2
should not be viewed as plausible estimates of optimal flat
rate tax rates given different labour supply elasticities. But
they are indicative of the rapid rate of growth of optimal
tax rates as the labour supply elasticity falls.
Both Tables 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate the key role of labour
supply elasticities in the optimal tax literature, with smaller
elasticities implying higher optimal tax rates. As I noted
earlier, this is to be expected since smaller elasticties imply
that raising taxes is less ‘costly’, in the sense that it leads to
less reduction in work effort and less shrinking of the
economic pie. With this background in mind, we will look
at what the labour supply literature implies about labour
supply elasticities and the welfare costs of taxation.
Section 7.2 describes the standard models of labour
supply used by economists. I’ll show how these models lead
to several alternative definitions of the elasticity of hours of
work with respect to the after-tax wage, so that in fact it is
not correct to talk about the labour supply elasticity as if
there were only one. Then, section 7.3 provides the survey
of the male labour supply literature. It discusses estimates
of the various labour supply elasticities, and what they
imply about the costs of taxation.
Section 7.3 is divided into four parts. Section 7.3.1
discusses the main econometric problems that arise in
attempting to estimate labour supply models. The next
three sections cover results from three main classes of
labour supply model. Section 7.3.2 covers ‘static’ models
that consider only the choice of work hours but take assets
and human capital as given. Section 7.3.3 covers ‘life-cycle’
models that incorporate decisions about saving. Section
7.3.4 covers life-cycle models that also account for how
wages depend on work experience (i.e. human capital).
Sections 7.2 and 7.3 are at times somewhat technical
(as they present mathematical models), so it is worth
5 The definition of a ‘period’ in labour supply models is somewhat arbitrary. In empirical work it is often chosen to be a year, although shorter periods are
sometimes examined. 
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Table 7.2 Revenue Maximising Flat Rate Income Tax
Rates for Different Labour Supply Elasticities
Elasticity (e) Tax rate (τ) (%)
2.0 33
1.0 50
0.5 67
0.2 83
0.1 91
0.0 100
summarising in advance what is discussed. Essentially, it is
fair to say that, regardless of which of the various
definitions of the labour supply elasticity you use, the
consensus of the economics profession—whether accurate
or not—has been that labour supply elasticities are quite
small (i.e. less than 0.50). This implies, for instance, that the
optimal top-bracket tax rate is towards the high end of the
figures given in Table 7.1.
The consensus is summed up nicely in a recent survey
by Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2009), who state:
…optimal progressivity of the tax–transfer system, as
well as the optimal size of the public sector, depend
(inversely) on the…elasticity of labour supply… With
some exceptions, the profession has settled on a
value for this elasticity close to zero… In models with
only a labour-leisure choice, this implies that the
efficiency cost of taxing labour income…is bound to
be low as well.
However, I believe that section 7.3 presents evidence
that challenges this consensus. First, I show that many well-
executed papers in the literature have produced reasonably
large estimates of labour supply elasticities, as well as the
welfare costs of taxation. The extent of agreement among
existing studies is not nearly so great as the conventional
wisdom would suggest. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, I’ll argue that a serious problem with the
existing labour supply literature is that it is based almost
entirely on models that ignore human capital. Section 7.3.4
shows how, in a model with human capital, conventional
econometric methods tend to seriously understate labour
supply elasticities. Hence, inclusion of human capital into
standard labour supply models leads to a conclusion that
labour supply elasticities may well be higher than the
conventional wisdom would indicate.
7.2 Basic Models of Labour Supply
Before discussing the empirical literature on labour supply,
it is necessary to lay out the theoretical framework on
which it is based. Labour supply models can be broadly
classified into two main types, static and dynamic. There are
many variations within each type, but for our purposes this
simple division will prove useful.
7.2.1 The Basic Static Labour Supply Model
In the basic static labour supply model, a person’s utility in
period t depends positively on consumption and negatively
on the hours of work needed to attain that consumption.5
One commonly used utility function has the form:
Here Ut is utility in period t. It depends on consumption Ct
and hours of labour supplied ht. To keeps things simple, I
assume that consumption is simply equal to labour earnings,
so that Ct = wt(1 – τ)ht where wt is the pre-tax wage rate and
τ is the tax rate. η and γ are parameters that describe
(1)
preferences. As η < 0 consumption is raised to a power less
than one, so we have diminishing marginal utility of
consumption.6 And γ > 0 means hours are raised to a power
greater than one, so that people find an additional hour of
work more painful as the level of hours increases. Both are
very standard economic assumptions. The parameter βt
captures the person’s tastes for leisure versus consumption,
and this may change over time.
The static model has two key features that distinguish it
from dynamic models. First, it assumes that workers do not
borrow or save, so that current period consumption is simply
equal to current after-tax income. Second, it ignores human
capital accumulation. This means that workers decide how
much labour to supply today based only on today’s wage
rate. They do not consider the possibility that working more
today may have the effect of raising future wages (because
by working more today one acquires more work experience).
To solve this model for optimal hours of work, use 
the budget constraint Ct = wt(1 – τ)ht to substitute for
consumption Ct in equation (1), obtaining:
We have now expressed utility as a function of hours, and
we can solve for the level of hours that maximises utility. To
do this, we simply differentiate (2) with respect to ht, set the
derivative to zero to maximise Ut, and then solve for the
optimal ht. Doing this we obtain:
This can be reorganised into the more familiar form:
This is one of the most basic equations in economics. The
left-hand side is the ratio of the marginal utility of leisure,
βtht
γ, (which is simply the negative of the marginal disutility
of work hours) to the marginal utility of consumption, 
[wt(1 – τ)ht]η. Utility is maximised by choosing hours of 
work so as to set this ratio equal to the after-tax wage rate,
wt(1 – τ).
Notice that as hours increase, income increases, and
hence consumption increases. Thus, the marginal utility of
consumption (MUC(h)) falls, given the assumption of
diminishing marginal utility of consumption (η < 0). And as
hours increase, the marginal utility of leisure MUL(h)
increases. Thus, as hours increase, the ratio on the left side
of (4) gets smaller.7 Hours increase up to that point where
the left and right sides of (4) are equalised.
Solving for ht we obtain:
This equation is easier to work with if we take logs, giving:
As I indicated earlier, the labour supply elasticity is simply
the percentage reduction in labour supply (i.e. hours of
work) with respect to a 1 per cent change in the after-tax
wage. Formally, this is defined as:
Thus, the labour supply elasticity e is obtained by taking 
the derivative of the log of hours with respect to the log 
of the after-tax wage. Given the form of equation (6), this
derivative is simple to calculate:
This quantity is called the ‘Marshallian’ labour supply
elasticity (after the great economist Alfred Marshall), and is
sometimes also called the ‘uncompensated’ or ‘total’
elasticity. It is certainly the simplest labour supply elasticity
concept. Recall that standard economic assumptions of
diminishing marginal utility of consumption and leisure
imply that η < 0 and γ > 0. Thus, we know that the
denominator in (8), which is (γ – η), is positive.
But apart from this result, economic theory tells us little.
Obviously, the magnitude of the Marshallian elasticity
depends on the utility function parameters γ and η. I’ll
discuss plausible values for these parameters in the
literature review. For now let us just note that it is possible
for the numerator 1 + η to be negative if η < –1. In that
case, an increase in the wage would actually reduce hours
of work. Several of the empirical studies that I review below
do find this. But most studies find that 1 + η > 0. In that 
case the Marshallian elasticity e = (1 + η)/(γ – η) is positive,
meaning that an increase in the after-tax wage increases
hours of work.
Conceptually, an increase in the wage rate can be
thought of as having two effects. First, given a higher
wage, a person can now earn more income just by
maintaining his/her original level of hours. Given
diminishing marginal utility of consumption, this creates an
incentive to reduce hours of work and take more leisure
time. This negative effect of a wage increase on desired
hours of work is called the ‘income effect’.
Second, given a higher wage, the rate at which a
person can increase his/her income by working more hours
increases. This gives the person an incentive to work more
hours, or, in economists’ terminology, to ‘substitute’ work
for leisure. This positive effect of a wage increase on desired
hours of work is called the ‘substitution’ effect.
Knowledge of both income and substitution effects is
important for understanding the impact of changes in tax(5)
(6)
(7)
(4)
(2)
(3)
(8)
6 That is, the utility to a person of the first dollar of consumption is less than that of the millionth dollar.
7 The ratio MUL(h)/MUC(h) is known as the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and leisure. Evaluating this at h = 0 one obtains the
‘reservation wage’, the minimum wage at which a person is willing to supply positive hours. Notice that MRS = (βt/[wt(1 – τ)]η)h
y
t
–n. Since (γ  – η) is positive,
we see that the MRS equals zero if h = 0. Thus, the reservation wage is zero and people in this model will work positive hours for any positive wage. The
model can be easily modified to account for people who choose not to work by including some non-labour income (e.g. government transfers) so that
consumption does not fall to zero when hours equal zero. But this extension is not critical for the points I wish to make in this section.
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and transfer policy. For example, suppose we have a flat
rate tax system. Further suppose that we decide to increase
the flat rate tax rate and use the revenue to finance grants
to every member of the population (perhaps with the goal
of guaranteeing a minimum income). Economists refer to
such grants that do not depend on income or hours of
work as ‘lump sum payments’. This policy discourages work
in two ways. The tax increase itself reduces the reward from
work, but the lump sum payments, which have the effect
of increasing the income attained by working any given
level of hours, also discourage work via the income effect.
In contrast, suppose the revenue from the increased
income tax is used to finance public goods (e.g. schools,
public transport, carbon capture). In that case, the negative
effect on labour supply will be less because the income
effect that comes from transferring the tax revenue directly
back to the population in the form of grants is avoided.
Eugene Slutsky developed a method for decomposing the
Marshallian labour elasticity into the separate substitution and
income effects. This is known as the ‘Slutsky equation’:
Here N represents non-labour income. In the previous
example, non-labour income comes from the grants or
lump sum payments that the government makes to
members of the population.
In equation (9) the first term on the right-hand side is
the substitution effect, while the second term is the income
effect. The second term can be understood as follows. First,
suppose a person is working h hours, and their wage
increases by a dollar. If they do not change their hours, then
their income will go up by h dollars. The idea behind the
Slutsky equation is that this is like giving the person a grant
(or lump sump payment) of h dollars. ∂h/∂N stands for the
effect on hours of an extra dollar of grant income. Recall
that this must be negative given diminishing marginal utility
of consumption. Thus, the second term, h•∂h/∂N tells us the
overall reduction in hours that occurs because the person
has, in effect, been given h extra dollars of grant income.
The first term on the right, the substitution effect, is
more subtle. The idea here is roughly the following: we can
think of giving a person a wage increase and simultaneously
taking away the same h dollars that we gave them above—
perhaps through a poll or head tax. This means that if the
person sticks with their original hours level, their net
income won’t change. Obviously their leisure is unchanged
as well, so their overall utility level is unchanged. The person
will have to increase hours in order to take advantage of
the higher wage rate and raise consumption. Thus, we see
that this ‘compensated substitution effect’ of a wage
increase—that is, raising the wage while simultaneously
‘compensating’ by taking away enough income (through a
poll or head tax) so that the person can’t be better off by
‘standing pat’—must be positive. The notation stands 
for this operation: it is the effect on hours of raising the
wage by one unit while taking away h units of non-labour
income so as to ‘compensate’ for the wage increase and
hold utility fixed.
Another way to think about (9) is that we hypothetically
give a person a wage increase in two steps. First, we give
them the wage increase but simultaneously apply a poll or
head tax to counteract it, so the person is not made better
off. At their original hours level the person’s net income and
consumption will be unchanged, but their marginal wage
rate is higher. Hence, according to theory, the person must
choose to increase hours. In the second stage we remove
the head tax. This increases the person’s income level at any
given level of hours, so, according to theory, the person
should reduce hours.
It is convenient to write the Slutsky equation in elasticity
form, so that the Marshallian elasticity appears on the left-
hand side. To do this we just pre-multiply equation (9) by
w/h, and multiply and divide the income effect term by N,
to obtain:
The first term on the right is called the ‘compensated’ or
‘Hicks’ labour supply elasticity (after the famous economist
John Hicks). The second term is the income effect, which
includes the elasticity of hours of work with respect to non- 
labour income, .
Now we see why the Marshallian elasticity is sometimes
called the ‘total’ elasticity, as it is the sum of the Hicks elasticity
and the income effect. We also see why the Marshallian
elasticity is sometimes called the ‘uncompensated’ elasticity;
in contrast to the Hicks elasticity, it is simply the total effect of
a wage increase, without any compensating head tax.
It should now be obvious why the Hicks elasticity is of
practical importance for tax policy. For example, an after-tax
wage increase induced by an income tax cut may in some
cases be financed via reduced transfer payments.
Depending on the size of the tax cut versus the cut in
transfers, the Hicks elasticity may well be the relevant one
for predicting the overall effect of the policy change on
labour supply.
Another point is that given a progressive tax system (i.e.
a system with brackets such that marginal tax rates increase
with income) it can be shown that the effect of a change in
upper bracket tax rates on the labour supply of upper
income workers depends mostly on the Hicks elasticity, not
the Marshallian elasticity. Thus, the extent to which a highly
progressive tax system generates a welfare cost by
shrinking the economic pie is largely a function of the Hicks
elasticity. I’ll discuss this key point in more detail later.
In most empirical applications, the Hicks, elasticity is
‘backed out’ by estimating the Marshallian elasticity and
income elasticity and applying equation (10). But some
applications estimate the parameters of preferences (γ and η)
directly, and then construct the elasticities using theoretical
formulas. To obtain the Hicks and income elasticities we
need to modify the budget constraint of our static model 
to include non-labour income, giving Ct = wt(1 – τ)ht + Nt.
Equation (2) then becomes:
N
h
h
N
∂
∂
uw
h
∂
∂
(10)
(9)
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The mathematics is a bit cumbersome, but it can be shown
that, in this simple model, the income elasticity of labour
supply, evaluated at small values of Nt, is approximately:
which means the income effect in equation (10), which I’ll
denote ‘ie’, is just:
Of course, the income effect is negative because η < 0 and
γ > 0, which are conditions required for diminishing marginal
utility of consumption and leisure. Intuitively, the magnitude
of the negative income effect is increasing in the magnitude
of the parameter η. If η is a larger negative number it implies
that the incremental utility from extra consumption diminishes
more quickly as consumption increases. Thus, the tendency
to reduce labour supply in response to an increase in non-
labour income is greater.
It is instructive to note that the income effect ie in (10)
can be written as:
Thus, the income effect is also the effect of an increase of
non-labour income on labour income (i.e. given an extra
dollar of non-labour income, how much does a worker
reduce his/her earnings?). As Pencavel (1986) notes, if both
leisure and the composite consumption good (Ct) are
normal goods, then ie must be between zero and –1.
Indeed, we can see from (12) that as η runs off towards
negative infinity, ie runs off towards –1. But Pencavel
(1986) argues that values of ie near –1 would be quite
implausible. Simple introspection suggests that people
would be unlikely to react to an increase in non-labour
income by reducing hours so sharply that total
consumption Ct = wtht + Nt does not increase.8
Now, using the Slutsky equation we can obtain the
Hicks elasticity as the difference between the Marshallian
elasticity and the income effect:
Notice that because η < 0, the Hicks elasticity in (14) must 
be greater than the Marshallian elasticity in (8). The two
approach each other as η → 0, in which case there are no
income effects. Much of the literature on optimal taxation
makes the assumption of no income effects in order to
simplify the analysis (e.g. see Diamond 1998). However, in
my view the assumption that income effects can be ignored
is questionable, for reasons I discuss later.
7.2.2 The Basic Dynamic Model with Savings
Consider next the basic dynamic labour supply model, also
known as the ‘life-cycle’ model. The pioneering work by
MaCurdy (1981) introduced dynamics in empirical labour
supply models by introducing savings. In his model, workers
are free to borrow and lend across periods (rather than being
constrained to consume their earnings in each period).
MaCurdy (1981) considered a multi-period model, but
in order to emphasise the key points it is sufficient to have
two periods in the working life.9 As before, the per-period
utility function is given by:
where Ct is consumption in period t and ht is hours of
labour supplied in period t.
The key change in the dynamic model is that now we
have C1 = w1(1 – τ1)h1 + b, where b is the net borrowing in
period 1, while C2 = w2(1 – τ2)h2 – b(1 + r), where b(1 + r) is
the net repayment of the loan in period 2. The amount that
must be repaid is b(1 + r) where r is the interest rate. Of
course, b can be negative, meaning the person saves in
period 1. Note that w1 and w2 are wage rates in periods 1
and 2, while τ1 and τ2 are tax rates on labour earnings in
periods 1 and 2, respectively.10
In the dynamic model, a person makes decisions so as
to maximise his/her lifetime utility over the two periods. The
present value of lifetime utility is given by:
where the parameter ρ is the discount factor. Substituting
the values of period t = 1 and t = 2 utility into (16) we obtain:
In the standard life-cycle model, there is no human
capital accumulation via returns to work experience. That
is, hours of work in period 1 do not affect the wage rate in
period 2. Thus, the worker treats the wage path {w1, w2} as
exogenously given (i.e. it is unaffected by the worker’s own
decisions).
In the life-cycle model, a new labour supply elasticity
concept is introduced. This is the response of a worker to a
temporary change in the after-tax wage rate. For instance,
this could be induced by a temporary tax cut in period 1
that is rescinded in period 2. Since the worker can now
save, the response to such a tax change may be to work
more in period 1, save part of the extra earnings, and then
work less in period 2. Economists call such a reaction (i.e.
shifting one’s labour supply toward periods where wages
are relatively high) ‘inter-temporal substitution’. The
magnitude of this response is called the ‘inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution’. It is also sometimes called the
‘Frisch’ elasticity, after the economist Ragnar Frisch. 
The first order conditions for the worker’s optimisation
problem are simply:
(15)
(16)
(17)
(14)
(13)
(12)
(11)
8 And, as I have already noted, even η < –1 implies that income effects dominate substitution effects, so that an increase in the wage reduces labour supply.
9 He also considered that the change in a person’s wage rate from one period to the next might be in part unexpected, but to keep things simple I put
aside uncertainty about future wages for now.
10 As in the static model I assume there is no non-labour income. This simplifies the analysis while not changing any key results.
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Equation (20) can be simplified to read [C1]η ⁄ [C2]η = 
ρ(1 + r), which is the classic inter-temporal optimality
condition that requires one to set the borrowing level b so
as to equate the ratio of the marginal utilities of
consumption in the two periods to ρ(1 + r).
An important special case is when ρ = 1/(1 + r), so that
people discount the future using the real interest rate. 
In that case, we have ρ(1 + r) = 1, so that [C1]η ⁄ [C2]η = 1 and
hence C1 = C2. So, we have complete consumption smoothing,
that is, the consumer desires to have equal consumption in
both periods.
Utilising the inter-temporal condition, we can divide
(19) by (18) to obtain:
And taking logs we obtain:
From (22) we obtain:
Thus, the Frisch elasticity of substitution, the rate at which
a worker shifts hours of work from period 1 to period 2 
as the relative wage increases in period 2, is simply 1/γ. 
The elasticity with respect to a change in the tax ratio 
(1 – τ2)/(1 – τ1) is identical.
There is an important relationship between the Frisch,
Hicks and Marshallian elasticities:
That is, the Frisch elasticity is larger than the Hicks,
which is larger than the Marshallian. This follows directly
from η < 0 (i.e. diminishing marginal utility of consumption).
This implies that if we can obtain an estimate of the Frisch
elasticity we have an upper bound on how large the Hicks
and Marshallian elasticities might be. With these concepts
in hand, we are in a position to talk about estimation of
labour supply elasticities.
7.3 A Survey of Labour Supply
Elasticity Estimates
There have been many surveys of the labour supply
literature and of labour supply elasticity estimates. These
include Hausman (1985b), Pencavel (1986), Killingsworth
and Heckman (1986), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and
Meghir and Phillips (2008). Here I will start by summarising
the main econometric problems this literature faces, and
then move on to describe the main empirical results on
male labour supply elasticities.
7.3.1 Econometric Issues
Broadly speaking, there are two main approaches to
estimating labour supply elasticties in the literature. One is
simply to run a regression of hours of work on the wage
rate and non-labour income. An alternative is to specify and
estimate a structural model of labour supply behaviour,
which would include specifying utility and wage functions.
I’ll begin by discussing a regression approach.
Various functional forms could be chosen for an hours
regression but, as a starting point, let’s consider a
logarithmic specification of the form:
where I now include person subscripts i to indicate that we
have data on a sample of people. Thus hit is hours of work
for person i in period t. Similarly wit is the wage rate faced
by person i at time t, and Nit is their non-labour income.
It is important that equation (25) controls for non-
labour income, Nit. As a result, the coefficient on the log
after-tax wage rate (e) is the effect of a wage change
holding non-labour income fixed. Thus it is interpretable as
the Marshallian elasticity (i.e. when the wage changes there
is no compensating change in non-labour income).11 The
coefficient on the non-labour income variable (βI = ∂hit/∂Nit)
can be multiplied by the after-tax wage rate to obtain the
income effect ie = wit(1 – τ)βI. Of course, given estimates of
(25), the Hicks elasticity can be backed out using the Slutsky
equation as eH = e – wit(1 – τ)βI.
In section 7.2, I considered models of the labour supply
of a single individual, so it was not necessary to consider
heterogeneity in tastes for work. In (25), the error term εit
captures the notion that different people may have
different tastes for work. That is, facing the same wage and
non-labour income, some people may choose to work
more than others.
It is also important to note that equation (25) does not
follow directly from the utility function specification I gave
in (1). I adopt the functional form in (25) because it is
simple to interpret. One should be aware that many
alternative specifications for the labour supply function
have been estimated in the literature, and there is no
consensus on the ‘right’ functional form. But (25) will
suffice for explaining the main issues/problems that arise in
attempting to estimate labour supply elasticities.
Indeed, there are a multitude of econometric problems
that arise in attempting to estimate labour supply elasticities,
so I will just highlight some of the most important.
Problem One
The first main problem is that there is no reason to think
that the tastes for work captured by εit would be
uncorrelated with either the wage rate wit or the level of
non-labour income Nit. For example, people who are
(25)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(20)
(18)
(19)
11 Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) provide an extensive discussion about how different sets of controls lead to different interpretations of the wage coefficient.
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relatively hard working (or, in other words, have a relatively
low taste for leisure) might also work harder and be more
productive when they do work. Thus, εit could be positively
correlated with the wage rate. Furthermore, those who are
relatively hard working might also tend to save more,
leading to relatively high asset income. This would create a
positive correlation between εit and non-labour income.
Either of these problems would violate standard
‘exogeneity’ assumptions on the error term used to justify
OLS regression. Econometricians refer to such problems as
‘endogeneity’ problems.
These problems are not merely academic. Pencavel
(1986, p. 23) reports a simple OLS regression of annual
male hours of work on wage rates, various types of non-
labour income, and a long list of demographic controls (e.g.
education, age, marital status, children, race, health,
region) using data from the 1980 US census. He finds that
the coefficient on asset income is actually positive, implying
that $10,000 in additional non-labour income would
increase annual hours by 46 hours. This contradicts the
assumption that income effects should be negative.12 He
also finds that the coefficient on the wage rate is negative,
implying that a dollar per hour wage increase would reduce
annual hours by 14. As noted earlier, a negative Marshallian
elasticity is theoretically possible (i.e. ‘backward bending
labour supply’), but only given a strong negative income
effect. Thus, taken at face value, the sign pattern found
here would seem to completely contradict economic
theory. But it is quite likely the result of endogeneity (or
other econometric problems I’ll list later). 
One approach to deal with such endogeneity problems
is to adopt a fixed effects specification, where the error
term is decomposed as:
Here μi is the individual fixed effect, which captures person
i’s taste for work (assumed to be time invariant), while ηit is
a purely idiosyncratic shock to tastes for work (e.g. person
i may have been sick in a particular period). In the fixed
effects approach, it is assumed that the fixed effect μi may
be correlated with wages and non-labour income, but that
the idiosyncratic shocks ηit are not. Methods such as first
differencing or de-meaning the data can be used to
eliminate μi from the error term. Then, the ηit that remain
are assumed to satisfy the conditions required for OLS
regression.13 In addition, labour supply studies typically also
include various observable control variables that might shift
tastes for work, such as age, number and ages of children,
marital status, and so on.
A second approach is to use an instrument variables
approach. An ‘instrument’ is a variable that is correlated
with the variable of interest—in this case wages and non-
labour income—but that is uncorrelated with the
regression error term εit. For example, changes in the price
of iron ore or bauxite might shift wage rates in Australia,
but changes in these prices are presumably uncorrelated
with changes in tastes for work. Thus, mineral prices would
be sensible instruments to use for wage rates.
In an instrumental variable (IV) regression, one exploits
only the variation in the variable of interest induced by the
instrument to calculate the effect of that variable on the
dependent variable. For instance, one might use only
variation in wages induced by changes in mineral prices to
calculate the effect of wage rates on hours of work. In most
contexts, the choice of whether instruments are valid is
quite controversial. We’ll see some examples of this in the
discussion of particular papers below.
Problem Two
The second main problem involved in estimation of (25) is
that real world tax schedules are typically not the sort of flat
rate schedules I assumed in the theoretical discussion of
section 7.2. The typical schedule in OECD countries involves
transfers to low income individuals, a rate at which these
transfers are taxed away as income increases, and then a
set of brackets, with progressively higher rates in higher
income brackets. We can summarise this by saying the tax
rate τi that a person faces, as well as their non-labour
income Nit, are actually functions of their wage rate and
hours of work. I’ll denote these functions as τi(wit, hit) and
Nit(wit, hit). Then (25) becomes:
This creates a blatant endogeneity problem, as the after-tax
wage rate and non-labour income depend directly on
hours, which is the dependent variable. For example, as
noted earlier, a person who is a hard worker—that is, has a
high value of εit—will work more hours for a given wage
and non-labour income. With a progressive tax system, this
may drive such a person into a higher bracket and/or lower
their level of transfers. Hence, the progressivity of the tax
system creates a negative correlation between the error
term εit and both the after-tax wage and non-labour
income. Again, OLS assumptions are violated.
An additional problem created by transfers and
progressive taxation is that tax rates and transfer amounts
do not usually vary smoothly with income. Rather, they tend
to take discrete jumps at certain income levels. An example
is given in Figure 7.1, which shows the sort of budget
constraint created by simple tax system with two brackets.
In bracket #1, the tax rate is τ1, while in bracket #2 the tax
rate jumps to τ2. The person represented by the graph
moves into the upper bracket if he/she works more than H2
hours, at which point his/her income exceeds the cut-off
level which is assumed to be wH2 + N. Notice that at this
income level the slope of the budget constraint suddenly
(26)
(27)
12 A positive income effect for hours, implying a negative income effect for leisure, would mean that leisure is not a normal good. That is, it is not a good
that people demand more of as they become wealthier. While not theoretically impossible this seems highly unintuitive. 
13 A limitation of the fixed effects approach, which is rather technical, is that the ηit must be ‘strictly exogenous’ as opposed to merely exogenous. This
means the ηit must be uncorrelated with all leads and lags of wages and non-labour income, not just the contemporary values. Strict exogeneity is actually
a much stronger assumption. It implies, for example, that an adverse health shock that lowers one’s taste for work today cannot affect one’s wage in the
next period. Yet, one could easily imagine that it would (e.g. if working less in the current period causes one’s human capital to depreciate). Keane and
Runkle (1992) provide an extensive discussion of this issue.
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An older approach, dating back to Hall (1973), is to
model each person as if they choose labour supply subject
to a simple hypothetical linear budget constraint created by
taking the segment (or bracket) on which they are observed
to locate, and extending this segment from h = 0 to h = Hmax.
In Figure 7.1, these extensions of segments 1 and 2 are
indicated by the dotted lines. As noted by Hall (1973), as
long as preferences are strictly convex (which is implied by
diminishing marginal returns to consumption and leisure) a
person facing such a hypothetical budget constraint would
make the same choice as a person facing the actual budget
constraint.14 It is common in applying this method to
instrument for wages and non-labour income to deal with
measurement error.
Problem Three
The third main problem, which was emphasised by
Pencavel (1986, p. 59), is that in estimating an equation like
(25) we can’t be sure if we are estimating a labour supply
curve or a labour demand curve, or just some combination
of the two. The key question here is why wages and non-
labour income vary across people. (Note that this general
issue can be taken as subsuming the more specific issues
raised under Problems One and Two above). For clarity, let
me focus on the problem of wages (assuming for now that
non-labour income can be treated as exogenous). A
common (although not universal) perspective on the issue
is that wages represent a payment for skill. Each person has
a skill level determined by their skill endowment, education,
experience, and so on, and the economy as a whole
determines an equilibrium rental price on skill. Thus, we
have that the wage rate is given by:
Here pt is the skill rental price at time t, and Sit is the person
i’s level of skill. It is determined by a set of variables Xit that
would typically include things like education and experience.
Now let’s consider explicitly modifying (25) to include a
set of observables Zit that shift tastes for work:
One approach to identification of the supply curve in
(29) is that there exist some variables in (28) that can be
plausibly excluded from (29). Unfortunately, it is far easier
to think of variables that fail to satisfy this requirement than
to think of ones that do.
For example, some authors have assumed that education
enters Xit in (28) but not Zit in (29). Yet it is perfectly plausible
that education is related to tastes for work (e.g. people
who are relatively hard working may also tend to get more
education), and hence that education belongs in Zit as well.
Indeed, the profession has had difficulty agreeing on any
particular variable or set of variables that could be included
in Xit and excluded from Zit.
(28)
(29)
14 It should be noted, however, that this approach does not deal with the endogenous choice of segment. If tastes for work are stochastic, as in (27), then
which segment one locates on is not determined solely by one’s wage rate and non-labour income, but also by the value of the taste shock εit. If we take
the segment on which a person chooses to locate as a given we are in effect truncating the range of the taste shock (e.g. people who locate on a high
hours segment will tend to be people with high tastes for work). As I noted earlier, this induces a negative correlation between the after-tax wage and
tastes for work, which will tend to bias the Marshallian and Hicks elasticities in a negative direction. The approach of Burtless and Hausman (1978)
accounts for the taste shock, which makes the segment a person chooses probabilistic. Thus, when estimating the labour supply elasticities, their method
accounts for the correlation between taste shocks and segment location. 
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drops from w(1 – τ1) to w(1 – τ2). This is what is known as
‘kink’ in the budget constraint. At that point the constraint
does not have a well-defined slope. Note that whole labour
supply theory discussed in section 7.2 was based on the
idea that hours are determined by setting the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure equal to
the after-tax wage rate, which is the slope of the budget
line. This approach breaks down if the budget constraint
contains kinks.
There have been three main approaches to these
problems in the literature. The ‘structural approach’ in which
one models in detail how people make labour supply
decisions when facing a non-linear tax schedule, is described
in the pioneering papers by Burtless and Hausman (1978),
Wales and Woodland (1979), Hausman (1980, 1981),
Blomquist (1983) and Moffitt (1983). A second idea is to
approximate the non-linear budget constraint by a smooth
(i.e. kink free or differentiable) polynomial function, as
suggested by MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990). Suppose
that tax rate is a differentiable function of earnings, which
I’ll denote by τ(wtht). Then equations (2)–(4) just become:
Comparing (4) and (4’), we see that the constant tax rate τ
in (4) is simply replaced by τ’(wtht), the derivative of the tax
function evaluated at earnings level wtht (or, in other words,
the tax on a marginal dollar of earnings).
(2’)
(3’)
(4’)
Figure 7.1 The Piecewise Linear Budget Constraint
Created by Progressive Taxation
Income
1)
w(1 – τ 2)
Segment (or Tax Bracket) 
#2
Segment (or Tax Bracket) 
#1
V
H=0H2Hmax
N(1 – τ1)
w(τ2 – τ1)H2
w(1 – τ 
Another approach becomes apparent if we assume that
Xit = Zit, but then substitute (28) into (29) to obtain what
economists call a ‘reduced form’ equation:
Here I have written β*Xit = elnSit(Xit) + βT(Xit) to subsume
all of the common skill and taste shifting variables into one
term. We see from (30) that one approach to identify the
Marshallian elasticity e in the supply equation is to exploit
exogenous variation in the skill rental price pt and/or in tax
rates τt.
As I already alluded to under Problem One, prices of
raw materials such as oil, iron ore or bauxite could plausibly
serve as ‘demand side instruments’ that shift the rental
price of skill but are unrelated to tastes for work. Also, as I
discussed under Problem Two, it may well be inappropriate
to treat the actual marginal tax rates that people face as
exogenous (as these are determined by labour supply
decisions which alter tax brackets). But the tax rules that
people face may (perhaps) be plausibly be treated as
exogenous. Thus, one might think about estimating an
equation like (29) using raw material prices and/or tax rules
as instruments for after-tax wages.
All of the issues I have discussed here potentially apply
to non-labour income as well. As with wages, one possible
approach is to instrument for non-labour income using the
rules that determine transfer benefits. This approach is
taken in Bernal and Keane (2009).
Problem Four
The fourth main problem involved in estimation of (25) is
that wages are not observed for people who choose not to
work. This tends to be more of a problem when studying
labour supply of married women (who have a fairly high rate
of non-participation) versus other groups like men or single
women. The reason non-participation creates a problem
can be explained as follows. Assume that, other things
being equal, the probability of working increases as the
wage rate increases. Then, the people we see working
despite relatively low wages will be those with relatively
high tastes for work (i.e. large values of the error term εit).
Suppose we try to estimate (25) using only the population
of workers with observed wages—the negative correlation
between wage rates and tastes for work amongst the
population of workers will cause us to underestimate the
positive impact of wages on labour supply.
In econometrics this is known as the ‘selection bias’
problem, as we must estimate (25) using only the people
who select to be employed, not the whole population.
Pioneering work by Heckman (1974) began a large
literature on methods to deal with the selection problem.
Unfortunately, there is no solution that does not involve
making strong assumptions about how people select into
employment. This means that empirical results based on
these methods are necessarily subject to some controversy.
In the literature on male labour supply it has been
common to ignore the selection problem on the grounds
that a very large majority of adult non-retired men do
(30)
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participate in the labour market, so the selection problem
can safely be ignored. Whether this is actually true is unclear,
but this is the approach of almost every paper I will review.
Problem Five
The fifth main problem concerns the interpretation of the
non-labour income variable. In the static labour supply
model, one’s current non-labour income is treated as a
measure of one’s wealth. But much of non-labour income is
asset income, which is the consequence of a person’s
decisions about consumption and savings over the life-cycle.
We expect assets to follow an inverted U-shaped path over
the life-cycle: low when people are young and have low
incomes (need to borrow to buy houses, etc.), high in the
middle of the life-cycle as people build up assets for
retirement, and then declining in retirement. This means that
a person’s asset level at a particular point in time is not a
good indicator of their actual wealth. For example, a 35 year
old with a high level of skills who has just gone rather heavily
in debt in order to buy a house may in reality be wealthier (in
a life-cycle sense) than a 60 year old who has positive savings
but at a level that is inadequate to fund retirement. The
income effect creates a greater inducement to supply labour
for the latter than the former, despite the fact that the latter
person has a higher level of current assets.
This brings us back to consideration of the dynamic (or
life-cycle) model. Let’s return to equation (22) and write it
in a slightly modified form:
We see that to obtain an estimate of the Frisch elasticity
(1/γ) we essentially need to regress changes in log hours on
changes in log after-tax wages, while also including
controls for interest rates and the discount rate. To put this
theoretical equation into a form that is amenable for
econometric estimation we’ll need to make several
changes. Obviously, we need person (i) and time (t)
subscripts on the hours, wage and interest rate variables.
And we will again need to account for taste shocks as in
(26). This can be done by letting the taste shift variable 
βit be given by βit = exp(Xitα + εit), where the X is observed
taste shifters and the ε is unobserved taste shifters.
Furthermore, (22’) assumes that the change in the after-
tax wage from period t = 1 to t = 2 is fully anticipated by
the worker. In fact, there may well be a surprise component 
to the wage change from t – 1 to t. In the life-cycle model
a surprise wage change has a different effect than an
expected wage change. A surprise wage increase would
make a person feel wealthier, and thus it has a negative
income effect. I’ll denote this surprise wealth effect by ζit.
An expected wage change does not make the person feel
wealthier (after all, it is what he/she expected already) and
so it has no income effect, only a substitution effect.
Given these changes, we can rewrite (22’) as:
(22’)
(31)
Many of the papers on life-cycle labour supply that I will
discuss estimate versions of (31).
Earlier I noted that tastes for work may plausibly include
an individual fixed effect that is constant over time (i.e. some
people are just more hard working than others). So in
equation (26) we wrote εit = μi + ηit, where μi is this individual
effect. One useful aspect of differencing the data as in (31) is
that it causes μi to drop out, avoiding the endogeneity
problems that its presence would otherwise cause. Thus, the
change in εit from t – 1 to t may be interpreted as capturing
only ‘idiosyncratic’ shocks to tastes for work (e.g. person i
may have been sick in a particular period). The Xit in (31) is
typically specified to include various observable control
variables that might shift tastes for work, such as age,
number and ages of children, marital status, and so on.
A few important econometric issues arise in the
estimation of (31). Most importantly, the change in the (log
of) the after-tax wage from t – 1 to t is correlated with the
error component ζit. This is essentially by construction: ζit
arises due to the surprise part of the change in the wage, and
that must be correlated with the wage change itself.
Typically, an instrumental variable procedure is used to deal
with this problem (see MaCurdy 1981). In the life-cycle
model with saving (but no human capital accumulation) valid
instruments for estimation of (31) would be variables that
people use to predict wage growth. As long as a variable 
Xt–1 is used to predict the growth in the after-tax wage rate
from t – 1 to t it should be uncorrelated with ζit, as the latter
derives from errors in forecasting wage growth.15
Good examples of variables that predict wage growth
are age and education. This is because wages over the life-
cycle follow a well-defined hump shape—tending to grow
quickly when people are young, levelling off in middle age
and actually declining in real terms for older workers. Also,
the shape of the hump varies with education; the peak of
the ‘hump’ comes at a later age for the more educated. To
capture these patterns, one might use age, age squared,
education and an interaction between age and education
as instruments for (i.e. predictors of) wage growth.
To gain intuition for how such a procedure works, it is
useful to note that an instrumental variables estimator is
typically implemented in a two-stage procedure known as
two-stage least squares (2SLS). In the first stage, one
regresses the endogenous variable (in this case, wage
growth) on the instruments (in this case, the functions of
age and education). From this regression one obtains a
predicted path of wage growth based on age and
education. In the second stage one regresses hours growth
on predicted wage growth. Thus, the estimated coefficient
on predicted wage growth captures how hours respond to
predictable variations of wages in the life-cycle—that is, the
extent to which people substitute their time inter-
temporally and allocate more work hours to those periods
when wages are relatively high. This is exactly the Frisch
elasticity concept.
Unfortunately, as we will see below, the typical
instruments used to predict wage growth (i.e. age and
education) actually predict it quite poorly. As a result, the
Frisch elasticity has proven difficult to estimate with any
precision. Furthermore, I will show in section 7.3.4 that
standard IV procedures generate seriously downward
biased estimates of the Frisch elasticity if wages rise with
work experience.
Problem Six
A sixth major problem in estimation of labour supply
elasticities is measurement error in wages and non-labour
income. There is a broad consensus that wages are
measured with considerable error in available micro data
sets. As is well known, classical measurement error will
cause OLS estimates of the coefficient on the wage variable
to be biased towards zero, thus leading to underestimates
of labour supply elasticities. Furthermore, the measurement
error may not be classical. In many data sets, such as the US
census, wage rates are constructed by dividing annual
earnings by annual hours. Suppose that hours are
measured with error—we then have an equation with the
error-ridden hours variable as the dependent variable and a
constructed wage measure, with the error-ridden hours
variable in the denominator, as the independent variable.
This creates what is known as ‘denominator bias’; the
measurement error induces negative correlation between
the hours measure and the constructed wage measure.
Then, not only will the wage coefficient be biased towards
zero, it may be biased in a negative direction. This may in
part account for the negative wage coefficient found by
Pencavel (1986, p. 23).
Measurement error creates more severe bias when
estimating an equation in differences, such as (31), than
when estimating equations in levels, such as (25) or (27).
This is because if a variable is measured with error then
taking the change in the variable over time compounds the
error. Again, there are two basic approaches to this
problem. One is a ‘structural’ approach where one models
the measurement error process (see Keane & Wolpin 2001;
Imai & Keane 2004). The second is to instrument for the
change in after-tax wages using variables that are
correlated with the true wage change but presumably
uncorrelated with the measurement error. Notice that in
discussing estimation of (25), (27) and (31) I have already
indicated that instrumental variables procedures may be
necessary to deal with endogeneity problems. Thus, use of
instrumental variables may serve the dual role of dealing
with endogeneity and measurement error.
It is likely that error in measuring non-labour income is
even more severe than that in measuring wages. As we’ll
see below, popular econometric methods to model labour
supply in the presence of taxes require modelling the details
of workers’ budget constraints. Yet knowing the actual
budget constraint that workers face given modern tax
systems is quite difficult. One of the most difficult problems
arises because taxes apply to taxable income, and the typical
tax system offers an array of deductions. In commonly used
data sets it is difficult, if not impossible, to know which
15 This idea of using variables that economic agents use to make forecasts as instruments in dynamic models originated in work by McCallum (1976) and
Sargent (1978). 
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deductions a worker is eligible for and/or actually takes, so
deductions must often be imputed. A related problem is the
difficulty in measuring fixed costs of work, which are
especially important for modelling participation decisions.
7.3.2 Summary of Estimation Results—Static
Labour Supply Models
As should be clear from the previous section, there are
many econometric problems one must face when
estimating labour supply elasticities. And there are many
alternative approaches to dealing with these problems.
Unfortunately, no consensus has emerged in the economics
profession on a ‘correct’ approach. Indeed, the controversy
between advocates of alternative approaches has often
been rather intense. The major surveys of the labour supply
literature that I cited earlier have tended to break down
results both by demographic group and/or by the
econometric methods/models employed. In this chapter I’ll
focus on labour supply of men, and consider in turn the
results from static models, life-cycle models with savings,
and life-cycle models with both savings and human capital
Pencavel’s (1986) classic survey of male labour supply
emphasises that the income effect given in equation (13),
which I repeat here for convenience:
could also be called the ‘marginal propensity to earn’ or
mpe. This is because it indicates how a dollar increase in
non-labour income N would shift earnings wh. He notes
that, in the static model, this quantity could also be
calculated from consumption data. In fact Deaton (1982)
did this, using the British Family Expenditure Survey of
1973, and obtained an estimate of ie near zero. (This
means consumption increases nearly one-for-one with an
increase in non-labour income, while wh hardly declines at
all.) Based on this result, Pencavel (1986) concludes that
estimates of the income effect that differ much from zero
are suspect. He goes on to largely discount the results of
several studies that obtain fairly large estimates of the
income effect, such as Wales and Woodland (1979) and
Hausman (1981).
While Pencavel’s survey is generally excellent, I think this
conclusion goes too far. The Deaton (1982) result is hard to
interpret as a causal effect of non-labour income on
consumption, given that non-labour income is likely to be
endogenous in a consumption equation. And in a life-
cycle model, a high level of non-labour income may simply
indicate a high level of permanent income, causing it to be
highly positively correlated with consumption.16 Furthermore,
there is substantial evidence that people mostly save the
proceeds from temporary tax rebates. As I indicated earlier,
introspection may suggest that very large effects of N on wh
(that is, values of ie very near –1) are implausible, but I would
not conclude based on Deaton (1982) that only effects near
zero are plausible.
Pencavel (1986) also largely discounts studies that use
estimation methods that impose restrictions from economic
theory a priori, such as the restriction that the Hicks elasticity
be positive or the income effect negative. I would again
disagree on this point. Any attempt to estimate labour
supply elasticities necessarily involves a long list of
assumptions, many of which I discussed in section 7.2.1.
These include: exogeneity assumptions (or exclusion
restrictions), functional form assumptions, issues of how
variables are measured and what is assumed about
measurement error, how missing wages of non-workers are
handled, assumptions about expectations (i.e. are people
forward looking or not?), assumptions about how wages
are determined, and so on. It is not clear to me why it is
more or less defensible to assume the restrictions that derive
from the basic economic theory of consumer behaviour than
it is to make these other types of assumptions.17
An important point stressed by Pencavel (1986) is that,
in work that takes the approach of first specifying a utility
function (as opposed to first specifying a labour supply
function), one should be aware of what restrictions the
utility function imposes on elasticities. For example, utility
functions in the constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
family have often been used:
Here L is the maximum hours of work in a period and (L – hit)
is leisure time. The parameter ρ governs the elasticity of
substitution between consumption and leisure, which is
1/(1 – ρ). Note that as ρ ↑ 1 the elasticity of substitution
approaches infinity (perfect substitutes). B is just the CES
share parameter. Now, given this utility function, it can be
shown that if N ≈ 0 we have:
Notice that the single parameter ρ governs the Marshallian
and Hicks elasticities and the income effect (or mpe). To see
clearly how this is restrictive, let’s think of a period as a day,
and assume L = 16. Let’s consider a person working 8 hours
per day. For such a person, ie must equal –0.5. The model
has no flexibility to make it more or less. This, in turn, means
that if I told you e, you could back out both eH and ie.
Imposing a particular value on the income effect (as
opposed to simply imposing the theoretical restriction that it
be negative) does appear to be an unwise modelling choice.
Contrast this situation to that for the functional form I
gave in equation (2), which leads to:
(33)
(32)
(13)
16 Note that a one-for-one increase in consumption, if interpreted causally, is wildly at variance with the life-cycle model. In a dynamic model, only
unanticipated changes in non-labour income would alter consumption, as an anticipated change would not make a person feel wealthier. Furthermore,
even an unanticipated change would be smoothed out over the whole life-cycle, and therefore would have little effect in any one period. Only an
unanticipated change in non-labour income that is also expected to be highly persistent should have much impact on current consumption. 
17 I believe Pencavel’s point is that the restrictions of economic theory should be tested rather than imposed. But, given that the theory cannot be tested
without a wide range of auxiliary assumptions, I don’t feel this position is completely tenable. Furthermore, assumptions about exogeneity are theoretical
restrictions as well.
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This is clearly more flexible, as it allows these three
quantities to be governed by two parameters (γ and η). The
income effect ie can take on a range of values, and
knowledge of e alone would not pin down eH.
Pencavel (1986) notes that the first labour supply
function estimation using individual (as opposed to
aggregate) level data was by Kosters (1969). He looked at
employed married men aged 50–64 in the 1960 US census.
Estimating an equation with log hours as the dependent
variable, and logs of wages and non-labour income as
independent variables (along with various control variables)
he obtained an estimate of the Marshallian elasticity of
–0.09 (i.e. backward bending labour supply) and a small
(negative) income effect (–0.14). However, this early study
ignored endogeneity, taxes, and essentially all the key
problems listed in section 7.2.1. As Pencavel (1986)
discusses, a number of subsequent studies attempted to
instrument for the wage to deal with measurement error.
But these studies generally continued to obtain small
negative Marshallian elasticities. For instance, Ashenfelter
and Heckman (1973) obtained e = –0.156 and ie = –0.27.
This study continued to ignore taxes.
The first studies to consider effects of after-tax wages
and non-labour income on labour supply were Boskin
(1973) and Hall (1973). But these studies did not deal with
the endogeneity of after-tax wages created by the
progressive tax system, which I discussed in section 7.2.1.
Also, they did not model the tax system exactly, but instead
treated people as if they were choosing labour supply
subject to a linear approximation to the piecewise linear
budget line created by progressive taxes. Boskin (1973)
estimated a Marshallian elasticity of –0.29, an income
effect of –0.41, and a Hicks elasticity of 0.12. As I’ll discuss
in more detail below, Hall (1973) presents his results in a
rather complicated form. But my interpretation is that they
imply backward bending labour supply but a Hicks elasticity
of at least 0.40.
The first study to model the full complexity of the
budget constraint created by progressive taxation, and
model men as choosing labour supply subject to this
constraint, was Wales and Woodland (1979). To achieve
this, however, they assume that wages and non-labour
income are measured without error. Their estimates,
obtained using married men from the PSID, were quite
different from the earlier literature. They estimated a
Marshallian elasticity of 0.14 (finally positive!), a large
income effect of –0.70, and a Hicks elasticity of 0.84.
Adopting a similar approach, Hausman (1981) also used
married men in PSID and obtained a Marshallian elasticity
of close to zero and an income effect of –0.77.
An important point, stressed by Hausman (1981), is
that, even with a small (or zero) Marshallian elasticity, large
Hicks elasticities of the type estimated by Wales and
Woodland (1979), Hall (1973) and Hausman (1981) imply
large negative labour supply effects of progressive taxation
for people in the upper brackets, as well as large welfare
losses.18 To understand why it is the Hicks elasticity that
matters, consider Figure 7.1, which shows a progressive tax
system with just two brackets. A person in bracket #1 has
an after-tax wage rate of w(1 – τ1), which of course is also
the slope of segment #1. At H = 0 segment #1 has a height
of N(1 – τ1), which is the person’s after-tax non-labour income.
Now, suppose the person increases his/her hours above
level H2, so that he/she earns enough to be in tax bracket
#2—suddenly the person has a flatter budget constraint
with a slope of only w(1 – τ2). Notably, if we project this
budget line all the way over to H = 0, we arrive at point V.
Point V plays an important role in the subsequent analysis
which is explained below.
Consider the hypothetical linear budget constraint that
starts from V and has slope w(1 – τ2). Provided preferences
have the standard concave shape (as is guaranteed by
diminishing marginal utility of consumption and leisure),
then any person who would choose to locate on segment
#2 given the actual non-linear budget constraint in Figure
7.1 will make the same choice if he/she were presented
with the hypothetical linear constraint that originates at
point V. Thus, the quantity V is known as ‘virtual’ non-labour
income for a person on segment #2, because such a person
acts as if Vwere his/her level of (after-tax) non-labour income.
Now consider what happens when a person moves
from segment #1 up to segment #2. Not only does his/her
after-tax wage rate fall from w(1 – τ1) to w(1 – τ2), but the
person also shifts to a linear budget constraint with income
V at H = 0. How does V compare to the actual level of after-
tax income N(1 – τ1) that is obtained if H = 0? Some simple
geometry shows that it exceeds this level by the amount
wH2(τ2 – τ1). That is, segment #1 and segment #2 have the
same height at h = H2. But their slopes differ by w(1 – τ2)–
w(1 – τ1) = w(τ2 – τ1). As we run from h = H2 to h = 0, the
height of the two segments must diverge by the run
multiplied by the difference in the slopes, or H2·w(τ2 – τ1).
Thus, we see that V = wH2(τ2 – τ1) + N(1 – τ2).
Thus, moving from segment #1 to segment #2 has a
‘double whammy’ effect on labour supply. Not only does a
worker face a lower marginal wage rate but, in addition,
the amount of the ‘virtual’ level of non-labour income that
is relevant for his/her decision-making has increased by
wH2(τ2 – τ1). This is precisely Hausman’s point: even if the
Marshallian elasticity is close to zero, there can be a large
negative effect of the progressive tax on labour supply if the
income effect is large. Of course, since we are talking about
a case where the Marshallian elasticity is small, this is
equivalent to saying there can be a large negative effect if
the Hicks elasticity is large.
Following MaCurdy (1992), we can formalise this as
follows. First, suppose the tax rate on segment #2 is
increased from τ2 to (τ2 + Δ). This causes the after-tax wage
rate to fall by Δw and virtual non-labour income to increase
by ΔwH2. Now, to keep things simple, let’s assume a simple
(34)
18 In fact, Hausman (1981) found that the welfare loss from progressive taxation was 22 per cent of tax revenues. He found that a shift to a flat rate tax would
reduce this to 7 per cent.
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linear labour supply function (which is in fact one of the
most common specifications in this literature):
where the notation τ2 and V2 denote the tax rate and virtual
income on segment #2, respectively. Plugging in the new
values for the tax rate and virtual income we get:
Thus, we have that h’  – h = –βwwΔ + βIwΔH2 = –(Δw)(βw – H2βI).
The first term here is the change in the after-tax wage, and
the second term is precisely the definition of the
substitution effect from equation (9), evaluated at the hours
level H2.19 Thus, we see that, to a good approximation, it is
the Hicks elasticity that determines the labour supply
response of taxpayers in the higher brackets. Given their
findings of substantial Hicks elasticities, Hall and Hausman
became strong advocates for a flat rate tax.
In the previous sections I have discussed only literature
based on US data. As Pencavel (1986) notes, the literature
based on British data took a somewhat different tack for two
reasons. First, it has always focused on the effect of taxation,
so that wages and non-labour income are always treated as
after-tax. Second, it has been largely based on the Family
Expenditure Survey, which contains both labour supply and
consumption data. Thus, it has generally estimated equations
for labour supply and consumption jointly. This is not
surprising as once one specifies a utility function defined over
both leisure (or hours) and consumption, as in (1) or (32),
along with a budget constraint, it is, of course, possible to
derive not only labour supply functions but also consumer
demand functions. The results from the eight British studies
Pencavel cites all find small negative Marshallian elasticitics
(with a mean of –0.16), income effects in the range of –0.04
to –0.50 (with a mean of –0.29), and Hicks elasticities
ranging from 0.30 to slightly less than zero, with an average
of 0.13.
A good deal of work on labour supply was stimulated
by the negative income tax (NIT) experiments that were
conducted in several US cities beginning in 1968. The NIT
experiments were intended to have treatment and control
groups. Members of the treatment groups received a grant
level G which was taxed away, at a fairly high rate, as they
earned income. Thus, G would serve as the guaranteed
minimum income for a person with no labour earnings or
non-labour income. At a certain level of income a person
reaches the ‘break-even point’ where G has been totally
taxed away. Beyond that, they revert to the conventional
income tax rate, which is typically less than the benefit tax
rate. This creates a non-convex budget constraint, because
tax rates fall as income rises.
Figure 7.2 illustrates the shape of a typical non-convex
budget constraint created by an NIT or other types of
welfare programs. The budget constraints connects points
a, b, c, and e. The figure has been drawn so a person who
works zero hours receives G. If they begin to work their
income actually drops (from a to b), due to fixed costs of
working, represented by FC. I have drawn an example
(35)
(35’)
19 Note that in the linear specification βw = ∂h/∂w is the uncompensated wage effect and h·βI = h·∂h/∂N is the income effect.
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Figure 7.2 The Non-Convex Budget Constraint
Created by NIT or AFDC Types of Programs
Notes: The budget constraint created by the program goes through points a,
b, c, e. It is generated by the program grant level (G), the fixed cost of working
(FC) and the program tax rate, which render the constraint non-convex. The
line straight through the origin is the after-tax wage line that would be the
budget constraint in the hypothetical situation of a flat rate tax. The dotted line
shows the shift in the budget constraint when the program tax rate on
earnings is reduced to 50 per cent.
Income
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where, as the person works more hours, his or her grant
money is taxed away at a 100 per cent rate as earnings
increase. This is represented by the flat dashed line from
point b to point c. The tax rate in the NIT program was only
40 per cent or 60 per cent, but it has not been uncommon
for other types of welfare programs that generate non-
convex budget constraints to generate tax rates as high as
100 per cent. A good example is the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program in the United States.
Finally, point c is the break-even point. Above that the person
is off the program and faces the regular income tax schedule.
Unfortunately, people in the NIT experiments were not
actually assigned randomly to the ‘treatment’ and ‘control’
groups, and there is a substantial literature on why this was
the case. Nevertheless, the NIT experiments generated
useful variation in budget constraints across workers that
can be used to help estimate labour supply elasticities.
A very well-known analysis of the NIT experiments by
Burtless and Hausman (1978), takes an approach similar to
the Wales and Woodland (1979) and Hausman (1981)
studies mentioned earlier. That is, the authors model the
complexity of the non-linear budget constraint created by
the NIT program, and model males as choosing labour
supply subject to this constraint (including the choice of
which segment to locate on). The difference here is that,
while the previously mentioned studies dealt with the
convex budget constraint created by progressive taxation
(i.e. taxes rising as income increases), the present study was
the first to deal with the non-convex budget constraint
created by the typical transfer program (i.e. tax rates falling
as income rises).
As Burtless and Hausman (1978) discuss, given a non-
convex budget constraint, if one wants to model the point
on the budget constraint that a person chooses, it is
necessary to specify the person’s utility function. This is
because each segment or point (like the non-working point
a in Figure 7.2) implies a different after-tax wage rate, a
different level of non-labour income, and a different
optimal hours choice. Thus, no single function exists that
maps ‘the wage’ and ‘the level of non-labour income’ into
optimal hours, as wages and non-labour income are
themselves functions of the hours choice.
Still, Burtless and Hausman (1978) argued that, since
we are more used to specifying hours equations directly
than specifying utility functions, it is more intuitive to
specify a familiar hours equation and work back (using
Roy’s identity) to the implied utility function. As an aside, I
suspect that many economists today would be more
accustomed to specifying utility functions than hours
equations. Regardless, Burtless and Hausman choose to use
a double log specification:
The parameter e in this equation would be the Marshallian
elasticity in the hypothetical case that the person faced a
linear budget constraint, but he does not. Thus the estimate
of e will not tell us how the person would respond to a
change in wage or tax rates. In a model of this type, that
would require simulating the person’s optimal behaviour
under the new regime.
The implications of this point are far reaching. In
particular, given piecewise linear budget constraints, utility
function parameters are no longer tightly linked with any
particular elasticity concept. Thus, labour supply could
appear to be ‘elastic’ or ‘inelastic’, depending on the type
of budget constraint shift one considers.20 This point is
illustrated in Figure 7.2. As I described above, the budget
constraint in the figure goes through points a, b, c, e. Now
consider the indifference curve, which is drawn in such a
way that utility is maximised at point a, where h = 0. I have
drawn the shape of the indifference curve so that the
Marshallian elasticity given a linear budget constraint
would be rather small. That is, the person would choose to
work close to 40 hours per week for a wide range of wage
rates. But, this elasticity tells us nothing about how the
person would respond to changes in the program tax rate
on earnings (sometimes called the benefit reduction rate).
The dotted line in the figure represents how the budget
constraint shifts if the tax rate on earnings is reduced from
100 per cent to 50 per cent. As we see, this has no effect
whatsoever on hours of work (i.e. the worker stays at zero).
In contrast, the figure is also drawn so that a small
increase in the worker’s actual market wage rate would
cause him/her to jump from zero to 40 hours of work per
week (by slightly raising point d). This is true whether the
program tax rate is 100 per cent or 50 per cent. Similarly,
reductions in the grant level or in the fixed costs of working
would have large effects.
Thus, given data that contained wide historical variation
in program tax rates (say between 50 per cent and 100 per
cent), a researcher studying a program like that described in
Figure 7.2 might well conclude labour supply elasticities are
small, so that it would be very difficult to induce members
of the target population to work. As a brief diversion into
the literature on labour supply of lone mothers, let me note
that historically this is roughly what happened with the
AFDC program in the United States. Years of tinkering with
the AFDC tax rate in an attempt to create work incentives
had little effect, leading to a conventional wisdom that
labour supply was ‘inelastic’ for single mothers.
Thus, most of the economics profession was taken
completely by surprise when a change in policy in the mid-
1990s, towards wage subsidies (EITC) and child-care
subsidies (CCDF), as well as a strong macroeconomy that
raised wage rates, led in a short period of time to very
dramatic labour supply increases for this group (see Fang &
Keane (2005) for a more detailed discussion). Notably,
however, in my work with Moffitt (Keane & Moffitt 1998)
and an earlier study (Keane 1995), we modelled the budget
constraint created by AFDC in great detail (along with the
Foodstamp program and fixed costs of work), and
suggested that, while substantial AFDC tax rate reductions
would have little effect, labour supply of single mothers
would be quite sensitive to wage subsidies, EITC and fixed
cost of work subsidies (or work bonuses). This illustrates the
value of a structural approach.21
Still, the labour supply literature has had a strong
tendency to report parameters like e in (36) as ‘the’
Marshallian elasticity obtained by the study in question. I
will generally follow this ingrained tradition, but the reader
should always keep this strong caveat in mind: when one
sees a typical labour survey that contains a list of
Marshallian and Hicks elasticities, one should recall that in
many cases these are statements about the shape of
workers’ utility functions, not about how they would
respond to particular tax changes.
That being said, I’ll note that Burtless and Hausman
obtained a ‘Marshallian elasticity’ of e ≈ 0 and an elasticity
of hours with respect to non-labour income of eI = –0.048.
As we see from (13), to obtain the income effect from the
income elasticity we need to multiply by wh/N. Given the
population under study, reasonable values (on a weekly
basis) would appear to be roughly w = $3.00, h = 35, N =
$70 so that wh/N = 105/70 = 1.5, giving a typical value of
ie ≈ –0.072.22 Burtless’ and Hausman’s overall conclusion
was that the income guarantee in the NIT experiments led 
(36)
20 This point was emphasised by all the authors who pioneered this literature. For instance, Blomquist (1983) states: ‘A change in the gross wage rate, non-
labour income, or parameters of the tax system changes the whole form of the budget set … the elasticities presented above should therefore not be
used to calculate [their] effects …’. 
21 As noted by Hausman (1980): ‘Structural econometric models which make labour force participation a function of…wages, income transfer levels and
the tax system can attempt to answer questions such as the effect of lowering the marginal tax rates on labour force participation. The more traditional
reduced form models which do not explicitly parameterise the tax system will be unable to answer such questions’.
22 The discussion in Burtless and Hausman (1978) does not go into much detail about characteristics of the sample. I choose h = 35 because they indicate
this was the mean of hours, and I choose N = $70 because their examples imply that that G was approximately $3,500 per year. w = $3.00 seems plausible
given the time and sample, which was very low income. Alternatively we could, for example, evaluate wh/N at the first kink point in the budget constraint
for control subjects, reported in the first row of Table 2. This gives (1.67)(43.16)/(27.8) = 2.6. Then we obtain a higher ie of (–0.048)(2.6) = –0.125. 
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to only modest reductions in labour supply (i.e. an hours
reduction of about 7.5 per cent).23
Pencavel (1986) summarises results from eight other
studies that also examined the NIT experiments. Again, the
estimates of the Marshallian elasticity are all small, but at
least here the mean is positive (0.03). Income effects range
from about 0.02 to –0.29 (mean –0.10). The Hicks elasticity
estimates are bunched fairly tightly around the mean of 0.13.
Next, I turn to Blomquist (1983), who used the
piecewise-linear method to study labour supply behaviour
in Sweden in 1973. The country had a highly progressive
tax structure at that time. Blomquist studied married men
who were of prime working age (i.e. 25–55 years old). His
estimates implied a Marshallian elasticity of 0.08 and an
income effect of ie = –0.03 at mean values in the data. The
implied Hicks elasticity is 0.11.
Blomquist (1983) stressed the key point that in non-
linear budget constraint models labour supply elasticities
cannot tell us how people will respond to changes in the
budget constraint. Hence, he went on to use his estimated
model to simulate the consequence of Sweden switching
from the highly progressive tax regime in place in 1973 to a
flat rate tax, a lump sum tax, and a no-tax regime. Under the
progressive income tax, the model predicts average annual
hours of work of 2,143 hours (close to the sample average).
The model predicts that complete elimination of taxes
would increase annual hours of work from 2,143 to 2,443.24
This is a 14 per cent increase. Blomquist also calculates that
a 34 per cent flat rate tax would raise the same revenue as
the progressive tax. Given a flat rate tax, average annual
hours would be 2,297 hours (a 7.2 per cent increase).
Comparing the proportional and no-tax worlds, we see
that a 34 per cent tax increase (wage reduction) leads to a
6 per cent reduction in hours. The implied Marshallian elasticity
is therefore roughly 6/34 = 0.18. This is quite a bit larger than
the Marshallian elasticity of 0.08 implied by the estimates at
the mean values of after-tax wages and hours in the data.25
This illustrates how elasticities calculated assuming linear
budget constraints can be quite misleading in a piecewise-
linear context. It may also indicate that mean values of
elasticities can be quite misleading with regard to population
responses in models with heterogeneous workers.26
The compensating variation is the lump sum payment
that would be needed to make a person in the progressive or
flat rate tax worlds as equally well off as a person in the no-
tax world. For the progressive tax, this is SEK16,417 while
for the flat tax it is SEK18,059. This compares to SEK16,103
in revenue per person raised (under either tax). One method
for calculating deadweight loss from the tax is to take the
amount by which the compensating variation exceeds 
the tax revenue, and divide by the tax revenue. This gives
(18,059 – 16,103)/16,103 = 12 per cent of revenue for the
progressive tax and 2 per cent of revenue for the flat rate
tax. Thus, at least for the progressive tax system, the implied
welfare losses are rather large. This is despite the quite
modest estimates of the Marshallian and Hicks elasticities at
the mean of the data (0.08 and 0.11 respectively).
At this point it is worth taking stock of the state of the
literature on male labour supply up until the early to mid-
1980s. I have discussed four papers that used sophisticated
econometric methods to model the structure of progressive
tax systems and the choice of hours of work subject to the
full complexity of those systems (thus dealing with the
endogeneity of wages created by progressive taxation).
These were: (i) Wales and Woodland (1979), who obtained a
Marshallian elasticity of 0.14, a large income effect of –0.70,
and a Hicks elasticity of 0.84, (ii) Hausman (1981) who
obtained a Marshallian elasticity of zero and an income effect
of –0.77, and so a Hicks elasticity of 0.77, (iii) Burtless and
Hausman (1978), who obtained a Marshallian elasticity of
zero and an income effect of about –0.07, and (iv) Blomquist
(1983), who obtained Marshallian and Hicks elasticities of
roughly 0.08 and 0.11, respectively. Notably, all these studies
obtained positive (although typically quite small) values for
the Marshallian elasticities and, even more importantly,
obtained Hicks elasticities that were positive and sometimes
quite large. In general, the work of these authors was taken
as evidence supporting the idea of a flat rate tax.
However, this conclusion, and the whole approach to
estimating models with piecewise-linear budget constraints
originated by Burtless and Hausman (1978) and Wales and
Woodland (1979), became the subject of considerable
controversy. This controversy is often referred to as the
‘Hausman-MaCurdy controversy’. In a very influential
paper, MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990) argued that the
Hausman approach to handling piecewise-linear tax models
was, in effect, biased towards finding large Hicks
elasticities. To see why, let’s use a linear specification as in
(35). For a person on segment #1 in Figure 7.1, the labour
supply equation is:
while, for a person located on segment #2, the labour supply
equation is: 
(37a)
(37b)
23 The Burtless and Hausman (1978) study has been criticised because the authors let the income elasticity eI be heterogeneous in the population, and a
large fraction of the estimates were bunched up near zero (see Heckman & MaCurdy 1981). The implication is that much of the mass would have been
on positive values for the income elasticity if this had been allowed in the estimation. But even so, it seems the main conclusion of small income effects
would not be altered. 
24 It is important to note that this is a partial equilibrium analysis. Such a massive increase in labour supply would presumably lead to a reduction of wages
in equilibrium. 
25 Of course, for such a large change, the direction in which we do the calculation matters. Going from the proportional tax world to the no-tax world,
hours increase 6.4 per cent while wages increase 52 per cent, so the implied elasticity is 6.4/52 = 0.12. This is still 50 per cent greater than Blomquist’s
calculation at mean values. 
26 It is also interesting to compare a no-tax world to lump sum tax world. Blomquist simulates that a SEK16,103 lump sum tax would increase hours from
2443 to 2506, an increase of 63 hours or 2.6 per cent. His estimated non-labour income coefficient of –0.0042 (per thousand) implies an increase in
hours of (0.0042)(16,103) = 0.068 thousand hours = 68 hours, which is quite close.
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Note that in (37b) I have simply replaced V2 in (35) by its
value V2 = N(1 – τ1) + w(τ2 – τ1)H2 which one can derive
from Figure 7.1. Now, the key point of this whole approach
is that the taste shock ε has to fall in a certain range in order
for a person to locate on one of the segments. The ε has to
be above a threshold such that desired hours are at least H2
in order for the person to locate on segment #2, and ε has
to be below some threshold in order for the person to
choose to locate on segment #1.27
Furthermore, there is an intermediate range of ε such
that a person will choose to locate precisely at the kink
point H2. This occurs if:
The first equation says that, given the hypothetical budget
line that extends segment #2 past h = H2 all the way down
to h = 0, the person would choose hours less than H2. The
second equation says that, given the hypothetical budget
line that extends segment #1 past h = H2 all the way up h =
Hmax, the person would choose hours greater than H2.
Given the actual two-segment constraint, this person’s best
choice is to locate precisely at the kink point H2.28
Now, rearranging (38) to express it as a range on ε, we
obtain:
I have adopted the notation U(ε) and L(ε) to denote the
upper and lower bounds on ε such that the person would
want to locate at the kink point. Now, obviously we must
have U(ε) > L(ε) in order for the probability of locating at
the kink point to be positive. Indeed, the opposite of would
imply the logical impossibility that the probability is
negative, implying an internal inconsistency within the
model. The condition that U(ε) > L(ε) can be written as:
which can be further simplified to:
or simply:
The left-hand side is simply the definition of the Hicks
compensated substitution effect from equation (9). Thus,
MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990) argued that the
Hausman approach to handling non-linear tax models
requires compensated substitution effects, and hence the
Hicks elasticity, to be positive in order to avoid generating
negative probabilities.
Notice that if βI > 0 (i.e. the income effect has the ‘wrong’
sign, implying that leisure is not a normal good) then (39) will
have to turn negative for large enough values of H2. Thus, if
confronted with a tax system with kinks at high levels of
income, this approach also requires for all practical purposes
that βI < 0.29 Indeed, papers such as Burtless and Hausman
(1978), Hausman (1981) and Blomquist (1983) restrict βI < 0
in estimation.30
To get an intuition for why (39) is necessary to induce
people to locate at kink points, suppose that βI > 0. Then,
for a person located at H2, the increase in virtual non-labour
income that would occur should he/she increase hours above
H2 would actually be an inducement to increase hours, not a
deterrent. Thus, the only thing that can keep the person
from increasing hours beyond H2 is if the uncompensated
wage effect is strong enough to outweigh the perversely
signed income effect (as the wage will drop if the person
moves above H2). But if the uncompensated wage effect is
strong enough to outweigh the (perverse) income effect it
means by definition that the Hicks elasticity is positive. 
Referring to the surveys of Pencavel (1986) and
Hausman (1985), MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990) note
that papers that used ‘simple’ empirical methods that did
not attempt to model the full complexity of the budget
constraint tended to obtain small Hicks elasticities, including
even perverse negative values. In contrast, the papers that
used the piecewise-linear budget constraint approach
advocated by Hausman tended to get large values for the
Hicks elasticity. MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990) argued
that the difference in results did not arise because the
Hausman type models did a better job of incorporating
taxes. Instead, they argued the difference arose simply
because the piecewise-linear budget constraint approach
imposed the restriction in (40) that the Hicks elasticity be
positive.31 This criticism was highly influential, leading many
  
(39)
(40)
(38’)
(38a)
(38b)
27 This dependence of the range of the errors on the observed segment is precisely why the errors do not satisfy standard OLS assumptions in models with
progressive taxation.
28 In other words, if a person with ε in the range given by (38) faced a flat tax at rate τ1 (i.e. if the tax rate didn’t increase from τ1 to τ2 at H2), then he/she
would want to work more hours than H2. However, given the reality that the tax rate does jump at H2, this person does not want to move up into segment
#2, and is content to locate precisely at H2.
29 Equation (39) says that the uncompensated wage effect (βw), times the drop in the wage in going from segment #1 to segment #2, must exceed the income
effect (βI) times the increase in virtual non-labour income in moving from segment #1 to segment #2. One would normally expect βI < 0, so that the second
term in (39) is positive, and the equation simply constrains how negative βw, the sign of which is theoretically ambiguous, can be. But if βI has the ‘wrong’
sign (i.e. βI > 0) then the second term is negative and increasing in H2. Then, it becomes very difficult to satisfy (39) for large values of H2.
30 These papers all adopt specifications where the income effect is randomly distributed in the population but the distribution is truncated at zero.
31 To quote MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990): ‘As documented in the surveys of Pencavel (1986) and Hausman (1985), empirical studies of men’s labour
supply based on econometric approaches incorporating piecewise-linear constraints produce results that…imply larger estimates of compensated
substitution responses that have the sign predicted by economic models of consumer choice, which is in contrast to much of the other empirical work on
labour supply. This finding of greater consistency with economic theory has been interpreted…as evidence confirming the merits of accounting for taxes
using the piecewise-linear approach. Contrary to this interpretation, this paper shows that the divergence in the estimates…follows directly from features
of the econometric models that implicitly restrict parameters… The simple estimation approaches impose no restrictions, but maximum likelihood
techniques incorporating piecewise-linear budget constraints require…the Slutsky condition to hold at various points in estimation’.
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to discount the large Hicks elasticities obtained in many of
the studies cited by Hausman (1985), and contributing to
the consensus that the Hicks elasticity is small.
While it is undeniable that the piecewise-linear budget
constraint approach requires the Hicks elasticity to be
positive in order to generate a sensible econometric model
(in the sense that probabilities are guaranteed to be
positive), it is not so obvious that this can explain the
difference in results between the piecewise-linear budget
constraint studies and those that use simpler linear
regression methods. There are two reasons for saying this.
First, a number of studies that use a piecewise-linear
budget constraint approach do nevertheless find Hicks
elasticities and income effects that are close to zero. And,
conversely, some papers using simpler econometric
approaches to handle taxes have found large Hicks
elasticites and/or large income effects.
To begin, consider what happened when MaCurdy,
Green and Paarsch (1990) applied the same approach as
Hausman to a sample of 1,017 prime age men from the
1975 PSID. Like Hausman (1981), they assume a linear
hours equation as in (35) with a random coefficient on non-
labour income. Strikingly, using the same econometric
approach as Hausman, MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch
obtained a wage coefficient of essentially zero and a (mean)
income coefficient of –0.0071 (see their Table 2, first column).
The latter implies an income effect of roughly w·(∂h/∂N) =
(4.4)(–0.0071) = –0.031 and hence a Hicks elasticity of roughly
0.031 at the mean of the data. Thus we have an example
where the Hausman approach does yield a very small Hicks
elasticity. And there have been other applications of the
piecewise-linear budget constraint approach that also
obtain small Hicks elasticities and small income effects. A
good example is Triest (1990) who applies methods very
similar to Hausman (1981) to study 978 married men aged
25–55 in the 1983 PSID. He obtains an income elasticity of
essentially zero and Marshallian and Hicks elasticities of
roughly 0.05. And recall that the Blomquist (1983) study
that I discussed earlier obtained a Hicks elasticity of roughly
0.11 and an income effect of –0.03, which can hardly be
called large.
Turning to the simpler approach of assuming a smooth
approximation to the kinked budget constraint, MaCurdy,
Green and Paarsch (1990) note that this approach also
constrains the Hicks elasticity, except now the constraint is a
bit weaker: instead of requiring it to be positive, it requires
that it can’t be ‘too negative’. But I don’t see this situation
as fundamentally different. As the smooth approximation to
the budget constraint is made more accurate, the bound on
the Hicks elasticity gets tighter, converging to a lower bound
of zero as the approximation approaches the true constraint.
When MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990, p. 458) apply
this approach, they conclude that ‘there is no perceptible
difference in the estimates obtained assuming differentiable
and piecewise-linear tax functions’. 
As for papers that use simpler methods but still obtain
a large Hicks elasticity and/or a large income effect, a prime
example is, in fact, the classic paper by Hall (1973) that
initiated this line of research. He used the simple method of
linearising the budget constraint around the observed
wage/hours combination (as in Figure 7.1), but he did not
model the choice of segment. But, like Hausman, he
obtained large income effects and fairly large estimates of
the Hicks elasticity. Pencavel (1986) excluded Hall’s paper
from his summary because ‘many different estimates are
presented and I gave up the attempt to summarise them
adequately with a few numbers’. However, Hall’s Figures
3.5 and 3.6 appear to provide a concise summary of the
results. Hall’s sample consisted of all men and women from
the 1967 US Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO), which
is an augmented version of the CPS, to include better wage
and hours measures and an over-sample of the low income
population. As I understand it, Figures 3.5 and 3.6 present
labour supply curves averaged across the various
demographic groups. Figure 3.6 shows backward bending
labour supply above an after-tax wage rate of about $2.00
per hour. But Figure 3.5 shows a Hicks elasticity evaluated
at 2,000 hours of approximately 0.45.32
Given these results, I don’t think that the use of piece-
wise linear budget constraint methods versus simpler
methods can explain the large divergence in results across
the studies I’ve discussed. It is particularly puzzling that
Wales and Woodland (1979), Hausman (1981), MaCurdy,
Green and Paarsch (1990) and Triest (1990) all applied
Hausman-like approaches to PSID data on married men
from the PSID, using data from nearby (and sometimes
identical) waves, and yet the former two studies obtained
very large Hicks elasticities and income effects while the
latter two studies obtained negligible values for each.
Indeed, the latter two papers clearly make note of the fact
that this is puzzling.
The excellent replication study by Eklöf and Sacklén
(2000) sheds a great deal of light on the reasons for the
divergence in results between Hausman (1981) and
MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990). Both papers study
married men aged 25–55 in the 1976 wave of the PSID.
The MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch sample size is a bit
smaller (1,018 vs 1,084), because they apply slightly more
stringent selection criteria33, but Eklöf and Sacklén (2000)
show this is not a main reason for differences in results.
Rather, the difference appears to arise because the two
studies adopt very different definitions of the wage and
non-labour income variables.
A key point about the PSID is that it contains questions
both about the interview week (e.g. what is your current
wage rate?) and about the prior year (e.g. what were your
annual earnings and annual hours during the past year?).
This is a common feature of panel data sets. Hausman
(1981) uses the current wage question as his measure of
the wage rate, while MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990)
32 I’m able to estimate this figure because the graph that Hall (1973) presents of the compensated labour supply function in Figure 3.5 is rather flat over a
very wide range. This is not true of the uncompensated graph. 
33 The main difference arises because Hausman (1981) requires that workers not be self-employed at the time of the 1976 interview, while MaCurdy, Green
and Paarsch (1990) require they not be self-employed in both 1975 and 1976. This costs 55 people. 
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use the ratio of annual earnings to annual hours. Both of
these wage measures have problems.
Hausman’s current wage measure is missing for 87
workers and for 4 workers who were not employed in the
survey week, and it is top coded at $9.99 per hour for 149
workers. Hausman imputes these missing wage observations
for 240/1084 = 22 per cent of the sample using a regression
method. In addition, even an accurately measured current
wage is presumably a noisy measure of the wage rate that is
relevant for the prior year.
MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch’s ratio wage measure
suffers from the denominator bias problem discussed in
section 7.3.1. That is, if observed hours are equal to h* = h
+ ε, where h is true hours and ε is measurement error, and
we construct the wage as w* = E/(h + ε), where E* is
measured earnings, then the measurement error in hours
tends to induce a negative covariance between h* and w*.34
As discussed earlier, this denominator bias has the potential
to drive the wage coefficient negative.
In addition, Hausman (1981) and MaCurdy, Green and
Paarsch (1990) take radically different approaches to
measuring non-labour income. Hausman simply imputes an
8 per cent return to equity in owner-occupied housing (this
is the only financial asset measured in the PSID). In contrast
to this very narrow measure, MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch
(1990) construct a very broad measure by taking total
household income minus total labour earnings of the
husband. The broad measure has the problem that it
includes the wife’s income, which may be endogenous. That
is, the husband’s decision on how much to work may affect
the wife’s labour supply. In contrast, Hausman’s narrow
measure simply leaves out many types of non-labour
income. Not surprisingly, the sample mean of MaCurdy,
Green and Paarsch’s non-labour income measure is roughly
three times greater than that of Hausman’s. Neither measure
includes imputed flows of services from durables.
Finally, Hausman (1981), and MaCurdy, Green and
Paarsch (1990), use different hours measures. The latter
study uses the answer to a direct question about hours of
work in 1975. Hausman (1981) uses questions about usual
hours per week and number of weeks worked in 1975. The
mean of the MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch hours measure is
2,236 while that of Hausman’s hours measure is 2,123.
Using the same data as MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch,
Eklöf and Sacklén (2000) are able to replicate their results
almost exactly. That is, the wage coefficient bumps up
against the non-negativity constraint and has to be pegged
at zero. And the mass of the random non-labour income
coefficient also piles up near zero. Then Eklöf and Sacklén
(2000) report results of an experiment where, either one by
one or in combination, they shift to Hausman’s wage
measure, non-labour income measure, sample selection
criteria and/or hours measure. A subset of the results is
reproduced in Table 7.3.
The first row of Table 7.3 presents the authors’ replication
of MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990). The only difference
is a slight change in the computation procedure that leads
to a small increase in the estimated income effect (from
about –0.037 to –0.068).35 The second row shows the
effect of adopting Hausman’s sample selection criteria. This
leads to a doubling of the income effect to –0.136. But the
wage coefficient remains pegged at zero.
In the third row, the authors switch to Hausman’s
narrower definition of non-labour income. This has a
dramatic effect on the results, with the income effect
jumping to –0.488. This result is actually rather
disconcerting. Given that each paper’s definition of non-
labour income is quite debatable, and that, as noted in
section 7.3.1, it is not at all obvious how one should define
non-labour income in a static model (given that in the real
world non-labour income evolves over the life-cycle as a
result of savings decisions), it seems unfortunate that results
are so sensitive to how non-labour income is defined.36
The fourth row shows the results using Hausman’s
wage measure. Strikingly, the wage coefficient now
converges to a positive value, implying a small but positive
34 Of course, if E* = (w + υ)(h + ε)/(h + ε) = (w + υ), where υ is a stochastic term independent of h*, then the denominator bias problem does not arise.
But this is a highly implausible special case. 
35 MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990) reported it was necessary to constrain the variance of the random income effect to obtain sensible estimates, but
Eklöf and Sacklén (2000) did not have this problem in the replication.
36 I was also puzzled as to why the authors maintained the peg of the wage coefficient at zero in this model. With an income effect as large as –0.488,
there is plenty of leeway for the Marshallian elasticity to go negative while maintaining a positive Hicks elasticity. 
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Table 7.3 Eklöf and Sacklén (2000) Analysis of Hausman vs MaCurdy-Green-Paarsch (M-G-P)
Non-labour Sample Coefficient on
Wage income selection Hours Non-labour Marshall Income Hicks
measure measure criteria measure Wage income elasticity effect elasticity
M-G-P M-G-P M-G-P M-G-P 0.0 –0.011 0.000 –0.068 0.068
M-G-P M-G-P Hausman M-G-P 0.0 –0.022 0.000 –0.136 0.136
M-G-P Hausman M-G-P M-G-P 0.0 –0.079 0.000 –0.488 0.488
Hausman M-G-P M-G-P M-G-P 10.3 –0.004 0.030 –0.025 0.055
Hausman Hausman M-G-P M-G-P 26.5 n.a. 0.078 n.a. n.a.
Hausman Hausman Hausman M-G-P 26.9 –0.036 0.078 –0.222 0.300
Hasuman Hausman Hausman Hausman 16.4 –0.036 0.048 –0.222 0.270
Hausman’s Reported Results 0.2 0.2 –0.120 0.000 –0.740 0.740
Notes: For the sake of comparability all elasticities and income effects are calculated using the mean wage of $6.18 and the mean hours of 2123 from
Hausman (1981). In the authors’ attempt to replicate Hausman’s data set the corresponding figures are 6.21 and 2148. The mean values of both hours and
wages are a bit higher in the MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch data set, but this makes little difference for the calculations. For the random non-labour income
coefficient, the table reports the median. n.a. denotes not available.
37 Recall that the income effect w·∂h/∂N in equation (10) can also be thought of as the derivative of earnings with respect to non-labour income ∂(wh)/∂N—
see equation (13)—and that Pencavel (1986) argued that the value obtained by Hausman (1981) was implausibly large based on the consumption literature.
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Marshallian elasticity of about 0.03. But the income effect
remains very small at –0.25, implying a Hicks elasticity of
only 0.055.
The fifth row shows the effect of simultaneously adopting
Hausman’s wage and non-labour income measures. This
causes the Marshallian elasticity to jump further to 0.078,
but unfortunately the authors do not report the income
coefficient for this case. The sixth row shows the effect of
simultaneously adopting Hausman’s wage and non-labour
income measures, and his sample selection criteria. The
Marshallian elasticity remains at 0.078 and now we see the
income effect is –0.222, giving a Hicks elasticity of 0.300.
The sixth row also adopts Hausman’s hours measure.
Having adopted all of Hausman’s variable definitions and
sample selection criteria, this is, in fact, the author’s attempt
to replicate Hausman (1981). The results have a similar
flavour to Hausman’s: the Marshallian elasticity is a modest
0.048 but the income effect is a solid –0.220, giving a fairly
large Hicks elasticity of 0.270.
Based on these results, the authors conclude it is not
the piecewise-linear budget constraint approach itself that
explains why Hausman (1981) obtained much larger values
for the Hicks elasticity and the income effect than did other
authors who adopted ‘simpler’ econometric approaches.
Instead, Eklöf and Sacklén (2000) argue that the key
differences were Hausman’s use of a direct wage measure
and his narrow definition of non-labour income. In
particular, the evidence suggests that measuring the wage
as annual earnings divided by annual hours does lead to a
severe denominator bias that tends to drive the wage
coefficient negative.
As further evidence of this assertion, they point to the
special issue on labour supply of the Journal of Human
Resources (1990). They note that in three studies where the
wage measure is the ratio of earnings to hours (Triest 1990;
MaCurdy, Green & Paarsch 1990; Colombino & del Boca
1990) the estimated Hicks elasticity is either negative or runs
up against the non-negativity constraint, while in the two
studies where a direct wage measure is used (Blomquist &
Hansson-Busewitz 1990; van Soest, Woittiez & Kapteyn
1990), as well as in the authors’ own version of MaCurdy,
Green and Paarsch (1990), the Hicks elasticity is positive.
Finally, the last two rows of Table 7.3 compare the
authors’ replication of Hausman (1981) with the results that
Hausman actually reports. As is clear, the authors are not
able to replicate Hausman very precisely. While Hausman
obtained a Marshallian elasticity close to zero, the authors
obtain 0.048. And while Hausman obtained a very large
income effect of –0.740, Eklöf and Sacklén (2000) obtain a
perhaps more plausible value of –0.222.37
How do we account for these substantial differences?
The authors note that they were unable to match Hausman’s
sample as accurately as they matched MaCurdy, Green and
Paarsch’s. They also note that the likelihood function was
quite flat in the vicinity of the optimum. In particular, they
found that a fairly wide range of different values for the
mean and variance of the random coefficient on non-labour
income produced similar likelihood values. Given this, they
speculate that fairly minor changes in the data set could
have produced a fairly large change in the estimates.
Recall that Hausman (1981) calculated that the
progressivity of the tax system led to a welfare loss equal to
22 per cent of tax revenues. As we have seen, this value is
driven largely by his large estimate of the Hicks elasticity.
Given that Eklöf and Sacklén (2000) obtain a mean Hicks
elasticity about a third as large as Hausman’s, one is
tempted to conclude that the implied welfare loss is about
a third as large as well. However, as these models assume a
distribution of income effects, and as Eklöf and Sacklén
(2000) obtain not only a lower mean but also a higher
variance, it is not at all clear what a simulation of their
model would imply about welfare effects. (It is unfortunate
that such a simulation is not available.)
At this point, it is worth taking a closer look at the 
work by Blomquist and Hansson-Busewitz (1990). They
study the labour supply of married men in Sweden using
1980 data from the Level of Living Survey. They restrict
attention to those aged 25–55 and have a sample size of
602. One innovation in this study is the use of an hours
equation that includes a quadratic in wages. They find that
this provides a significantly better fit than a linear
specification, although the difference has little impact on
the main results. The authors use a direct wage measure (as
does Hausman 1981) and a broad measure of non-labour
income (the same as MaCurdy 1981). Based on the results
in Eklöf and Sacklén (2000) we would predict this
combination to lead to a modest positive Marshallian
elasticity and a small income effect. It is somewhat
comforting that this is roughly what happens. Blomquist
and Hansson-Busewitz (1990) obtain Marshallian elasticities
of 0.12 to 0.13 in their preferred models, and income
effects of only about –0.005.
One nice feature of the Blomquist and Hansson-
Busewitz (1990) paper is that they plot both the ‘basic’ or
‘structural’ labour supply equation—that is, the equation
that would apply if people maximised utility subject to a
linear budget constraint (and the structural parameters of
the equation could be used to infer the underlying utility
function)—and the ‘mongrel’ or ‘reduced form’ wage
equation that gives desired hours as a function of wages,
non-labour income and the existing tax structure. This
reduced form hours equation will vary as the tax system
varies. Strikingly, even though the true labour supply curve
is linear with a positive Marshallian elasticity throughout,
the reduced form labour supply curve becomes backward
bending for wage rates above about SEK26 per hours. This
compares to an average gross wage rate of SEK41.75 and
an average marginal after-tax rate of only SEK14.83. Thus,
a reduced form analysis that fails to account for progressive
taxation could easily conclude that labour supply is
backward bending when, in fact, this is a feature induced
by the tax system, not by underlying preferences.
Finally, when Blomquist and Hansson-Busewitz (1990)
simulate the consequence of shifting to a flat rate tax
(which needs to be 37 per cent to generate equivalent
revenue) they find that the welfare loss from taxation falls
from 16 per cent to 5 per cent of revenue collected, while
annual hours of work increase from 2,099 to 2,238 (or 6.7
per cent). They also simulate a cut in the national tax rate
in the top several brackets by 5 percentage points, from a
range of 44–58 per cent to a range of 39–53 per cent. They
simulate that this would increase labour supply by 0.4 per
cent while actually increasing tax revenue by 0.6 per cent.
This implies that the upper bracket tax rates in Sweden in
1980 actually exceeded the revenue maximising rates (see
section 7.1, equation (3)).38
The paper by van Soest, Woittiez and Kapteyn (1990)
uses data from the Dutch Organization of Strategic Labour
Market Research (OSA) 1985 survey. This survey contains a
direct question about wages on a weekly or monthly basis
(which in the latter case is converted to weekly). Consistent
with the above conjectures, the authors obtain a Marshallian
elasticity of 0.19 and an income effect of –0.09 at the mean
of the data, and so have no problems with the non-
negativity constraint on the Hicks elasticity (0.28).39 In my
view, the more important aspect of this paper is that, as far
as I can discern, it was the first to use simulated data from
the model to actually examine model fit. A rather striking
failure of the labour supply literature (which it shares with
many other literatures in economics) is the lack of effort to
examine model fit. The authors find, perhaps not surprisingly,
that the simple linear labour supply function (like equation
(35)), combined with a piecewise-linear budget constraint,
does a very poor job of fitting the observed distribution of
hours. In particular, it is completely unable to generate the
substantial bunching of male hours at exactly 40 hours per
week (see their Figure 1).
The authors attempt to rectify this problem by
introducing a demand side constraint on possible hours
choices. Each worker is assumed to draw a set of hours
points at which he may locate, and the probability of each
point is estimated. Of course, offers of 40 hours are
estimated to be much more likely than offers of lower
hours levels. So this model does fit the spike in hours at 40
(as well as the distribution over other points) quite well.
What seems unsatisfactory about this procedure is that the
model contains no rationale for why offers of lower levels
of hours are uncommon. One explanation would be start-
up costs at work, so that productivity rises with hours but
starts to decline somewhere after 40. An alternative supply
side story for why low levels of hours are uncommon would
be fixed costs of work. 
Returning to our main theme, Eklöf and Sacklén (2000)
found that the major differences in results between Hausman
(1981) and MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990), as well as
between several other studies in the Journal of Human
Resources (1990) special issue on labour supply40, could be
explained by differences in the definitions of the wage rate
and non-labour income. Specifically, the use of a ratio wage
measure (i.e. annual earnings over annual hours), rather
than an hourly or weekly wage measure, led to much
smaller estimates of wage elasticities, presumably due to
denominator bias. And the use of more narrow definitions
of non-labour income lead to larger estimates of the
income effect. Given the problem of denominator bias, it
seems fairly clear that the use of ratio wage measures
should be avoided in favour of hourly measures.41 But the
best way to measure non-labour income is not at all clear.
In general, non-labour income may include many
components, such as interest income from assets, the
service flow from durables, government transfer payments,
transfers from relatives, and, in a household context,
spouse’s income (or some share thereof). Determining the
‘right’ measure of non-labour income in a static labour
supply model is difficult in part because the static model
does not provide a framework to even think about asset
income. Indeed, in a static model assets should not even
exist, as there is no motive for saving. This leads us to an
examination of life-cycle labour supply models with savings.
7.3.3 Life-Cycle Labour Supply Models with Savings
In dynamic models, workers make labour supply decisions
jointly with decisions about consumption/savings, and the
evolution of non-labour income becomes part of the
model. But as I’ll discuss below, estimation of such dynamic
models is difficult. Thus, some authors have sought to
develop an alternative approach that maintains the
simplicity of static models while producing estimates that
are still consistent with life-cycle behaviour.
In an important paper, MaCurdy (1983) developed a
scheme for estimating the parameters of a life-cycle labour
supply model using techniques no more complicated than
instrumental variables estimation. To see how his method
works, it is useful to return to the simple two-period model
of section 7.2.2. Begin by modifying (17) to include an
exogenous source of non-labour income Nt whose level is
independent of the person’s labour supply decisions (e.g. Nt
might represent a lump sum government transfer and/or
transfers from relatives):
Now we can modify equation (18), the first order condition
for optimal choice of hours in period t = 1, to obtain:
(17’)
38 Note that Sweden had an array of payroll, value-added and local taxes that brought the overall rates to well above the 58 per cent top bracket national
rate. In 1980, the upper limit for the sum of national and local taxes was set at 85 per cent.
39 The paper does not give information on the construction of the non-labour income variable, but in private correspondence the authors have told me that
they used a fairly narrow measure that consists only of child benefits (which do not depend on income) and capital income (which few households have). 
40 Specifically, these are Triest (1990), Colombino and del Boca (1990), Blomquist and Hansson-Busewitz (1990) and van Soest, Woittiez and Kapteyn (1990). 
41 This is not to say that an hourly wage measure is ideal. Its drawback is that we are typically modelling labour supply over a longer period, such as a year.
Indeed, this is presumably the reason that many studies chose to use annual wage measures (to better match the time period of the wage with that of
the observed labour supply behaviour).
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Recall that b is net borrowing (or net dissaving) in period 1,
which can be positive or negative. Thus, C1 = w1h1(1 – τ1) +
N1 + b is consumption in period 1. We can rewrite (18’) as:
Recognising that in a T period model an analogous optimality
condition will hold in every time period t = 1,...,T, we have:
It is also important to note that, while (17) and (17’)
assumed a flat rate tax, an optimality condition analogous
to (42) will also hold in a world with progressive taxation.
Then, τt is the marginal tax rate the person faces at time t,
for the tax bracket in which he/she sits at that time.42 Also,
the equation for consumption must be modified. This is
illustrated in Figure 7.3 for a system with two brackets.
Consider a person who chooses to locate on segment
#2, which means he/she chooses a level of hours ht > H2,
where H2 is the hours level that renders the person’s
earnings high enough that he/she enters tax bracket #2. The
consumption level for this person is:
where ‘virtual’ non-labour income Vt is given by:
MaCurdy (1983) noted these points, and also noted that
the optimality condition (42) contains only variables dated
at time t. Hence, despite the fact that we have a dynamic
(18’)
(41)
(42)
(43a)
(43b)
42 Condition (42) would fail to hold for a person who locates at a kink point. Thus, MaCurdy assumes the tax system is approximated by a smooth function,
ruling out kink points.
43 Obviously, hours are endogenous because a person who is hard working (i.e. has a low value of εit) will tend to work more hours, other things being
equal. The after-tax wage is endogenous because a person who is hard working will: (i) tend to have a high pre-tax wage because he/she puts in greater
effort, and (ii) tend to face a higher tax rate because he/she works enough hours to be pushed into a high bracket. And consumption is likely to be
endogenous because it is a function of the endogenous w and h.
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Figure 7.3 The Budget Constraint Created by
Progressive Taxation in the Presence of Saving
Consumption
H = 0H2Hmax
wt (1 τ1)
wt (1 – τ2) Vt
wt(τ2 – τ1)H2
Nt + bt
–
Segment (or Tax Bracket) 
#2
Segment (or Tax Bracket) 
#1
model with saving, the parameters γ and η that describe
preferences can be estimated from a single period of data,
provided we utilise not only data on hours and wages but
also data on consumption. MaCurdy proposed two
methods for doing this:
Method 1: Estimate (42) using two-stage least squares.
As MaCurdy notes, (42) must hold at a person’s optimal
hours choice, regardless of whether there is a progressive
income tax or a flat tax (provided the person is not at a kink
point). To put (42) in a form that can be estimated we need
to introduce a source of stochastic variation in hours and
consumption choices. Let the parameter β which shifts the
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption
and leisure, be given by:
Here Xit represents observed characteristics of person i that
shift his/her tastes for consumption versus leisure, and εit
represents unobserved taste shifters. Now, taking logs of
(42), and putting i subscripts on all variables to indicate
person-specific values, we get:
Note that (45) is not a typical labour supply equation (which
would have hours as the dependent variable). Rather, it is
simply a relationship among three endogenous variables—
the after-tax wage, hours and consumption—that must hold
if person i is making work/consumption choices as suggested
by economic theory. All three variables are endogenous
because they are correlated with the taste shocks εit. This
occurs for reasons we have already discussed.43 As a result, it
is really just a matter of convenience which endogenous
variable we call the ‘dependent’ variable.
Given the endogeneity of hours and consumption, we
should estimate (45) using instrumental variables. The
instruments must be correlated with wage, hours and
consumption but not correlated with the unobserved tastes
for work εit. Naturally, the choice of instruments tends to be
controversial in any such approach. Estimation of (45) gives
us the values of the structural parameters of preferences γ
and η, from which we could construct the Marshall, Hicks
and Frisch elasticities, as in equation (24).
Method 2: Estimate a labour supply function that is
consistent with the life-cycle framework. The idea here is to
extend the Hall (1973) approach to the dynamic case simply
by redefining virtual non-labour income for period t to
include bt. The approach is illustrated in Figure 7.3, for the
case of a two-bracket tax system. Note that if the person
locates on segment #1 then their after-tax wage is wt(1 – τ1)
and their virtual non-labour income is Vt = Nt + bt. If the
person locates on segment #2 then their after-tax wage is
wt(1 – τ2) and their virtual non-labour income is Vt = wt(τ2 –
τ1)H2 + Nt + bt. Notice that, regardless of segment, virtual
non-labour income is given by:
(45)
(44)
where τt denotes the tax rate for the segment on which the
person locates at time t. Thus, MaCurdy suggests estimating
labour supply equations of the form:
To implement this procedure one must pick a particular
functional form for the labour supply function in (47). For
example, one might choose the linear specification we saw
in (37a), or the double log specification we saw in (36).
Also, because both the after-tax wage rate and virtual non-
labour income are endogenous, we must instrument for
them, analogous to the approach in Method 1.
MaCurdy (1983) implements both Method 1 and
Method 2 using a sample of 121 married males who were
part of the control group in the Denver Income Maintenance
Experiment (a negative income tax experiment) in 1972 to
1975. To implement Method 1—equation (45)—MaCurdy
includes as observed taste shifters (Xit) the number of
children and race indicators. His main instruments are
quadratics in age and education, as well as interactions
between the two. This makes sense given the strong
correlation between education and lifetime earnings, and
the fact that both wages and hours follow hump shapes
over the life-cycle. The interactions capture the fact that the
peaks of these humps tend to come at later ages for those
with more education. But the use of these instruments does
require the strong assumption that age and education are
not correlated with tastes for work εit.
MaCurdy’s estimates indicate that γ = 0.16 and η = –0.66.
To compare these figures to prior literature, MaCurdy
calculates what they would imply about labour supply
elasticities given a linear budget constraint. It turns out that
the estimates imply highly elastic labour supply behaviour.
Using our formulas for a person with no non-labour
income—equation (24)—the implied Marshallian elasticity
is (1 + η)/(γ – η) = 0.42, the Hicks elasticity is 1/(γ – η) = 1.22,
the income effect is η/(γ – η) = –0.80, and the Frisch
elasticity is 1/(0.16) = 6.25. MaCurdy calculates elasticities
at the mean of the data, and obtains a Marshallian elasticity
of 0.70, a Hicks elasticity of 1.47, and an income effect of
w∂h/∂N = –0.77.
Turning to Method 2, MaCurdy considers both linear and
double log specifications, using the same control variables
and instruments as in Method 1. For the double log
specification he obtains:
and for the linear specification he obtains:
where the figures in parentheses are standard errors. The
log specification gives a Marshallian elasticity of 0.69,
almost identical to that obtained via Method 1 when
evaluated at the mean of the data.
MaCurdy (1983) evaluates the other elasticities at the
mean of the data. To do this we need to know the mean of
Vit = Cit – wit(1 – τit)hit = $133 per month, the mean of the
after-tax wage is $2.75 per hour and the mean of hours is
170 per month. In the double log model the income effect
is then (wh)(1/h)∂h/∂V = (468)(–0.0016) = –0.75. This is
again almost identical to the value obtained using Method 1.
The Hicks elasticity is thus 0.69 + 0.75 = 1.44.
For the linear specification, the Marshallian elasticity is
(2.75/170)(19.4) = 0.31, the income effect is (2.75)(–0.16)
= –0.44 and the Hicks elasticity is 0.75. Thus, the linear
specification produces more modest elasticity estimates.
Nevertheless, as MaCurdy (1983) notes, all three
approaches (Method 1 and Method 2 with a double log or
linear specification) produced estimates of labour supply
elasticities that are quite large relative to most of the prior
literature. MaCurdy notes that this may indicate that prior
estimates were misleading because: ‘Existing studies of
male labour supply rarely treat measures of wages and
income as endogenous variables… Many of these studies
ignore taxes or fail to account properly for the endogeneity
of marginal tax rates, and none of them recognises that a
household may save or dissave during a period’. But
MaCurdy also notes that other factors, such as possibly
invalid instruments or the small and unrepresentative
nature of the Denver Income Maintenance Experiment
sample, could have led to upward biased estimates of
labour supply elasticities. It is also the case that the
parameter estimates are rather imprecise (see above).
Altonji (1986) noted that one could rewrite (45) as:
By estimating this equation using instrumental variables we
would uncover the Frisch elasticity (1/γ) directly. Recall that
the Frisch elasticity is defined as the effect of a change in
the wage holding lifetime wealth fixed. In (48) consumption
serves as a summary statistic for lifetime wealth. If the wage
changes but consumption stays fixed it means that perceived
wealth remained fixed. This means either (i) that the person
expected the wage change, so it does not affect his/her
perception of lifetime wealth, or (ii) that the person expects
the wage change to be very short-lived, so that it has a
negligible effect on lifetime wealth. Estimation of (48) also
enables us to back out the preference parameter η as the
ratio of the consumption coefficient to the wage coefficient.
Altonji (1986) estimates (48) using data on married
men, aged 25–60, taken from the 1968–1981 waves of the
PSID. Two key differences with MaCurdy (1983) are that
Altonji does not use after-tax wage rates, and the PSID
measure of consumption includes only food consumption.
Altonji also includes a more extensive set of observed taste
shifters in X than does MaCurdy (i.e. in addition to children
and race he also includes age, health, region and year
dummies). Recall that we must instrument for wages and
consumption both because they are measured with error
and because they are presumably correlated with the
unobserved taste shifter εit. A novel feature of Altonji’s
paper is that he uses a ratio wage measure (annual earnings
over hours) as the independent variable in (48), and then
uses as an instrument a direct question about the hourly
wage. As long as the measurement error in these two
  
  
(46)
(47)
(48)
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measures is uncorrelated (as seems plausible), the latter is 
a valid instrument.44 As an additional instrument Altonji
uses a measure of the ‘permanent wage’, constructed by
regressing the observed wage on individual fixed effects,
education, a quadratic in age, an interaction between age
and education, year dummies, health and region.
Altonji (1986) estimates that (1/γ) = 0.172 (standard
error = 0.119) and that (η/γ) = –0.534 (standard error =
0.386). The implied values of γ and η are 5.81 and –3.10.
These, in turn, imply Frisch, Hicks and Marshall elasticities
of 0.17, 0.11 and –0.24, respectively, and an income effect
of –0.35. It is interesting to compare these values with
those obtained by MaCurdy (1983) of 6.25, 1.22, 0.42 and
–0.80. Reminiscent of the ‘Hausman-MaCurdy’ debate
discussed earlier, we again find ourselves in the situation—
now in the context of life-cycle models—of authors finding
very different estimates of labour supply elasticities for
reasons that are not evident. Does MaCurdy get much
higher elasticities because he accounts for taxes and/or has
a more complete measure of consumption? Or, because he
uses different instruments? Or are his results unreliable due
to the small and unrepresentative nature of the Denver
Income Maintenance Experiment sample? Does rearranging
(45) to obtain (48) actually matter? Unfortunately, there is
no replication study that attempts to reconcile the Altonji
(1986) and MaCurdy (1983) results so we don’t know the
answer to these questions.
Blundell and Walker (1986) published a closely related
paper. Like MaCurdy (1983), these authors also develop a
scheme for estimating the parameters of a life-cycle labour
supply model using techniques no more complicated than
instrumental variables estimation of a static model, and
again the method involves a redefinition of the virtual non-
labour income variable. Blundell and Walker adopt the
approach of ‘two-stage budgeting’. In the first stage, the
worker/consumer decides how to allocate his/her ‘full
income’ across all periods of his/her life. Full income is
defined as the wage rate times the total hours in a period,
plus any exogenous non-labour income, plus net dissaving.
Within each period, full income is allocated between
consumption and leisure. Thus we have the within-period
budget constraint:
where Ft is full income, T is total time in a period and T – ht
is leisure.45 Similar to MaCurdy’s Method 2, where one
estimates labour supply equations that condition on the
virtual income variable Vt = Ct – wt(1 – τt)ht (see equation
(47)), here one conditions on the full income allocated to
period t 46:
Notice that full income allocated to period t plays a role
analogous to that of consumption in MaCurdy’s Method 1
or virtual income in his Method 2. That is, if the wage
increases but the full income allocated to the period is held
fixed, it means that the wage increase has not made the
person feel wealthier (i.e. it has not relaxed his lifetime
budget constraint).
Blundell and Walker (1986, p. 545) argue that there is
no need to instrument for Fit, even though it is a choice
variable, because it reasonable to assume that taste shifters
which affect that allocation of resources over the life-cycle
are independent of those that affect choices within a
period. But this seems like an odd argument. For instance,
one would plan to allocate more resources to periods when
tastes for consumption and/or leisure are high than towards
other periods.
In contrast to the direct utility function, which expresses
utility as a function of the goods a person consumes (i.e.
consumption and leisure), the indirect utility function
expresses the maximum utility a person can attain as a
function of his/her budget constraint variables, in this case
full income and the after-tax wage rate (under the
assumption that he/ she will make consumption and leisure
choices optimally given Ft and wt(1 – τt)). Blundell and
Walker (1986) consider a case where the indirect utility
function has the form:
Actually, as we will see below, Blundell and Walker consider
a more complex model of joint labour supply of couples,
where the price of consumption goods varies over time in
addition to the wage. But I will omit those complications for
now in order to focus on how the two-stage budgeting
idea is implemented. Obviously, we have that:
This equality holds because if the after-tax wage increases
by one unit then the person has ht extra units of income to
spend on consumption.47 But if full income increases by one
unit the person has only one extra unit of income to spend
on consumption. Thus the derivative on the left of (52)
must be ht times greater than that on the right. Applying
(52) to (51) we can obtain the labour supply equation:
(49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
44 To be in the estimation sample a person must have both wage measures. There are 4367 men who satisfy the criteria. Note that this tilts the composition
of the sample towards hourly workers. 
45 Given progressive taxes, Nt could be defined to include the virtual non-labour income for the linearised budget constraint, just as before. 
46 Indeed, the methods are not just analogous but identical, as one can always write a one-period budget constraint in terms of after-tax wage and either
full income or virtual non-labour income. That is, the expressions (47) and (50) are alternative expressions for the same labour supply function. 
47 The assumption that ht stays fixed when the wage increases is a simple application of the ‘envelop theorem’. This says that for very small changes in the
wage rate, the consumer can’t do better than to spend all the extra income on consumption. Any utility gain that he/she might achieve by reallocating
his/her full income between consumption and leisure is trivially small. 
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As Blundell and Walker (1986) note, the researcher has a
great deal of flexibility in choosing the a(·) and b(·)
functions. Thus, labour supply can be allowed to depend on
the wage and full income in rather complex ways. This has
a downside in terms of interpretability, in that, in contrast
to the MaCurdy (1983) and Altonji (1986) specifications,
elasticities will have to be simulated. As best as I can
ascertain, the basic specification that Blundell and Walker
(1986) estimate for men looks like this:
Here wmt is the after-tax wage for the husband, wft is 
the after-tax wage for the wife, pft is the price of consumption
goods and Ft is full income as given by (49).
Blundell and Walker (1986) estimate this model on a
sample of families from the 1980 UK Family Expenditure
Survey. As the focus in this chapter is on labour supply of
men I only discuss those results. Some limitations of the
analysis should be noted. First, as already noted, the
authors do not instrument for full income or wages.
Second, the analysis was limited to families where the
household head is a manual worker, a shop assistant or a
clerical worker. This gives 1378 households with a female
participation rate of 64 per cent. (The authors do not
indicate why they chose to restrict the sample in this way.)
Third, the consumption measure was limited, including
food, clothing, services and energy but excluding housing,
transport, alcohol and other important categories.
Averaging over the whole sample, the authors simulate
a Frisch elasticity for men of only 0.026 and a Hicks
elasticity of only 0.024. These values are small for all
demographic subgroups examined. The authors report an
elasticity of male hours with respect to full income of
–0.287. Based on figures reported in the paper, I calculate
that full income is £267 per week on average, and that
male after-tax earnings are (2.08)(39.8) = £82.78 per 
week on average. These figures imply an income effect of
(wh/F)(F/h)(∂h/∂F) = w(∂h/∂F) = –0.08948 and a Marshallian
elasticity of –0.065. In this regard, it is notable that the
authors use a ratio wage measure (i.e. usual earnings over
usual hours) to construct wage rates. As we discussed
earlier, this may lead to downward bias in elasticity
estimates due to denominator bias, particularly when no
instrument is used to correct for measurement error. This
may account in part for these low elasticity estimates.
Beginning with MaCurdy (1981), a number of studies
have attempted to use equations similar to (31) to estimate
the Frisch elasticity directly. Here I repeat (31) for convenience:
MaCurdy (1981) estimates equation (31) using annual data
on 513 married men observed from 1967–1976 in the
PSID. To be included in the sample the men must have been
25–46 years of age in 1967 and have been continuously
married to the same spouse during the sample period.
MaCurdy uses a complete set of time dummies to pick up
the log interest rate terms in (31), rather than using a
particular interest rate variable. No observed taste shifter
variables X are included. It is also notable that MaCurdy
does not adjust wages for taxes.49 Hence, the specification
is simply a regression of annual log hours changes on log
wage changes, along with a set of time dummies.
MaCurdy presents his analysis in a setting where
workers have perfect foresight about their future wages.
But, as he notes, his results do not hinge on this assumption
provided he uses as instruments for wages variables that
were known to a worker at time t or before, so that the
worker could have used these variables to forecast wage
growth from time t – 1 to t. Provided the worker forecasts
wage growth rationally, such instruments will be
uncorrelated with the error term ξit which arises because of
errors in forecasting wage growth. Such forecast errors
should only be correlated with variables that are revealed
during the time t – 1 to t interval (e.g. an unexpected
recession, illness or plant closure). The instruments that
MaCurdy uses to predict wage growth are by now familiar:
quadratics in age and education as well as age/education
interactions, parental education and year dummies.
Using this approach, MaCurdy (1981) obtained a Frisch
elasticity of only 0.15 (standard error = 0.98). It is striking
to compare this to the Frisch elasticity of 6.25 that
MaCurdy (1983) obtained using the Denver data, where he
adopted the alternative approach of using consumption to
proxy for the marginal utility of wealth. But, given that
Altonji (1986) obtained 0.172 using a closely related
consumption-based approach, and Blundell and Walker
(1986) obtained 0.026 using the two-stage budgeting
approach, the high Frisch elasticity figure in MaCurdy
(1983) starts to look like a striking outlier. Furthermore, as
the Frisch elasticity is in theory an upper bound on the Hicks
and Marshallian, this would lead one to a conclusion that
labour supply elasticities are small for men in general.
But before reaching this conclusion, it is important to
keep two points in mind. First, the large standard error
(0.98) on MaCurdy’s estimate, which suggests that the
instruments are doing a very poor job of predicting wage
changes. Second, as noted earlier, wages themselves are
measured with error, and taking the change in wages as in
(31) greatly exacerbates the problem. This would
substantially bias the coefficient on wage changes towards
zero. The two issues are related, as one needs good
predictors of true wage changes in order to correct the
measurement error problem.
Altonji (1986) tried to address this problem by using a
better instrument for wage changes. As I noted earlier, he
(31)
(54)
48 Consistent with calculation, when the authors simulate a £50 reduction in non-labour income it leads to an average 2.5 hour increase in weekly hours for males,
implying a derivative of about –2.5/50 = –0.05. Multiplying this by the mean male after-tax male wage rate of 2.08 gives an income effect of about –0.10.
49 It may be argued that taxes will largely drop out of (31) if the marginal tax rate a person faces does not change too much from year to year. Altonji (1986)
makes this argument explicitly. 
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uses two wage measures from the PSID, one serving as the
wage measure in the labour supply equation, the other
serving as an instrument. Using a PSID sample very similar to
MaCurdy’s, and using similar predictors of wage changes
(quadratic in age and education, etc.) he gets an R-squared
in the first stage prediction equation of only 0.008. Then, in
estimating the main labour supply equation, he gets a Frisch
elasticity of 0.31, again with a large standard error of 0.65.
However, when Altonji uses the alternative wage change
measure as an additional instrument, he gets a much better
R-squared of 0.031 in the prediction equation.50 Then, in
estimating the labour supply equation, he gets Frisch
elasticity of 0.043, with a standard error of only 0.079. Thus,
we seem to have a rather tight estimate of a small Frisch
elasticity. The problem here, of course, is that the use of an
alternative wage change measure as an instrument is only
valid under the strong assumption that workers do have
perfect foresight about wage changes. Otherwise, any wage
change measure will be correlated with ξit.51
Angrist (1991) proposes dealing with the measurement
error problem by using grouped data estimation. That is, he
works with the equation:
Here, denotes the sample mean of variable 1nhit over
all people i observed in year t. The idea is that, while the
individual log hours and log wage variables may be measured
with error, this measurement error will cancel out when we
average over people.52
Notice that I have substituted a function of time f(t) for
the interest rate variable that appears in (31). MaCurdy
(1981) and Altonji (1986) both used a complete set of year
dummies to pick up the interest rate variable in estimating
versions of (31). But that will not work here because a
complete set of year dummies would enable one to fit
changes in average hours perfectly and the Frisch elasticity
(1/γ) would not be identified. Identification requires that f(t)
be specified as a low order polynomial in time.
Also notable is that (55) includes the mean of the
surprise variable ζ¯ it. We would expect this to be negatively
correlated with the mean wage change. That is, an
unexpected aggregate productivity shock that increases the
average wage rate would tend to make people feel
wealthier, inducing a negative income effect. For estimation
of (55) to identify the Frisch elasticity, f(t) must capture such
unexpected aggregate shocks, so that ζ¯ it drops out. 
At this point, it is important to consider whether
estimation of (55) will actually uncover labour supply
parameters, or some mongrel of supply and demand
factors. For estimation of (55) to identify the Frisch
elasticity, it is necessary that the variation in average wages
be induced by anticipated shifts in labour demand (e.g.
anticipated productivity growth). For this to be true we
must not only rule out aggregate unexpected productivity
shocks, but aggregate shocks to tastes for work as well. Or,
if these are present, we must assume they are all captured
by the time polynomial f(t).
Note that is the average change in tastes for
work in the sample. If there are aggregate shocks to tastes
for work, we would expect to have a negative correlation
between and the change in average wages (as an
increased supply of labour would drive down wages in
equilibrium). In that case, we should estimate (55) using
demand side variables known at t – 1 as instruments. But in the
absence of aggregate shocks to tastes for work 
is simply noise, and (55) does represent a supply equation.
With these caveats in mind, let’s consider Angrist’s
results. He uses the PSID data from 1969–1979, and takes
a sample of 1,437 male household heads aged 21–64 with
positive hours and earnings in each year. He then constructs
average hours and earnings for the sample members in
each year, and uses these to estimate (55), with f(t) either
left out or set to be a linear or quadratic time trend. When
no trend is included the estimate of the Frisch elasticity is
–0.132 (standard error = 0.042), which violates economic
theory. However, this obviously occurs only because during
the 1969–1979 period there was a secular downtrend in
average hours and a secular upward trend in the wage rate.
When a linear trend is included in the model it picks this up,
and Angrist obtains a Frisch elasticity of 0.556 (standard
error = 0.124).53 Using a quadratic trend he obtains 0.634
(standard error = 0.205). Specification tests do not reject
the model with a linear trend, although it is likely that the
test has little power given the small sample size.
Regardless, these estimates provide some evidence for
higher values of the Frisch elasticity than results from most
of the prior literature would suggest. However, it is unclear
whether Angrist obtains the higher value because of a
superior method of handling measurement error or
because the results are contaminated by unanticipated
labour demand shocks that induce a positive correlation
between wages and hours.
A related paper by Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985)
shows how one can estimate the Frisch elasticity using
repeated cross-section data instead of true panel data. First,
they show how to derive a version of the Frisch labour
supply function that has the wage change in levels (not logs)
as the dependent variable, giving an equation of the form:
(55)
1nhit
(εit – εi,t–1)
(εit – εi,t–1)
(εit – εi,t–1)
(56)
50 This may still seem small, but is actually not bad given the large sample size of roughly 4000 observations, as indicated by the highly significant F statistic
of 129.
51 Given this problem, Altonji tried using the lagged wage change as an instrument, as the lag would have been known at time t. But it is a poor predictor,
and the standard error jumps to 0.45.
52 Of course, this requires that the measurement error be additive.
53 It is interesting that when Angrist simply estimates (55) on the micro data, using a linear trend, he obtains a Frisch elasticity of –0.267 with a standard
error of 0.008. But when he estimates the hours equation in levels he obtains –0.063 (standard error = 0.005). This illustrates how first differencing
exacerbates the downward bias in the wage coefficient. 
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To estimate this equation, the authors use data on married
men from the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES) for the
seven years from 1970–1976. The FES does not track
individual people through time. Rather, it takes a random
sample of the population in each year. Thus, it is not
possible to take first differences like hit – hi,t–1 for individual
people i. Instead Browning, Deaton and Irish construct eight
cohorts from the data: men who were 18–23 in 1970, men
who were 24–28 in 1970, up to men who were 54–58 in
1970. (Note that members of the first cohort are 24–29 in
1976 when the data ends, while members of the last
cohort are 60–64. Thus, the data cover all ages from 18 to
64.) The authors then take the cohort-specific means of
each variable in (56) for each year of the data. This gives:
Here, for instance ln wct is the mean of the log wage for
people in cohort c, c = 1,…,8 in year t, t = 1970,....,76. Notice
that ζct is the mean of the surprise shock to wealth for
members of cohort c in year t. It is important to note that
this may differ among cohorts because different cohorts are
affected differently by aggregate shocks in period t. For
example, an unexpected recession in year t may lead to
larger unexpected wage reductions for younger workers.
Similarly, εct is the mean of the taste shock for cohort c
in year t. As we discussed earlier, writing the labour supply
equation in terms of aggregate or cohort means highlights
the potential existence of aggregate taste shocks. If
aggregate taste shocks exist, they will alter equilibrium
wages, and (57) will no longer represent a labour supply
relationship. To deal with this problem we would need to
find instruments that generate exogenous variation in
wages (i.e. variation that is not induced by supply shocks).
And, given the existence of aggregate surprise changes to
lifetime wealth (captured by the ζct) it is necessary that any
instruments we use to predict wage growth from t – 1 to t
be known at time t – 1.
Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985) use time dummies to
pick up the aggregate shock, an approach that is feasible for
them (in contrast to Angrist) because they observe multiple
cohorts at each point in time. However, it should be noted
that this does not address the possibility that aggregate
shocks may differ by cohort, a point I’ll return to below.
To estimate (57) Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985) use
as instruments a quadratic in age along with lagged wages.
They include number of children as observed taste shifters
in Xct. The wage measure is ‘normal’ weekly salary divided
by normal weekly hours, and taxes are not accounted for.
The main results, which they report in their Table 4/row 4.6,
indicate that the Frisch elasticity is very small. The estimate
of β in (57) is 0.13 (standard error = 0.27) and given this
functional form the Frisch elasticity is roughly β/h which is
3.77/43 = 0.09 at the mean of the data, implying very little
inter-temporal substitution in labour supply. Indeed, only
the time dummies (and, marginally, children) are significant
in the equation.
Based on this result, the authors argue that, ‘there is a
marked synchronisation over the life-cycle between hours
worked and…wage rates...’ but ‘the characteristic hump-
shaped patterns of…hours…though explicable in terms of
life-cycle wage variation…can be explained as well as or
better…as the response of credit-constrained consumers to
the variation in needs accompanying the birth, growth and
departure of children’. This quote from Browning, Deaton
and Irish (1985) illustrates one of two possible reactions to
a finding that the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is
very small.
One possibility is to maintain that the life-cycle model is
valid but that preferences are such that people are not very
willing to inter-temporally substitute hours (i.e. that γ >> 0).
In this case, since the Frisch elasticity is an upper bound on
the Hicks and Marshallian, we must conclude the other
elasticities are small as well.
Alternatively, one could conclude, as do Browning,
Deaton and Irish (1985), that consumers are credit
constrained. In this case, the life-cycle model is invalid, and
the static model of labour supply is in fact appropriate.
Under these circumstances the Frisch elasticity is
meaningless, and the estimates that imply it is small tell us
nothing about possible values of the Hicks and Marshallian
elasticities. Of course, if we abandon the life-cycle model
we need some alternative explanation for the variation in
assets over the life-cycle.54
Now let’s consider further the issue of aggregate shocks.
It is important to note that the presence of aggregate
surprise variables such as ζ¯ it or ζct is not an issue only in
studies like Angrist (1991) and Browning, Deaton and Irish
(1985) which work with sample or cohort means. Taking
means just makes the issue more salient. In fact, the same
issue is implicitly present in the studies by MaCurdy (1981)
and Altonji (1986) which used micro panel data to estimate
versions of (31). The potential problems created by
aggregate shocks for the estimation of (31) or (57) were
stressed by Altug and Miller (1990). In particular, they argue
that use of time dummies to soak up the mean of the
aggregate shock in each period may not solve the problem.
Specifically, let (ξit – ζ¯ it) be the idiosyncratic surprise for
household i at time t. Having included time dummies Dt in
equation (31), it now takes on the form:
where now the error term includes only the idiosyncratic
surprise terms (ξit – ζ¯ it) along with the unobserved taste
shifters. Despite the fact that (ξit – ζ¯ it) is mean zero by
construction, it may be systematically related to instruments
like age and education that are typically used to predict
wage growth in this literature.
(57)
(31’)
54 There is, of course, a huge parallel literature testing the life-cycle model by looking for evidence of liquidity constraints that prevent people from using
assets to smooth consumption over the life-cycle (e.g. Keane & Runkle 1992). It is beyond the scope of this survey to discuss that literature, except to
mention that whether liquidity constraints are important determinants of savings behaviour remains controversial. 
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For example, suppose the sample period contains an
adverse productivity shock in year t, but that low education
workers were much more adversely affected. This would
cause low education workers to have relatively large values
for ζit (recall that a positive value for ζit represents a surprise
negative shock to lifetime wealth). Thus, letting Si denote
education, we have that Cov[Si , (ζit – ζ¯it)] < 0. Now, this
would not invalidate education as an instrument if the
sample contained some other years where shocks to lifetime
wealth tended to favour low education workers. However,
the key point is that we would want our sample to consist of
a fairly large number of years before we could be confident
that such favourable and unfavourable shocks cancelled out. 
Altug and Miller (1990) adopt a rather radical approach
to this problem, which is to adopt assumptions that make
it vanish. Specifically, they assume that workers have
complete insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, so that the
idiosyncratic shock terms (ζit – ζ¯ it) vanish. Of course, all
economic models are abstractions, so we should not
dismiss a model simply because it contains some
implausible assumptions. And, as Altug and Miller argue,
given the existence of unemployment insurance, family
transfers and so on, the existence of complete insurance,
while obviously false, might not be such a terrible
assumption. The real questions are: What does the
assumption buy you? Does its falsity severely bias our
estimates of parameters of interest?
Now, let’s see what Altug and Miller (1990) gain from
the complete insurance assumption. Let’s return to
equations (18)–(20), the first order conditions for the
worker’s optimisation problem, and extend them to a
many-period setting. Rewrite (18)–(19) as:
and rewrite (20) as:
Recall that [Cit]η is the marginal utility of consumption at
time t. Equation (59) describes how the marginal utility of
consumption evolves over the life-cycle, given that the
worker makes optimal consumption/savings decisions. For
example, if ρ(1 + rt) = 1, the worker will want to equate the
marginal utility of consumption across all periods. Given 
the particular utility function in (1), this means equating
consumption itself across all periods.55 But if ρ(1 + rt) > 1,
meaning the rate of return on assets exceeds the discount
factor, the consumer will choose to have [Cit]η fall over
time—that is, he/she will tend to save early in order to have
higher consumption later in life.
It is important to note that, given optimal behaviour,
the marginal utility of consumption in period t is equivalent
to what economists call the ‘marginal utility of wealth’ at
time t. Let’s call this λit. This is the increment in lifetime
utility that the consumer can achieve if we give him/her an
extra unit of assets (or wealth) at the start of period t. 
The equivalence λit = [Cit]η arises because, for a very small
increment in wealth at time t, the consumer can’t do
significantly better than to simply spend it all at once.56
Now, (59) describes a situation of perfect foresight,
where a consumer knows how λit will evolve over time.57
That is a very strong assumption, as, in order to know how
λit will evolve, the consumer must know how wages,
interest rates and his/her own preference shocks will evolve
over time. Taking logs of (59), and grouping terms, we have:
Thus, with perfect foresight, the marginal utility of
consumption at time t evolves in a known way with the
interest rate and the discount factor. As MaCurdy (1981)
pointed out, this makes estimation of equation (58) possible
without consumption data. Taking logs of (58) we have:
Now, by first differencing (61) and using (60) we can make
the marginal utility of consumption terms vanish:
And, if we assume that the taste shifters βit have a
stochastic component, as in βit = exp(Xitα + εit) we obtain
the estimable equation:
(59)
(60)
(61)
(58)
 
55 For more general utility functions this consumption smoothing result does not follow. For example, suppose that we generalise (1) to have: 
where G( ) is a concave function. Then the marginal utility of consumption is, G’t(·)Cηt , and we have that λt = G’t(·)Cηt . Now if ρ(1 + rt) = 1 it is that G’t(·)Cηt
the consumer seeks to equate across periods. Notice that, for given Ct, the derivative G’t(·) is increasing in ht, so that, if consumption were equalised across
periods the marginal utility of consumption would be higher in periods when hours of work are higher. This will cause the consumer to allocate more
consumption to periods when ht is relatively high. I discuss this issue more below. 
56 This is a simple application of the ‘envelop theorem’. If we give the consumer a very small increment of assets at the start of period t, then he/she can’t
do significantly better than to consume it all at once. Any incremental gain in lifetime utility that he/she might achieve by optimally allocating tiny increases
in consumption over all remaining periods of the life, so as to satisfy (59), would be trivially small.
57 Notice that (59) implies: 
or, in logs:
Thus, the marginal utility of consumption at any time t is simply a function only of the marginal utility of consumption in the first period, along with the
discount rate and interest rates in subsequent periods, all of which the consumer is assumed to know at t = 1.
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Given the perfect foresight assumption, this equation can
actually be consistently estimated using OLS, provided the
unobserved taste shocks are uncorrelated with wages.
However, as MaCurdy (1981) pointed out, as a practical
matter we would still want to use instrumental variables to
deal with measurement error in wages.
Now, consider a situation where, rather than having
perfect foresight, the worker is uncertain about future
wage realisations. It is simple to introduce such uncertainty
into the life-cycle model of (58)–(59) just by modifying (59)
to read:
Here Et denotes the worker’s expectation of his/her future
state, given all the information he/she has available at 
time t. Specifically, the worker is forecasting what his/her
consumption will be at time t + 1, and this in turn depends
on what his/her wage rate realisation will be.
Now, we can rewrite (63) as:
where ξi,t+1 is a forecast error that is independent of
information known at time t. Taking logs of (63) we obtain:
In the second line I’ve made use of the approximation that
ln(1+ξit) ≈ ξit as long as ξit is not too large.58
At this point it appears as if we can introduce
uncertainty into the model with little added complication. If
we proceed as before, first differencing (61) but simply
using (65) in place of (60), we obtain:
This is precisely our familiar equation (31) that we derived
informally earlier, except that in (31) we defined ζit = ξit/γ
and we introduced after-tax wages. Now, given (65), we can
see quite clearly what we previously stated informally: ξit
represents a surprise increase in the marginal utility of
consumption from t – 1 to t, or, equivalently in this case, a
surprise decrease in consumption. This would be induced
by a surprise wage reduction, which makes the person feel
less wealthy than expected.
Now, the point made by MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji
(1986) is that estimation of (66), the labour supply model
that accounts for uncertainty, is hardly any more difficult
than estimation of (62), the model that assumes perfect
foresight. Estimation of (62) already made use of
instrumental variables to deal with the measurement error
in wages. The only complication apparent in estimating (66)
is that we must also make sure the instruments are
uncorrelated with the forecast errors ζit.
But as Altug and Miller (1990) argue, things are not
quite so simple. If aggregate shocks are present, so that the
ζit do not have mean zero within each period, this violates
the assumptions that allow us to estimate the Frisch
elasticity (1/γ) by applying instrumental variables to (66).
And the obvious solution of using time dummies to ‘sop up’
the period-specific means does not necessarily work if there
is idiosyncratic uncertainty.
Altug and Miller (1990) deal with the problem by assuming
away idiosyncratic risk. Specifically, they write that:
A person i with a low ηi has a relatively low marginal utility
of wealth, meaning he/she is relatively rich. But a person’s
position in the wealth distribution stays constant over time.
Aside from interest rates and discounting, the only source
of variation (and hence uncertainty) in the marginal utility
of wealth over time are aggregate shocks that cause
movements in λt.
Given this assumption, Altug and Miller can rewrite (63) as:
Then (64) and (65) become:
Notice also that, using (67), equation (61) becomes:
So first differencing (61) and using (69) in place of (65), 
we obtain:
Compared to (66), this equation has the almost imperceptible
difference that the surprise term ζt = ξt/γ no longer has an 
i subscript, so it really is just an aggregate shock, and it can be
appropriately captured with time dummies.
But Altug and Miller (1990) do not make this point
simply as a critique of other work (or at least its
interpretation). They note that if we adopt the assumption
(67) then we can first difference (70) to obtain:
That means we can actually estimate the changes in ln λt as
the dummy coefficients in estimating equation (72). That in
turn means that, given data on interest rates rt we can
actually estimate the asset pricing equation (69), with the
only unknown parameter being ρ.
(65)
(63)
(64)
(62)
(66)
(67)
(68)
(69)
(70)
(71)
(72)
58 A more formal derivation would define the mean zero error term ζit = ln(1 + ξit) – Etln(1 + ξit). The derivation in the text would then go through except
that the mean Etln(1 + ξit) would show up as part of the intercept of hours equation.
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So the main point of the Altug and Miller (1990) paper
is to use data on hours, wages, consumption and rates of
return to jointly estimate (i) a within-period optimality
condition like (48), (ii) a first difference hours equation like
(72), and (iii) an asset price equation like (69), using the
cross equation restrictions among the equations (e.g. γ
appears in multiple places) to get a more efficient estimate
of the Frisch elasticity.59 They estimate their model on a
sample of married men from the PSID. To be in the sample
the men had to be continuously married from 1967–1980,
and be no older than 46 in 1967.
A complication is that Altug and Miller (1990) do not use
the simple utility function (1) that was used by MaCurdy
(1981) and Altonji (1986). They use a more complex function
where the wives’ leisure is allowed to be non-separable
with consumption and husbands’ leisure. For instance, the
within-period optimality condition gives the following
demand for husband leisure equation that is the analogue
to (48):
where now (1/γ˜) is the inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution in leisure and l sit is the wives’ lesiure. Estimating
(73) jointly with the rest of the system, the authors obtain
a Frisch elasticity of leisure with respect to the wage of 0.037
with a standard error of 0.013. This precise estimate
contrasts with an estimate of 0.018 with a standard error
of 0.087 that they obtain when they do not include the first
difference hours equation and the asset equation in the
system. Thus we see that their approach does lead to a
substantial efficiency gain.
Given that leisure is normalised to a fraction of total
time, we have the Frisch elasticity of male labour supply with
respect to the wage implied by the authors’ estimate as:
Thus, despite the different methodology, the estimate is
similar to the rather small values obtained by MaCurdy
(1981) and Altonji (1986). To conclude the discussion of
Altug and Miller, it is worth pointing out some limitations
of the study. One is that it does not incorporate taxes and
another is that it uses a ratio wage measure.
Finally, one odd aspect of the Altug and Miller (1990)
results is that the coefficient on consumption in (73) is
0.003, which implies that η = 0.08 (i.e. the coefficient on
consumption in the utility function is 1 + η =  1.08). This
violates the theoretical restriction that η < 0 (i.e. diminishing
marginal utility of consumption). However, the coefficient is
so imprecisely estimated that one can’t reject that utility 
is linear in consumption (η = 0). On the other hand, log
utility (η = –1) is rejected. So all that can be discerned is that
–1 < η < 0, which is essentially the entire plausible range for
the parameter.60
Now let’s consider further developments in the line of
work that adopts the two-stage budgeting approach.
Blomquist (1985) noted that there was problem in applying
the two-stage budgeting approach of MaCurdy (1983)—
Method 2—and Blundell and Walker (1986) in contexts
with progressive taxation. The basic idea is that an increase
in hours of work in period t, holding consumption fixed, will
cause the person to have more assets at the end of period t.
This, in turn, will lead to higher asset income in period t + 1.
And this in turn may increase the person’s tax bracket at 
t + 1. More generally, a worker’s decisions at time tmay affect
the tax rates that he/she faces at time t + 1. This means we
no longer achieve the simplification that, conditional on the
full income allocated to time t, we can model the person’s
time t decisions as if he/she were choosing labour supply
subject to a one-period budget constraint.
The paper by Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) attempts to
deal with the problem of progressive taxation within the
two-stage budgeting framework (specifically, MaCurdy’s
Method 2). Following Blomquist (1985) they note that the
two-stage budgeting approach can be salvaged in a world
of progressive taxation by writing labour supply in period t
as conditional on assets at both the start and end of the
period. The idea is that, by holding end-of-period assets
fixed, you shut down any channel by which increased
labour supply in period t might affect the budget constraint
in period t + 1 (or later). Thus, they estimate a labour supply
equation of the form:
In this equation A*t–1 is ‘virtual wealth’, which plays a role
analogous to virtual non-labour income in static piecewise-
linear budget constraint models (see Figure 7.1). It is
defined as:
where τ Ait is the average tax rate paid by person i in period
t, and rt is the risk-free rate of interest.
Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) estimate equation (74) using
data on 532 married men from the PSID who are 22–51
years old in 1978 and who are observed to work in every year
from 1978–1987. The asset measure is home equity plus the
capitalised value of rent, interest and dividend income. In
constructing the wage measure, Ziliak and Kniesner seek to
avoid the denominator bias problem by using hourly wage
rates for hourly workers. For workers paid weekly, they
divided weekly earnings by 40 hours rather than actually
observed hours (and so on for workers paid over other time
periods). This procedure avoids denominator bias, at the cost
(73)
 
(74)
(75)
59 For good measure they throw in a wage equation as well. There are no cross equation restrictions between this and the other three equations, but allowing
for the error covariance increases efficiency. 
60 The greater imprecision of the η estimate compared to prior studies may stem from attempting to estimate the extent of non-separability between female
non-market time and both consumption and male labour supply, which adds female non-market time as an additional regression in the labour supply
equations. Altug and Miller (1990) reject the joint hypothesis that female non-market time is separable from both consumption and male labour supply,
but their estimates are too imprecise to determine from which quantity it is non-separable.
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of introducing a different type of measurement error in
hours. In forming taxable income and marginal tax rates, the
authors use information in the PSID to estimate standard and
itemised deductions.61 Observed taste shifters included in Xit
are age, health and number of children.
Equation (74) contains three endogenous variables: the
after-tax wage, end-of-period assets, and start-of-period
virtual assets. All three variables may be correlated with the
individual fixed effect μi (i.e. a person with high tastes for
work will tend to have both a high wage and high asset
levels). Thus, as a first step towards estimating (74), the
authors take first differences to eliminate the individual
fixed effect μi:
Now, wit(1 – τit) and Ait are presumably correlated with εit
as a high taste for work in period t will tend to both (i) shift
a person into a higher tax bracket and (ii) lead to higher
assets at the end of the period. Furthermore, even start-of-
period virtual wealth A*t–1 is presumably correlated with εit. If
a high εit tends to shift a worker into a higher tax bracket at
time t, then it affects A*t–1 directly as shown in (75). Now, valid
instruments for estimation of (76) must be uncorrelated with
both εit and εit–1. For this reason, Ziliak and Kniesner (1999)
argue that one must lag the wage and asset variables by two
periods (i.e. wit–2(1 – τit–2), Ait–2 and A*t–3) so as to obtain valid
instruments that are uncorrelated with εit–1. They also include
a quadratic in age, age interacted with education, and home
ownership as additional instruments.
The main estimation results imply a Marshallian
elasticity evaluated at the mean of the data of (w/h)∂h/∂w =
(10.19/2179)(24.66) = 0.1153, and a very small income
effect of wt∂ht/∂At–1 = (10.19)(–0.00162) = –0.0165. Thus,
the Hicks elasticity is 0.1318. In a second stage, which I 
will not describe in detail, they estimate the Frisch elasticity
as 0.163.62
Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) go on to use their model to
simulate the impact of various tax reform experiments. The
average marginal tax rate in their data was 29 per cent.
One experiment simulates an across the board 10 per cent
rate cut by the United States in 1987. In the authors’
simulation, this would only increase average annual hours
for prime age married men by 13 hours (or 0.6 per cent).
This small effect on hours is not too surprising given the
Marshallian elasticity of 0.12. The authors also simulate the
effect of the 1986 tax reform that substantially reduced the
progressivity of the tax system. As we’ve seen, it is the Hicks
elasticity, which they estimate to be 0.13, that is relevant
for determining the welfare effects of changing
progressivity. They simulate only a 2 per cent hours
increase, but a substantial welfare gain from these changes.
It is interesting to compare this result to those in the
papers by Blomquist (1983) and Blomquist and Hansson-
Busewitz (1990) which I discussed earlier. These papers
found Hicks elasticities of 0.11 and 0.13 respectively, but
they both found large welfare gains from switching to a flat
rate tax. So all three of these papers are similar in finding
that a fairly modest value of the Hicks elasticity can imply
substantial welfare gains from reducing progressivity.
At this point I’d like to discuss the issue of non-
separablility between leisure and consumption, which up
until now I have largely ignored. To further explore the
implications of non-separability, suppose we modify the
utility function in equation (1) to read:
Let’s assume that G[·] is a concave function, such as G[X] =
log (X) or G[X] = (1 + σ)–1X1+σ for σ ≤ 0. Notice that now the
marginal utility of consumption is given by:
Thus, unlike in (1), the marginal utility of consumption is 
no longer a function only of consumption itself. It also
depends on Xt which is a composite of consumption and
hours of work. Notice that, for a given level of
consumption, Xt is a decreasing function of ht. Given 
our assumption that G is concave, this means G’t (Xt) is
increasing in ht. Thus, if the consumer were (naively) to
equate consumption across periods, he/she would have 
a higher marginal utility of consumption in periods 
when hours of work are higher. Thus, ceteris paribus, 
the consumer would like to allocate more consumption 
to periods when hours are higher. Thus, a concave G
function generates a situation where hours and
consumption are complements.
The consumer still seeks to satisfy an inter-temporal
optimality condition like (63) but, with our new expression
for the marginal utility of consumption, we must revise (63)
to obtain:
Notice that now, even if ρ(1 + rt) = 1, the consumer will not
seek to equalise consumption across periods. As indicated
above, with a concave G function he/she will seek to make
consumption higher when hours are higher. But of course,
in the life-cycle model, hours are high when wages are
high. Hence, the consumer will seek to make consumption
high when earnings are high. Thus, if G is sufficiently
concave, the life-cycle model can generate consumption
and earnings paths that look very much like liquidity
constrained behaviour!
(76)
(77)
(78) where
(79)
61 Basically, they use IRS data to calculate the average level of itemised deductions for a person’s income level. Beginning in 1984, the PSID asks whether or
not a person itemised, so the authors can assign them either the standard deduction of the itemised deduction. Prior to 1984, the authors assign either
the standard or (estimated) itemised deduction, whichever is larger. 
62 The authors demonstrate that if they use a ratio wage measure (annual earnings over annual hours) and apply exactly the same estimation procedure,
they obtain a Marshallian elasticity of –0.083 and a Hicks elasticity of –0.072. This highlights the severe bias created by use of ratio wage measures which
I discussed earlier.
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Now, consider what the MRS condition in (58) will look
like, given the new utility function in (77):
That is, it doesn’t change at all. The factor G’t (Xt) appears in
both the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal
utility of leisure, and so it cancels out. This point was made
by MaCurdy (1983): the G function does not affect within-
period decisions about work and consumption, and so
estimation of the MRS condition does not tell us anything
about the form of G.
This is why MaCurdy (1983), in his Method 1, proposed
estimating the form of G in a second stage. The first stage
(discussed earlier) uses the MRS condition to obtain
estimates of the parameters of the Xt function, which are γ
and η in our example (77). One can then use these estimates,
along with a person’s actual hours and consumption data,
to construct estimates of the Xt. One then treats these
estimates of the Xt as data. In the second stage, one uses
data on Xt, Ct and rt from multiple periods to estimate the
unknown parameters of (79). These include the discount
rate ρ and the parameters of G. For instance, if we assume
that G[X] = (1 + σ)–1X1+σ then the only parameter of G is σ.
In his study, MaCurdy actually estimated σ = –0.14 but with
a standard error of 0.23. Thus, he couldn’t reject the simple
linear G case (σ = 0).
Now, let’s return to the first order conditions for
consumption and hours in (18)–(19), which will now take
the form:
Thus, we now have that:
So the Frisch elasticity, which is the effect of a change in the
wage holding the marginal utility of consumption λt fixed,
is no longer simply (1/γ), because in general a change in wt
will affect G′(Xt).
To explore further how a concave G affects willingness
to substitute labour across periods, let’s assume G[X] = (1 +
σ)–1X1+σ so that (82) becomes:
Clearly, the elasticity of hours with respect to the wage rate
holding λt fixed—the Frisch elasticity—is not simply (1/γ) in
this case, because we have to worry about the lnXt term,
and Xt contains Ct and ht. The exception, of course, is if σ = 0
so the lnXt term drops out.
To determine what (82’) implies about the Frisch
elasticity, we can use the within-period MRS condition in
(80) to substitute out for consumption in Xt (see equation
(78)) obtaining an expression for Xt solely in terms of hours.
Then (82’) becomes an implicit equation that relates hours
and the wage, holding λt fixed. Implicitly differentiating this
equation one obtains:
First note that if σ = 0 then the (83) reduces to just (1/γ) as
we would expect. However, as σ → –∞ the fraction in curly
brackets becomes less than one. We can see this because
the extra term –σ(β/γ)ht1+γ in the denominator is positive.
Thus, greater complementarity between hours and
consumption reduces the Frisch elasticity to less than (1/γ).
Numerical simulations of the simple two-period model
in (77)–(82) reveal a lot about how σ influences behaviour,
and give a clear intuition for why the Frisch elasticity falls as
σ → –∞. I start from a base case where the wage is 100 in
both periods, hours are 100 in both periods, the tax rate is
40 per cent and consumption is 6,000 in both periods (as I
set ρ(1 + r1) = 1). In a two-period model where each period
corresponds to roughly twenty years of a working life, a
plausible value for 1 + r is about (1 + 0.03)20 ≈ 1.806, or 
ρ = (1 + r)–1 ≈ 0.554. The utility function parameters are set
to γ = 0.5 and η = –0.5
Then, from (24), the Marshallian elasticity, which indicates
how hours respond to a permanent (i.e. two-period) wage
change, is 0.5, while the Hicks elasticity which also
indicates how hours respond to a permanent (i.e. two-
period) wage change, but in this case compensated by a
lump sum transfer that keeps utility fixed, is 1.0.
Importantly, these elasticities are invariant to σ. The Frisch
elasticity (i.e. how hours respond to an anticipated one-
period wage change) is equal to (1/γ) = 2.0 if σ = 0. But this
elasticity varies with σ.
In Table 7.4, I simulate the effect of a 1 per cent after-
tax wage increase in period 1 (from 60 to 60.6) induced by
cutting the tax rate from 0.40 to 0.394. Results are shown
for values of σ ranging from zero to –40. Notice that when
σ = 0 the worker increases work hours in period 1 by 1.03
per cent and reduces work hours in period 2 by 0.96 per
cent, leading to the expected 2 per cent increase in labour
supply in period 1 relative to period 2 implied by the Frisch
(80)
(81)
(82)
(82’)
(83)
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Table 7.4 How Frisch Elasticity Varies with Willingness to Substitute Utility over Time
Changes in hours (%) Changes in consumption (%) Changes in utility (%)
σ Frisch elasticity Hours(1) Hours(2) C(1) C(2) G(X(1)) G(X(2)) 
0.0 2.00 +1.03 –0.96 +0.97 +0.97 –0.05 +1.44
–0.5 1.40 +0.82 –0.58 +1.18 +0.58 +0.27 +0.87
–1.0 1.25 +0.76 –0.48 +1.24 +0.48 +0.38 +0.72
–2.0 1.14 +0.73 –0.41 +1.27 +0.42 +0.41 +0.62
–5.0 1.06 +0.70 –0.36 +1.30 +0.36 +0.45 +0.54
–10.0 1.03 +0.69 –0.34 +1.31 +0.34 +0.46 +0.51
–40.0 1.01 +0.68 –0.33 +1.32 +0.33 +0.48 +0.49
elasticity of 2.0. Note also that the consumer continues to
smooth his/her consumption across the two periods, as
consumption is increased by 0.97 per cent in each period.63
The consequence of this is that utility actually falls slightly
in period 1 while rising by 1.44 per cent in period 2 (when
the consumer gets to consume more and work less than
under the baseline).
As σ increases, the consumer is less willing to sacrifice
utility in period 1 in order to achieve higher utility in period
2. By the time we get to σ = –40 the consumer is almost
completely unwilling to substitute utility across periods.
Notice he/she allocates consumption and hours so that utility
increases by 0.48 per cent in period 1 and 0.49 per cent
period 2. To achieve this, the worker shifts consumption into
period 1 to compensate him or herself for having to work
more hours in that period (i.e. consumption increases by 1.32
per cent in period 1 versus only 0.33 per cent in period 2).
Simultaneously, the worker shifts less labour supply towards
period 1 than in the σ = 0 case. Now, hours only increase by
0.68 per cent in period 1 and only fall by 0.33 per cent in
period 2. This implies a Frisch elasticity of 1.01. If we send σ
all the way to –∞ we end up with a Leontieff utility function
where the consumer only cares about maximising the
minimum utility in any period. As σ → –∞ the Frisch elasticity
approaches 1.0. Interestingly, this is exactly the Hicks
elasticity for a permanent (two-period) wage change.64
In summary, in the linear case of G(X) = X, combined with
a within-period utility function that is additive between
consumption and hours, there is a separation of the labour
supply and consumption problems. The worker chooses savings
to smooth consumption across periods. The worker also
chooses to work more hours in those periods when wages are
higher. This means sacrificing utility in the high wage periods.
But if G is concave, the worker/consumer tries to
equalise utility across periods. This tends to reduce inter-
temporal substitution in labour supply. But inter-temporal
substitution still takes place. However, the worker tries to
smooth utility by shifting consumption into the high
wage/high hours periods. As σ → –∞ the consumer insists
on equal utility in all periods. Thus, any increase in hours
worked during a high wage period must be fully
compensated by an increase in consumption. Then, the
consumer’s willingness to substitute consumption across
periods puts a damper on his/her willingness to substitute
hours. As a result, the Frisch elasticity is less than (1/γ) and
in the limit it equals the Hicks elasticity.
It is worth recalling that the within-period conditions
(45) or (48) still hold regardless of the form of G. Thus, one
might estimate such an equation and uncover (1/γ), but fail
to realise that this is not the Frisch elasticity. However, one
can still use such equations to obtain the Hicks and
Marshallian elasticities.
Returning to the empirical literature, Ziliak and Kniesner
(2005) also allow for non-separablity between leisure and
consumption, and adopt MaCurdy’s estimation Method 1.
However, they introduce non-separablity not only via the G
function but also by allowing for an interaction between
leisure and consumption in the within-period utility
function Xt. Specifically, they adopt a translog within-period
utility function:
with G[X] = (1 + σ)–1X1+σ. If α3 > 0 then hours and
consumption are complements in the within-period utility
function. This appears to be the only paper that allows for
within-period non-separability while also incorporating
taxes in a dynamic framework.
As in most of the US-based work that estimates versions
of the within-period MRS condition, Ziliak and Kniesner
(2005) use the PSID, which only contains a measure of food
consumption.65 However, they try to improve on this by
using a method proposed by Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston
(2001) to impute nondurable consumption in the PSID.
Essentially, they use the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CES), which has much more complete information on
consumption, to develop an equation for predicting total
nondurable consumption based on food consumption,
food prices and demographics. They also try a method
proposed by Skinner (1987) that predicts total consumption
based on food consumption, house value and rent.
Ziliak and Kniesner use the 1980–1999 waves of the
PSID, which have data on the years 1979–1998. One
advantage over prior work is the long sample period, which
encompasses five significant tax law changes.66 This provides
(84)
63 Earnings increase by about 2 per cent in period 1 and drop by about 1 per cent in period 2. This causes the present value of lifetime earnings (and hence
of consumption) to increase by [1.02 + (0.554)(0.99)]/1.554 ≈ 1.0097 or 0.97 per cent. 
64 Notice that if we take the limit of (83) as σ → −∞ we get that:
For the particular parameter values in this simulation, the term in curly brackets is equal to 0.5. Notice that if η = 0, meaning there are no income effects
(utility linear in consumption) then the second term in the denominator vanishes, and the term in curly brackets is exactly equal to 1. Thus, with utility
linear in consumption, the value of σ has no impact on the Frisch elasticity. What happens in this case is that, for σ < 0, if the wage increases in period t
the consumer fully compensates him or herself by shifting more consumption into period t, holding utility exactly equal across periods. Unlike the case of
η < 0, there is no ‘compromise’ solution where the consumer both shifts more consumption into period t while also damping the hours increase in period t.
Hence, curvature in G does not dampen the Frisch substitution effect in this case. Ironically, a high degree of substitutability in consumption combined
with curvature in G makes the consumer behave in a way that looks a lot like liquidity constrained behaviour (i.e. consumption closely tracks income).
Finally note that when η = 0 the Frisch (1/γ) and Hicks 1/(γ – η) elasticities are always exactly equal regardless of the value of σ. Again, this is because the
consumer is willing to make all utility equalisations across periods via consumption shifting, leaving him/her free to substitute hours of work towards high
wage periods as much as desired. 
65 Recall that the Denver data used by MaCurdy (1983) had a very comprehensive consumption measure.
66 The Economic Recovery Tax Act 1981, the Tax Reform Act 1986, the Omnibus Reconciliation Tax Act 1990 (and also1993), and the Taxpayer Relief Act 1997.
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more variation in the budget constraint to help identify
utility function parameters. The sample includes 3402 male
household heads who were at least 25 in 1980, no older
than 60 in 1999 and who are observed for at least five years.
The authors use the hourly wage rate question for workers
paid by the hour, and, in an effort to reduce denominator
bias, for salaried workers they use the same procedure of
hours bracketing as in their 1999 paper discussed earlier.
Of course, a challenge in incorporating taxes is to
estimate taxable income. The authors assume that all
married men filed joint returns and that all unmarried men
filed as heads of households (the latter being the more
likely source of error). The income of working wives is
included when calculating adjusted gross income (AGI). To
estimate deductions, the authors use IRS estimates of the
average levels of itemised deductions by AGI. From 1984
onwards the PSID reports whether a person itemised or
took the standard deduction. Following MaCurdy, Green
and Paarsch (1990), the authors use a smooth
approximation to the piecewise-linear tax schedule.
The parameters α1 and α2 in equation (84) are allowed
to depend on children, race, and age of youngest child, to
capture how these demographic variables may shift tastes
for work and consumption. Besides these, the instruments
used to estimate the MRS equation, which should be
correlated with after-tax wages and consumption but
uncorrelated with unobserved tastes for work, are age and
education, health, home ownership, and industry, occupation
and region dummies.
The authors estimate that α3 > 0, which implies that
hours and consumption are complements in the within-
period utility function. That is, if work hours are higher
then, ceteris paribus, the marginal utility of consumption is
higher. Ziliak and Kniesner (2005) let σ vary with age, and
estimate σ = 0.844 – 0.039∙Age. This means that σ is roughly
zero at age 20 and falls to –1.496 at age 60.67 However, the
age effect is imprecisely estimated.
Given the translog within-period utility function in (84)
there is no closed form for the Marshallian and Hicks
elasticities. At the mean values in the data, the authors
calculate a Marshallian elasticity of –0.468 (standard error =
0.098) and a Hicks elasticity of 0.328 (standard error =
0.064). These results imply a very large income effect of
–0.796, which is comparable to the large values obtained
by Hausman (1981) and Wales and Woodland (1979). In
the second stage, incorporating information from the inter-
temporal condition (79), they obtain a Frisch elasticity of
0.535. When they restrict α3 = 0 they obtain Marshallian,
Hicks and Frisch elasticities of –0.157, 0.652 and 1.004
respectively (note that the implied income effect is similar).
Thus, ignoring the complementarity between work hours
and consumption appears to cause upward bias in all three
labour supply elasticities.68
Interestingly, Ziliak and Kniesner (2005) examine how
their results are affected by the use of different consumption
measures. The comparison is as follows:
Obviously the Hicks and Frisch elasticity estimates are very
sensitive to the consumption measure used, while the
Marshallian elasticity is relatively insensitive to the
consumption measure. This is reminiscent of our earlier
observation, when discussing the ‘Hausman-MaCurdy
controversy’ that elasticity estimates tend to be quite
sensitive to the wage and non-labour income measures
used. In the context of life-cycle models, the same appears
to be true of the consumption measure.
Finally, the authors use the estimates of within-period
preferences (i.e. the Hicks elasticity) to calculate the
marginal welfare cost of tax increases that raise all tax rates
proportionately. This turns out to be 16 per cent of the
revenue raised. However, if they do the same calculation
using the estimates obtained using the PSID unadjusted
food consumption measure, the welfare loss is only 5 per
cent of the revenue raised.
A novel twist in the literature is taken in the paper by
Pistaferri (2003), who estimates regressions for the change
in hours (i.e. equation (31) or (66)), as does MaCurdy
(1981), Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985) and Altonji
(1986) in papers discussed earlier. But Pistaferri adopts a
very different approach. Recall that the earlier papers
treated the expected change in wages from time t – 1 to t
as unobserved, and hence they used instruments dated at
time t – 1 to construct predicted wage growth in the first
stage of a two-stage least squares procedure. This approach
relies on the assumption that the econometrician knows
quite a bit about how workers forecast wage growth.
Specifically, he/she must be able to pick instruments that 
(i) are uncorrelated with the workers’ forecast errors, and
(ii) are good predictors of the wage growth the workers
actually expect. But as we saw, these papers all suffered
from the problem that coming up with good predictors for
actual wage growth is difficult (i.e. first stage R2s are low).
Perhaps workers can make better predictions of their wage
growth than we can. Furthermore, as we don’t actually
know how workers forecast wage growth, we can’t be sure
Consumption 
measure Marshall Hicks Income effect Frisch
Blundell, Pistaferri 
and Preston (2001) –0.468 0.328 –0.796 0.535
Skinner (1987) –0.313 0.220 –0.533 0.246
PSID unadjusted –0.442 0.094 –0.536 0.148
67 It is a bit difficult to conceptualise what it means for σ to vary with age, given that σ governs how willing a person is to substitute utility across periods.
Does a 20 year old with σ ≈ 0 solve his/her lifetime planning problem as if he/she is very willing to substitute utility inter-temporally, and then engage in
re-planning each year as his/her σ drops? Or does a person plan out his/her life knowing that his/her σ will fall over time? If so, exactly how does one do
that? Does a person fully take into account the preferences of his/her future selves? Apparently, one can circumvent such questions when estimating inter-
temporal conditions like (79), but these issues would have to be confronted to actually obtain a full solution of a person’s lifetime optimisation problem.
I discuss models that involve such full solutions in sesction 7.3.4.
68 I believe the intuition for this result can be explained in the following way. If work and consumption are complements within a period, then a wage
increase affects hours through three channels. There are the usual substitution and income effects. But in addition, a wage increase will, ceteris paribus,
increase consumption. This reduces the marginal utility of leisure at the initial hours level, giving an additional reason for hours to increase. As a result, a
smaller substitution effect is required to explain any given level of responsiveness of hours to wages.
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that all variables dated at time t – 1 are in fact used to make
forecasts, so we can’t be sure they are valid instruments.
The Pistaferri (2003) innovation is to use actual data on
expectations to construct measures of workers’ anticipated
and unanticipated wage growth.69
The data that Pistaferri uses is the Bank of Italy Survey
of Households’ Income and Wealth (SHIW) from 1989,
1991 and 1993. The survey is conducted every two years,
and a fraction of subjects are re-interviewed (creating a
panel component). The survey contains questions about
expected earnings growth, not wage growth. I’ll discuss the
problems this creates below, but first consider how we
could use wage expectations data if we had it.
Recall that the hours growth equations (31) and (66)
contain actual wage growth as a regressor, while the surprise
part of wage growth was relegated to the part of the residual
denoted by ζit or ξit, respectively, which represented how 
the surprise wage change altered the marginal utility of
consumption λit. The presence of this term in the residual
meant that the instruments used to predict wage growth
had to be correlated with expected wage growth and
uncorrelated with unexpected wage growth. Specifically,
recall that:
where I have defined:
Equation (85) consists mostly of definitions that have 
been previously stated and which are collected here for
convenience. For the sake of brevity, I have introduced the
delta notation ΔZt to denote the change in a variable Zt
from t – 1 to t. And I have introduced ψt to denote the
unexpected wage change from t – 1 to t. The only statement
of substance embodied in (85) is the third equality, which
implies that all surprise changes in the marginal utility of
consumption are due to surprise changes in wages. The
term d 1nλit/dψit captures how surprise wage growth 
affects the (log) of the marginal utility of consumption. The
assumption that only wage surprises move λit is a strong
one, which rules out, for example, unexpected transfers 
of assets. I believe that this assumption is important for
Pistaferri’s approach, as I note below.
Now, if expected wage growth could actually be
measured, then, using the definitions in (85), we could
rewrite (66) as:
where ξit in (66) has been replaced by
Furthermore, if we decompose the first term on the right-
hand side of (86)—actual wage growth—into parts that were
anticipated versus unanticipated at time t – 1, we obtain:
Equation (87) captures how anticipated wage changes 
Et–1Δlnwit have only a Frisch substitution effect (1/γ) > 0 on
hours. But unanticipated wage changes {Δlnwit – Et–1Δlnwit}
have both a substitution effect (1/γ) and an income 
effect (1/γ)(dlnλit/dψit) < 0. Thus, the sign of the effect of
unanticipated wage changes is theoretically ambiguous.
Now, a number of authors, including Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999) among others, have argued that tax
reforms (that alter after-tax wages) are generally
unexpected and, to a reasonable approximation, assumed
to be permanent by workers.70 If we grant this, then, as
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) state, the coefficient on
unanticipated wage changes, (1/γ) + (1/γ)(dlnλit/dψit), is
what we should be concerned with for evaluating the
labour supply effects of tax reforms.71 But a staggering
number of issues are being buried under the rug here.
For instance, the coefficient (dlnλit/dψit) depends on
many things, including: (i) how do consumers forecast
future wages? (i.e. to what extent do they expect surprise
wage changes to be permanent or transitory?); (ii) how do
consumers forecast future tax changes? (i.e. to what extent
do they expect tax rule changes to be permanent or
transitory?); and (iii) to what extent do the answers to
questions (i) and (ii) depend on the source of the wage or
tax surprise? (e.g. if a surprise wage change occurs due to
an unexpected change in tax law is it expected to be more
or less persistent than if it occurs due to an unexpected
promotion or layoff?). Many more questions of this type
could be asked.
The first fundamental issue that one must deal with is
how workers map unanticipated wage changes into
expectations of future wages. To do this one must specify a
model of the wage process, and make an assumption
(85)
  
(86)
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(87)
69 This idea is of particular interest to me, as my undergraduate dissertation (Keane 1983), proposed using actual data on money supply growth expectations
to inform the then active debate on effects of anticipated versus unanticipated money supply growth on real economic activity. Like Pistaferri, I argued
that the agents in the market had more information than the econometrician, so that their forecasts might well be better than the hypothetical forecasts
we can construct using regressions of outcomes (e.g. either wage growth or money supply growth) on a set of variables that we assume were in the
agents’ information sets. 
70 Note that the two assumptions are really two sides of the same coin: if one always thinks the current tax regime is unlikely to change, then one will always
be surprised by changes.
71 See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999, p. 1603): ‘As most tax and benefit reforms are probably best described as once-and-for-all unanticipated shifts in net-of-
tax real wages today and in the future, the most appropriate elasticity for describing responses to this kind of shift is αI + γ0’, where αI and γ0 correspond,
in their notation, to the two coefficients on unexpected wage changes in equation (87). 
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about how consumers forecast future wages. Pistaferri
(2003) assumes that log wages follow a random walk
process with drift:
where ψit is the unexpected shock to wage growth.
Pistaferri (2003) further assumes that workers know that
(88) is the wage process, and that they use (88) to forecast
future wages. Ironically, having data on wage expectations
does not enable you to get around the need to make
assumptions about how expectations are formed!72 The key
behavioural assumption implied by (88) is that workers view
all wage innovations as permanent: an unexpected wage
change ψit shifts a worker’s expectation of all his/her future
wages by exactly ψit.
Next, similar to MaCurdy (1981), Pistaferri (2003) must
make an assumption about how current and expected future
wages, as well as current assets, map into the marginal utility
of consumption. Specifically, he assumes that:
There is a fundamental difference between MaCurdy
(1981) and Pistaferri (2003), however, in that MaCurdy
approximates the marginal utility of wealth in a model with
perfect foresight. This is obviously a function of the whole
life-cycle wage path and initial assets, and it varies over
time only according to the deterministic relationship λit =
ρ(1 + rt+1)λi,t+1 (see equation (59)). Thus MaCurdy is trying to
estimate a single ln λi0, while Pistaferri is trying to estimate
the time varying ln λit.73
A key element that an approximation to ln λit ought to
capture is that, as the remaining time horizon grows
shorter, the effect of a one-period increase in the wage
should have a larger effect on the marginal utility of
consumption (i.e. if you are in the terminal period, a
surprise wage increase will be devoted entirely to higher
consumption in that period. If you are in an earlier period,
then a temporary wage increase will have a smaller effect
on current consumption because it will be spread out and
used to increase consumption in the current and all future
periods). Similarly, a permanent wage increase at T – 1
should have about the same effect on consumption in the
last two periods as an (equal sized) wage increase at T
would have on consumption at T.74 This is why the {Γkt}
terms in (89) are allowed to vary over time. Each term has
both a subscript k = 0,…,T – t that indicates the effect of
the expected wage at time k on perceived wealth at time t,
and a time subscript t that allows these effects to change
over time. Of course, if one allowed the {Γkt} terms to vary
in an unconstrained way over k and t there would be a
severe proliferation of parameters. So Pistaferri constrains
them to vary linearly.75
From (89) we get that the surprise change in the
marginal utility of consumption is related to the surprise
change in the wage as follows:
where I have suppressed the time subscripts on the Г to
conserve on notation.
In (90) all of the Γ terms are negative because a surprise
increases in assets, a surprise increase in the current wage,
or a surprise increase in any future wage all increase the
consumer’s perception of his/her wealth. This leads to
higher current consumption and hence a lower marginal
utility of consumption. The second line of the equation
utilises the fact that, given the random walk wage process
assumed in (88), the changes in all future wage expectations
Etlnwi,τ – Et–1lnwi,τ for τ = t + 1,…,T are equal to the current
wage surprise ψit. Again, this is because that surprise is
expected to persist forever. At the opposite extreme, if we
had instead assumed that consumers perceive all wage
surprises as purely transitory, then we would have Etlnwi,τ –
Et–1lnwi,τ = 0 for all τ = t + 1,…,T and the third term in the
second line would vanish. Finally, the last line of (90)
invokes Pistaferri’s assumption of no unexpected asset
changes, and defines Г = Г0 + Г1 + ∙∙∙ + ГT–t.76
(88)
(89)
(90)
72 This point has been made in a different context (forecasting future prices of durable goods) by Erdem et al. (2005). They show that when enough periods
are available one can use the expectations data to estimate expectations formation process, but one still has to impose some a priori structure on the
process. Pistaferri cannot pursue this approach because he only has two periods of expectations data. 
73 MaCurdy (1981) can back out ln λi0 in a second stage after he has estimated the differenced hours equation (62) in the first stage. This is because
estimation of (62) uncovers all the parameters of the hours equation in levels (61), except for (1/γ)ln λi0, which serves as the individual specific constant
term (or ‘fixed effect’) in the levels equation. Having estimated these constants, MaCurdy can regress them on the whole set of life-cycle wages. Of course,
the difficulty that MaCurdy faces is that he only observes wages for his ten-year sample period, not for the whole life-cycle. Thus, he must fit a life-cycle
wage profile for each person using ten years of data. He then regresses (1/γ)ln λi0 on the individual specific parameters of this (assumed quadratic) profile.
Using the coefficient on the wage equation intercept in this equation, MaCurdy can determine how an upward shift in the intercept of the whole wage
profile would affect (1/γ)ln λi0, and hence labour supply. MaCurdy estimates that a 10 per cent increase in wages at all ages would increase labour supply
by only 0.8 per cent. Of course, the problem with this procedure relative to MaCurdy (1983) Method 1 or Blundell and Walker (1986) is the need to
extrapolate out of sample wage information rather than using current consumption or assets as a proxy for lifetime wealth. 
74 The same argument holds for an increase in assets. For instance, a 60 year old who wins a million dollars in the lottery should be much more likely to
retire than a 30 year old. 
75 This is not indicated in notation in his paper (see Pistaferri, equation (8)), but Pistaferri has confirmed this to me in private correspondence.
76 Notice that the wealth effect term Γ gets (mechanically) smaller as t gets larger, simply because there is less of a future horizon over which wages will
increase, so fewer Γt terms are being added up. Counteracting that, as I argued earlier, is that the wealth effect of each individual (period specific) wage
increase should grow larger as one gets closer to the end of the planning horizon.
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Now, given (90), we have that and hence
we can rewrite (87) as:
This gives us Pistaferri’s essential idea. We can use the
coefficient on expected wage changes to estimate the inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution (1/γ), while using the
coefficient on unexpected wage changes to estimate the
‘total’ effect of a wage change, which includes both the
substitution effect and the income effect. Taking the
difference between the two coefficients enables us to isolate
the income effect of a permanent wage increase (Г/γ).
Estimation of this equation would have other key
advantages over the conventional approach, as pursued in
MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986). First, there is no need
to instrument for the wage change variables because now
the unexpected wage change is controlled for rather than
being relegated to the error. This circumvents the problem,
noted earlier, that it is hard to come up with good
predictors for wage growth. Second, as Pistaferri notes, the
best predictors are usually age and education, but it is a
strong assumption that these are excluded instruments that
do not appear in the hours equation itself, as we would
expect these variables to shift tastes for work. Third, the
problem of aggregate shocks that I discussed earlier is
avoided, as the average forecast error no longer enters the
error term.
Unfortunately, there is quite a gap between this
excellent idea and its actual empirical implementation. The
first problem Pistaferri faces is that the Bank of Italy Survey
does not really contain expectations of wage changes, but
only of earnings changes. Pistaferri shows how to construct
a version of (91) where expected and unexpected earnings
replace wages, and the coefficients are suitably modified.
However, as Pistaferri notes, this introduces a major
problem: unobserved shifts in tastes for work will, of
course, alter earnings (since earnings are a function of
hours). And, as in all the models we have considered so far,
unobserved tastes for work (Δεit) enter the error term in 
the hours equation. This renders expected and unexpected
earnings changes endogenous.
Second, expected earnings changes are presumably
measured with error. Given that variables such as hours and
earnings are measured with error (as are even simple
demographic variables in some cases), it would be highly
implausible to assume that a more subtle variable such as
the expected change in earnings is not measured with error
as well. Furthermore, there may well be systematic errors
arising from how respondents interpret the question. The
question reads, ‘We are interested in knowing your opinion
(91)
77 Pistaferri (2003) contains a couple of other elements that I haven’t mentioned. His version of (91) includes a measure of the perceived variance of earnings,
also obtained from the survey of expectations. But he finds that variance is not significant in the hours equation. He also tests for separability between
leisure and consumption but does not find strong evidence for non-separability. Finally, Pistaferri also uses his data to estimate an hours change regression
like that estimated in MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986), using a cubic in age and education and interactions between age and education as instruments.
This produces a Frisch elasticity of 0.318 with a standard error of 0.319. The R2 in the first stage regression is only 0.0025 with an F-statistic of 1.73. One
of the key advances in econometric practice since the 1980s is the much greater attention that is now paid to the problem of weak instruments in the
first stage of 2SLS regressions. A common rule of thumb is that the F-statistic should be at least 5 before results can be trusted. 
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about your labour earnings or pensions twelve months from
now’. Do we think respondents would or would not include
expected tax changes when answering such a question?
And, while the expectations question asked about earnings
twelve months hence, the data on wages, hours and earnings
were collected in 1989, 1991 and 1993. In order to align the
two-year time interval of the earnings data with the one-
year forecast horizon, Pistaferri assumes a person would
have projected their earnings growth rate forecast to persist
for two years, an additional source of measurement error.
Both of these problems suggest that it may be
necessary to instrument for expected and unexpected
changes in earnings, using variables that help predict these
variables but that are uncorrelated with taste shocks and
measurement error. In that case, one of the key advantages
of Pistaferri’s procedure is lost. Pistaferri (2003) does not
actually attempt to deal with these problems, and he
estimates his version of (91) by least squares. 
For estimation, Pistaferri uses data on male household
heads who were aged between 26 and 59 in 1989. There
are 1,461 person-year observations in the unbalanced
panel. As observed taste shifters, he uses age, education,
region, family size, whether the spouse or other household
members work, and the number of children in various age
ranges. He estimates that the Frisch elasticity is 0.704
(standard error = 0.093) and the income effect (Г/γ) is
–0.199 (standard error = 0.091). Thus, the elasticity of
labour supply with respect to a surprise permanent upward
shift in the wage profile is 0.51. That is, a permanent
unexpected 10 per cent wage increase would cause a 5 per
cent increase in labour supply. This is a very large
uncompensated wage effect, and it implies that permanent
tax changes have very large effects on labour supply. The
result contrasts sharply with MaCurdy (1981) whose
comparable estimate is only a 0.8 per cent increase. We
should view both results with some caution, however, given
the data limitations noted above.77
It is important to note also that Italy had a recession in
1993. Pistaferri (2003) includes a 1993 dummy in (91) and
obtains a coefficient of –0.068 with a standard error of 0.023.
This is a large value, implying a 6.8 per cent decline in hours
not explained by the model. This would appear to suggest
that workers in Italy are not always free to adjust hours in the
short run, and that there was demand-induced rationing.
Bover (1989) adopts a different approach to estimating
responses to both anticipated wage changes and
unanticipated permanent wage changes within the life-cycle
framework. Her innovation is to use a Stone-Geary utility
function in place of the utility function (1) that was adopted
by MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986). The virtue of the
Stone-Geary is that it can deliver a closed form solution 
for the marginal utility of consumption λ. The Stone-Geary
functional form is:
where Hmax and Cmin, which denote maximum feasible
hours of work and minimum subsistence consumption
respectively, are parameters to be estimated. βit is a
parameter that captures tastes for leisure relative to
consumption. Given this functional form, the marginal
utility of consumption and leisure are given by:
Thus, the usual within-period MRS conditional gives us:
From (94) we solve for labour supply as a function of the
marginal utility of consumption λit:
where the equation to the right of the arrow is simply a
rearrangement of the labour supply equation that will be
useful below.78 Now, using (95) we can obtain the Frisch
elasticity as follows:
This expression is not particularly useful as it still involves λit,
but we can use the right side of (95) to substitute out for
βit and obtain:
This equation illustrates the restrictiveness of the Stone-
Geary utility function for this purpose. The single parameter
Hmax will determine the Frisch elasticity (at any given level
of hours) but, as we see from (95), this parameter also plays
a key role in determining the average level of hours. The
restrictiveness creates problems in fitting the data, as we
will see below.
Now, returning to the issue of solving for λ, we first use
(93) to solve for labour supply as a function of the marginal
utility of consumption λit:
Now, following Bover (1989), we assume perfect foresight and
assume that ρ(1 + r) = 1. In this case, λit is just a person-specific
constant λi, and we can write the demand functions as:
Note that with perfect foresight the lifetime budget constraint
would be:
Substituting the (99) into the budget constraint, and
approximating finite sums by infinite sums (Bover 1989), we
obtain, after some simple algebra:
The right-hand side of (100) is the definition of lifetime ‘full
income’ in the Stone-Geary setup (i.e. initial assets plus the
present value of the maximum amount one could possibly
earn in excess of the subsistence consumption level Cmin).
Notice that as lifetime wealth (as measured by full income)
increases, the marginal utility of consumption λi falls. We
can now use (100) to substitute for λi in the labour supply
equation in (99), obtaining:
Now, to see how a permanent increase in wages would
alter labour supply it is useful to specify a process for
wages, such as the linear time trend wit = α0i + α1it that 
Bover (1989) chooses. Substituting this into (100) we obtain:
Now we can calculate the elasticity of labour supply with
respect to an anticipated permanent wage increase (i.e. an
upward shift in the whole wage profile induced by
increasing the wage equation intercept α0i). We have:
The first term on the right is the substitution effect that
arises from the increase in the current wage, while the
second term is the income effect that arises due to the
increase in Fi.79 Bover shows how to extend this analysis to
the uncertainty case where wages evolve stochastically, but
I will not discuss this in detail as her empirical results for the
uncertainty case are nearly identical to those in the perfect
foresight model.
Bover (1989) estimates the labour supply model
obtained by combining (101) and (102) using PSID data
(92)
(93)
(94)
(95)
(96)
(97)
(98)
(99)
 
(100)
(101)
(102)
 
78 It is worth noting that, in contrast to (61) or (70), the labour supply equation in (95) does not take a form where it is possible to eliminate the unobserved
λit term via a simple transform such as taking logs and differencing. However, note that Lit ≡ Hmax – hit is interpretable as leisure. If we observe leisure then
we could write the demand for leisure as lnLit = lnβit – lnwit – ln λit. Thus, the Frisch elasticity of demand for leisure is simply –1. This means that the Frisch
elasticity of demand for labour is:
Thus, if leisure were observed the Frisch elasticity would simply be the ratio of leisure hours to labour hours, and it would not depend on any model
parameters. This illustrates the lack of flexibility of the Stone-Geary functional form for this purpose. 
79 The second term is equivalent to the expression in Bover (1989), equation (11). That expression gives the wealth effect of shifting up the wage profile,
but it does not include the current wage effect. 
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from 1968–1976. She uses data on 785 white men aged
20–50 in 1968, requiring that they have positive annual
hours and wages for all periods. In a first stage, she uses
the ten years of wage observations for each person to
estimate the person-specific parameters in the wage
equation wit = α0i + α1it.80 As usual, randomness is introduced
into the labour supply model by letting the taste shift
variable βit in (101) be stochastic. It is also allowed to vary
with age and number of children. The wage is treated as
endogenous, both due to measurement error and because
workers with a high unobserved taste for work may work
harder and thus achieve a higher wage rate. The
instruments are the typical age and education variables,
along with the state unemployment rate (interpreted as a
demand shifter) and time dummies.
Turning to the estimates, the value of Hmax is 2,353 hours
(standard error = 43). This result seems rather implausible,
given that many people do in fact work more than 2,353
hours. Indeed, Bover reports that observed hours exceed
Hmax for 65 per cent of observations. As I discussed earlier,
the Frisch elasticity in the Stone-Geary model is simply
(Hmax – hit)/hit, and since hit exceeds 2,000 for most working
men, the low value of Hmax guarantees that the Frisch
elasticity will be quite small. At the mean of the data Bover
calculates that it is 0.08. Bover also finds very small income
effects. Thus, she reports that the response of hours to a
shift in the entire life-cycle wage profile is trivially small. But
the main point of these results seems to be to cast doubt
on the ability of a model with Stone-Geary preferences to
fit observed hours data—which is unfortunate given that
the Stone-Geary delivers a simple form for λ.
7.3.4 Incorporating Human Capital into the 
Life-Cycle Model
A fundamental problem with all of the labour supply models
that I discussed in sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 is that they treat
wages as exogenous. That is, they ignore the fact that work
experience may lead to increased wages. If that is the case,
it has rather striking implications for all of the proposed
estimation methods discussed in those earlier sections.
To see this, let’s return to the simple two-period model
of (17) but assume that the wage in period 2, rather than
being exogenously fixed, is an increasing function of hours
of work in period 1. Specifically, I will assume that:
where α is the percentage growth in the wage per unit of
work. Given a two-period model with each period
corresponding to twenty years, it is plausible in light of
existing estimates that αh1, the percentage growth in the
wage rate over twenty years, is around one-third to a half.81
Once we introduce human capital accumulation via
work experience as in (103), equation (17) is replaced by:
and the first order conditions for the problem are now:
Comparing (105) to (18) we see that it now includes an
extra term ρC
η
2w1αh2(1 – τ2), which captures the effect of an
extra hour of work at t = 1 on the present value of earnings
at t = 2. If we perform the usual manipulations on (105) to
obtain the within-period MRS condition we now obtain:
This can be simplified by using (107) to eliminate C
η
2 / C
η
1 =
[ρ(1 + r)]–1 giving:
It is useful to compare (108) to (42), the MRS condition for
the model without human capital. Here the opportunity
cost of time is no longer simply the after-tax wage rate.
Instead, it is augmented by the term αw1h2(1 – τ2)/(1 + r),
which captures the effect of an extra hour of work at t = 1
on the present value of earnings at t = 2.
Of course, in a multi-period model, this extra term
would instead be the effect of an extra hour of work at t = 1
on the present value of all future earnings, which depends
on hours of work in all future periods. Thus, the essential
idea of Method 1 (MaCurdy 1983) and the related two-
stage budgeting technique whereby current period
consumption can be used as a sufficient statistic for all
future period variables no longer holds.
Suppose we ignore this problem and attempt to
estimate the parameters of preferences by estimating (42)
ignoring the human capital term. Then the resultant bias
will depend on the size of the human capital term relative
to the after-tax wage. If the human capital term were
trivially small then ignoring it might not be a problem.
However, a simple back of the envelope calculation in
Keane (2009a) suggests that, given plausible values for the
return to work experience in the United States,82 at age 20
the human capital term is roughly the same size as the
wage rate, so that for a 20-year-old worker the opportunity
(103)
(104)
(105)
(106)
(107)
  
(108)
80 As in MaCurdy (1981), a profile is also fit to assets, and the intercept is used to measure initial assets Ai0. 
81 For instance, using the PSID, Geweke and Keane (2000) estimate that for men with a high school degree, average earnings growth from age 25–45 is 33
per cent. For men with a college degree, they estimate a rate of 52 per cent. Most of this earnings growth is in fact due to wage growth because the
growth in hours is modest. 
82 Specifically, Keane (2009a) specifies a Mincer-type wage equation with a quadratic in work experience. Parameters are set so a full year of work experience
increases the wage rate by 5.7 per cent at age 20, but by only 1.3 per cent at age 40. That is lnwit = constant + 0.057 x – 0.11 x2/100, where x is years of
work experience. 
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cost of time is roughly double the wage. As a worker ages
there is less time to recoup the gains to human capital
investment, so the size of the human capital term falls. The
same back of the envelope calculation in Keane (2009a)
suggests that by age 40 the human capital term is only
about 20 per cent as large as the wage.
We can get a more precise idea of how the presence of
human capital investment will bias standard methods of
estimating the Frisch elasticity based on hours change
regressions like (62). If we divide (106) by (105), using (107)
to cancel out the consumption terms, we obtain:
We can simplify this to a more intuitive expression if we plug
in w2 = w1(1 + αh1) and assume that τ1 = τ2 = τ. Then we get:
Taking logs we obtain:
This is the same as the first difference log wage equations
typically used to estimate the Frisch elasticity (e.g. see
equation (22)), except now we have the additional
term, –ln(1 + αh2/(1 + r)). Notice that this term is negative:
the existence of wage growth with experience (α > 0) will,
ceteris paribus, cause workers to shift hours towards the
early part of the life-cycle. As a result, hours grow less over
the life-cycle than they would if wage growth were
exogenous.
Thus, conventional estimates of (1/γ) will be biased
downward. Since human capital dampens the association
between hours growth and wage growth, a model that
ignores human capital will rationalise the observed (smaller)
association via a smaller value of (1/γ).
How large is the magnitude of this bias likely to be?
One way to think about the problem is to note that the
correct way to estimate (1/γ) would not be to regress hours
growth on wage growth but to instead to regress hours
growth on the growth of the opportunity cost of time, that
is, on lnw2/w1(1 + αh2/(1 + r)). Referring to the back of the
envelope calculation from Keane (2009a) mentioned earlier,
I find that, using conventional estimates of returns to
experience, the opportunity cost of time grows roughly six
times more slowly than the wage from age 20 to age 40.83
Given that differential, we would expect conventional
estimates of (1/γ) that ignore human capital to be biased
downward by roughly a factor of 6.
Another way to look at the problem is to simplify (109)
by assuming that ρ(1 + r) = 1 and that β1 = β2. Then, if we
solve (109) for (1/γ) we obtain:
 
 
(109)
(110)
83 This occurs, of course, because the human capital term αwtht+1/(1+r) shrinks over time as the wage wt grows.
84 That is, it does not plot any particular data set, but simply illustrates the typical patterns for male wages and hours observed across a broad range of data sets. 
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Figure 7.4 Hours, Wages and Price of Time over the
Life-Cycle
Notes: HC denotes the return to an hour of work experience in terms of
increased present value of future wages. The opportunity cost of time is
wage + HC.
Hours, Wage
HC
Hours
Wage + HC
Wage
Age
Thus, wage growth from t = 1 to t = 2 would have to be
adjusted downward by roughly αh2/(1 + r) percentage points
in order to correct for the missing human capital term (and
obtain a valid estimate of the growth of the opportunity
cost of time).
As I noted earlier, a reasonable (and, in fact, conservative)
estimate of αh1 (i.e. wage growth during the first twenty
years of the working life) is about 33 per cent. For
illustration, let’s suppose that h2 is 20 per cent greater than
h1, so that αh2 is roughly 40 per cent. As I also noted earlier,
in a two-period model a reasonable value for ρ = 1/(1 + r)
is 0.554, giving αh2/(1 + r) = 22 per cent. Hence, for these
values, we need to subtract roughly 22 percentage points
off the rate of wage growth to obtain the growth in the
opportunity cost of time (i.e. 33 per cent – 22 per cent = 11
per cent). If we had used observed wage growth to
calculate 1/γ, we would obtain 20/33 ≈ 0.60 for the Frisch
elasticity. But the correct value is ln(1.20)/ln[1.33/1.22] ≈
2.1. Thus, for reasonable parameter values, the downward
bias in estimates of the Frisch elasticity due to ignoring
human capital will tend to be very substantial.
Finally, there is a useful graphical intuition for the same
idea. Figure 7.4 presents a stylised plot of male wage rates
and hours of work over the life-cycle.84 The black line
represents annual hours of work. It has a hump shape as
noted in the descriptive regressions presented by Pencavel
(1986), with a peak at roughly age 45 and a fairly rapid
decline in the 50s and 60s. The dotted line is the wage rate
which also has a characteristic hump shape. As has been
noted by many studies, male wages grow very rapidly early
in the life-cycle, peak in the 40s, and then decline. (Some
studies have also found that wage growth in the early part
of the life-cycle is faster for more educated workers.)
Now, as we have seen, the typical study in the male
labour supply literature regresses hours (or hours growth)
on wages (or wage growth), and, in order to deal with
problems of measurement error and endogeneity, it
instruments for wages (or wage growth) using primarily
polynomials in age and education. These instruments are
chosen precisely because they capture the hump shape of
the life-cycle wage path depicted in Figure 7.4; of course,
the predicted wages based on these instruments will closely
track the typical life-cycle wage path depicted in the figure.
Thus, when one regresses hours on predicted wages, one
will essentially uncover the relative slope of the hours and
wage curves in Figure 7.4. Since the wage path is much
steeper than the hours path over most of the life-cycle, the
estimated elasticity of hours with respect to predicted wage
changes will be much less than 1.0.
The thick grey line in Figure 7.4 represents the return to
human capital investment. That is, it is the return to an
additional hour of work in terms of increased future wages
(and hence increased future earnings) captured by the second
term in equation (108). As I noted earlier, given reasonable
estimates of the return to experience this term will be at least
as great as the wage rate itself at the start of a person’s
working life. But it falls quickly over time and is zero in the
terminal period (when investment serves no further purpose).
The opportunity cost of time, as indicated in (108), is the sum
of the wage rate and this human capital effect. This is
represented by the dashed line in Figure 7.4. Note that the
dashed line is much less steep than the wage line. Thus,
hours appear to be much more responsive to changes in the
opportunity cost of time than to changes in the wage rate.
In another paper (Keane 2009b), I pointed out that if
returns to work experience are important, there will be
important implications for tax policy. Returning to (108) we
see that a temporary t = 1 tax increase affects only the
current wage w1(1 – τ1) but does not alter the return on
human capital investment. But a permanent tax increase,
which increases both τ1 and τ2, will reduce the human capital
return αw1h2(1 – τ2)/(1 + r) as well. Thus, looking only at the
effect of wages on hours may have consequences beyond
just causing us to understate how responsive workers are to
changes in the opportunity cost of time. It may also cause
us to understate the responsiveness of workers to
permanent tax rate changes.
Put another way, (108) implies that, contrary to
conventional wisdom, a permanent tax change may have a
larger effect on current labour supply than a temporary tax
change (as the former alters only the current wage while
the latter also alters the return on human capital
investment). Keane (2009b) shows that in a model with
both human capital and saving it is theoretically ambiguous
whether a permanent or transitory tax change has a larger
effect on current labour supply. A permanent tax increase
has both (i) a larger income effect and (ii) a larger effect on
the return to human capital than a temporary tax increase.
These factors have opposite effects on current labour
supply. Keane (2009b) presents simulations showing that
for quite plausible parameter values the human capital
effect dominates, so that permanent tax changes have
larger effects.
I now turn to the empirical literature on male life-cycle
labour supply that includes human capital accumulation.
Unfortunately, there are very few papers of this type. As far
as I am aware, the first paper to estimate a life-cycle model
with human capital was Heckman (1976). The computing
technology available at that time did not permit estimation
of a model where workers decide jointly on savings and
human capital investment, particularly not while also
allowing for uncertainty in wages and stochastic taste
shocks. Thus, Heckman’s model is deterministic and only
attempts to fit ‘typical’ life-cycle paths of wages and hours.
The Heckman (1976) approach is rather different from
the ‘learning by doing’ human capital investment model
that I have described here (see equation (103)). Instead of
specifying that work experience increases human capital in
and of itself, Heckman follows Ben-Porath (1967) and Haley
(1973) in using a type of model where a worker may
choose to devote some fraction of his/her work time to
investment. The worker is paid only for productive time, not
time spent learning. But observed labour supply is the sum
of all time at work: actual productive time plus investment
time. Hence, the observed market wage rate in period t is
given by wt = w*t (1 – S(t)), where wt is the worker’s actual
productivity and S(t) is the fraction of his/her time at work
that the worker spends in investing in human capital.
The key similarity between Heckman’s model and the
learning-by-doing model is that the observed market 
wage rate wt is not the true opportunity cost of time. In
Heckman’s model that is w*t, the workers true productivity,
as that is what the worker gives up per unit of time spent
in leisure or learning. Since w*t = wt/(1 – S(t)), the true cost
of time exceeds the wage rate by the multiplier 1/( 1– S(t)),
which is an increasing function of the fraction of his/her
time at work that the worker spends investing in human
capital. So fundamentally his model is quite similar in spirit
to the approach taken in equations (109)–(110), in that
human capital investment causes the opportunity cost of
time to exceed the wage rate.
Heckman (1976) estimates an equation for S(t) jointly
with an equation for observed hours and wages (derived
from a particular functional form mapping investment time
into wages). The model is estimated using data on 23–65-
year-old males from the United States in 1970, but as
noted, the model is deterministic and it is fit to average
wages and hours (by age). Heckman’s estimate of the S(t)
function implies that 23-year-old male workers spend
roughly 35 per cent of their work time in human capital
investment activity. Hence, their opportunity cost of time
exceeds their observed wage rate by roughly 54 per cent.
The fraction of time spent on investment is estimated to
drop steadily, becoming near zero per cent at about age 40.
Thus, his estimates imply that the opportunity cost of time
grows by only 65 per cent as much as the observed wage
rate from age 23 to age 40.85
Shaw (1989) substantially extended Heckman (1976) by
estimating a model where workers make joint decisions
about savings and human capital investment, incorporating
uncertainty about future wages and hours. Her approach is
85 Note that: w*40 /w*23 = w40/[w23/(1 – 0.35)] = (0.65)(w40/w23).
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to estimate an equation similar to equation (108), the MRS
condition. However, to use the model with data one must
first extend it to multiple periods and introduce uncertainty.
In that case (108) becomes:
and the wage equation (103) becomes wt+1 = wt + (αht)wt.
Note that a one unit increase in hours at time t will raise the
wage rate by (αwt) in all future periods. This induces an
increase in earnings of (αwt)ht+1+τ for τ = t + 1,…,T. We can
thus see that the second term in (111) is the expected
present value of the increased (after-tax) earnings in all
future periods obtained by working an extra unit of time at
time t.
The problem with estimating (111) is that it involves
hours of work in all future periods, which will not be
available in any data set. Shaw (1989) uses the following
trick to get around this problem. First, rewrite (111) as:
Now take (111) and date it forward one period:
Now, notice that the summations in (112) and (112’) are
identical, except for a factor of 1/(1 + r) and the dating of
the expectation. So, by pre-multiplying (112’) by 1/(1 + r)
and taking the expectation at time t we obtain:
Intuitively, these manipulations are useful because the
worker knows (or, rather, we assume he/she knows) that at
time t + 1 he/she will choose hours and consumption to
satisfy expression (112’’). Thus, we can use the worker’s
own labour supply and consumption behaviour at t + 1,
described by the simple expression on the left, to infer what
he/she believes about the complex expectation term sitting
on the right.86
So, using (112’’) to substitute for the summation term
in (112), we obtain:
This is an equation that is feasible to estimate, as it only
requires data on hours at t and t + 1, wages at t and t + 1,
and consumption at time t and t + 1. The final step is to
replace the expectation term with its actual realisation,
while appending a forecast error:
Equation (114) is the basic type of equation that Shaw
(1989) estimates.87 The estimation is done in two stages. In
the first stage, a wage equation is estimated to determine
how wages grow with work experience (the parameter α in
equation (114)). In the second stage, the wage equation
parameters are treated as known and (114) is estimated by
instrumental variables. Valid instruments are variables
known by workers at time t, so they are uncorrelated with
the forecast error ξt+1.
While (114) is similar to the equation that Shaw (1989)
estimates, she does not include taxes. On the other hand,
she introduces a number of additional complications. First,
rather than that the utility function in (1) she uses a translog
utility function as in (84), with G(X) = X. As a consequence,
the marginal utility of consumption and leisure terms in
(114) become more complicated. Second, she lets the taste
for work parameter β vary across workers based on schooling
level. Third, in the wage equation she allows the rental rate
on human capital to vary over time.
It is interesting that Shaw (1989) does not introduce
stochastic variation in tastes as in all the previous studies we
have examined. The reason why can be seen by looking
back at the simple MRS condition for the model without
human capital, (58), and following the steps that led to the
estimating equation (66), where expectation errors and
taste shocks entered as a composite additive error. This
meant we could estimate (66) by instrumental variables
without having to assume any distribution for the forecast
errors and taste shocks. In contrast, looking at (114), we
see that if β is allowed to have a stochastic component then
that term will enter (114) in a highly nonlinear way. Thus, is
not possible to make the taste shock ‘pop out’ into an
additive error that could be combined with the ξt. This, in
turn, would make the simple application of instrumental
variables estimation infeasible.88
Turning to the wage equation, Shaw (1989) assumes
that a worker’s human capital, denoted by K, evolves
according to:
That is, current human capital is a quadratic function of last
year’s human capital and last year’s hours of work. The {τt}
are year-specific aggregate shocks to the productivity
growth rate, and the {εit} are person-specific productivity
shocks (i.e. illness, involuntary job separations, etc.).
The wage rate is then determined by the aggregate rental
price of human capital times the stock of human capital:
(111)
(112)
(112’)
(112’’)
(113)
(114)
(115)
86 Interestingly, this is a continuous data analogue of the procedure developed by Hotz and Miller (1993) to infer agents’ expectations from their discrete
choices in discrete choice dynamic models. 
87 Shaw (1989) also substitutes for consumption at t + 1 using the familiar relationship  Cηt = Etρ(1 + r)C
η
t+1.
88 Recently, I proposed a method (Keane 2009c) for estimating models where multiple stochastic terms enter the first order conditions nonlinearly.
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Shaw (1989) allows the rental prices to vary over time in an
unconstrained way. However, as the units of human capital
are arbitrary, the rental price must be normalised to one 
in one year of the data, R1 = 1. An estimable wage equation
is obtained by substituting the expression for Kit in (116)
into (115). The parameters to be estimated are the {α}, the
rental rates,{Rt}Tt = 2, and the time dummies, {τt}.
Shaw (1989) estimates the wage equation using data
on white males, aged 18–64, from the 1968–1981 waves
of the PSID. The instruments are a polynomial in current (i.e.
dated at time t) wages and hours, along with schooling,
age, the local unemployment rate, a South dummy and
year dummies. The assumption is that these variables are
uncorrelated with the person-specific productivity shock εit
in (115).
It is worth commenting on the use of current hours hit
as an instrument. In general, we would expect the person-
specific productivity shock εit to enter the decision rule for
hours of work. For example, if εit is high, a person realises
that his/her human capital is going to rise substantially at
time t + 1, even if he/she has low current hours of work.
Thus, assuming there are diminishing returns to human
capital, we would expect the person to work less at time t.
Thus, under this scenario, current hours is not a valid
instrument. The key assumption that would validate using
hours as an instrument is if the person-specific productivity
shock εit is not revealed until after the worker decides on
current hours of work.
Another important point is that, unlike conventional
studies in the human capital literature, the wage equation
estimated here does not include an individual effect to
capture a person’s unobserved skill endowment. Shaw
(1989) makes the point that this is not necessary here,
because the lagged level of human capital proxies for
unobserved ability.
Given (115), the derivative of human capital with
respect to hours of work is:
The estimates are α3 = 0.30, α4 = –3.55 and α5 = 0.69. To
interpret these figures, let R = 1, and note that mean hours
in the data is 2160 while the mean wage rate is $3.91.
Then, noting that hit is defined as hours divided by 1000,
we have, at the mean of the data:
This implies, for example, that an increase of 500 in hours of
work at time t (which is an increase in ht of 0.5) would increase
the wage rate at t + 1 by 30 cents per hour. In percentage
terms, this is a 23 per cent hours increase causing an 8 per
cent wage increase. This is a very strong effect of work
experience on wages; far stronger that the ‘conservative’
estimates I used for the back of the envelope calculations of
the size of experience effects that I discussed earlier.
Notice that the positive estimate of α3 implies that
hours of work and human capital are complements in the
production of additional human capital. That is, wages rise
more quickly with work experience for high wage workers
than low wage workers.
The estimates also imply that human capital rental rates
are quite volatile, although the year-specific rental rates are
quite imprecisely estimated. Interestingly, Shaw (1989) reports
that the series of annual rental rates for the fourteen years of
data has a correlation of –0.815 with an index for the price
of fuel. This is consistent with other results (Keane 1993)
showing that oil price movements in the 1970s and 1980s
had very large effects on real wages in the United States.
Shaw (1989) estimates the first order condition (114)
using a subset of the data (ten years) because the PSID did
not collect food consumption data in 1967–1968 and
1975. The instruments, which are assumed uncorrelated
with the forecast error ξt+1, include a fully interacted
quadratic in the time t values of leisure (obtained by taking
8760 minus hours of work), food consumption, and the
wage rate (constructed as annual earnings divided by
annual hours). Also included are education, age, the local
unemployment rate, a South dummy and time dummies.
The parameter estimates are reasonable, implying that the
marginal utility of leisure and consumption are both positive,
and with diminishing marginal returns. The coefficient on the
cross term between consumption and leisure is negative,
implying hours of work and consumption are complements.
The discount factor is estimated to be 0.958. More
interesting, however, are the simulations of the model.
Unfortunately, first order conditions like (114) are
generally inadequate to simulate the behaviour of workers
in a life-cycle model. The problem is that the first order
condition, combined with the law of motion for human
capital (equation (115)) and the law of motion for assets
(At+1 = (1+r)(wtht – Ct + At)), only tell us how hours, wages
and assets move from one period to the next, conditional
on a particular starting point. That is, conditional on some
levels of assets, the wage rate, hours and consumption at 
t = 1, these equations can be used to simulate what levels of
hours and consumption the worker would choose at t = 2,
as well as the new levels of assets and wages that these
choices would lead to. So, from a particular assumed
starting point it is possible to simulate the behaviour of a
worker going forward. However, the assumed starting
point is arbitrary. The first order conditions cannot be used
to determine the optimal first period choices for the worker
implied by the model. To achieve that we need to obtain
what is known as a ‘full solution’ of the worker’s dynamic
optimisation problem, which I’ll return to shortly.
This criticism is not particular to the model in Shaw
(1989). Indeed, it applies to all of the methods based on
estimating first order conditions of life-cycle models that I
discussed earlier (e.g. MaCurdy 1983, Method 1), as well as
to the life-cycle consistent methods of estimating labour
supply equations (e.g. MaCurdy 1983, Method 2; Blundell
& Walker 1986).89 Furthermore, the criticism as I have stated
(116)
  
89 MaCurdy (1983) himself emphasised the limitations of all these approaches. As he stated: 
Implementing the above procedures yields estimates required to formulate the lifetime preference function, but…this…is not sufficient to determine
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it omits the further problem that even to use the first order
conditions to simulate forward from an arbitrary starting
point, one still needs the know the distribution of the
stochastic terms (e.g. the forecast error ξt+1 in the case of
equation (114)). The instrumental variables estimation
techniques that are typically used to estimate first order
conditions do not deliver estimates of the distributions of
the stochastic terms of the model, making even this limited
type of analysis infeasible.90
These problems explain why authors who have
estimated dynamic models using first order conditions or
life-cycle consistent methods have sometimes used the
estimated preference parameters to simulate how workers
would respond to tax policy changes under the
hypothetical situation that they live in a static world (with a
static budget constraint). An example of this was MaCurdy
(1983). In some cases such simulations are informative. For
instance, in the simple life-cycle model of equations
(16)–(17) the response of workers to a permanent
anticipated tax change is given simply by the Marshallian
elasticity of the static model (1), which is given by (8). But
only in special cases will such an equivalence hold. It
certainly will not hold in a model with human capital
because if a tax change alters labour supply at time t it will
also alter the pre-tax wage at t + 1. Thus, the response to tax
changes will generally differ by age.91
Consistent with the above discussion, Shaw (1989)
conducts her simulations by choosing particular arbitrary 
t = 1 values for wages, hours and assets, and setting the
stochastic terms to zero. Despite these limitations, the
simulations are interesting. Take a worker starting out at
age 18 with a wage of $3.30 per hour and working 2200
hours per year. The simulations imply that such a worker’s
wage would rise to roughly $3.65 over the first eight years
of employment (an 11 per cent increase), but his/her hours
are essentially flat (in fact, they decline very slightly). This
behaviour illustrates a somewhat extreme version of the
phenomenon I described in Figure 7.4. Even though the
wage increases by 11 per cent over the first eight years, the
opportunity cost of time does not rise because the drop in
the human capital return to experience is sufficient to
outweigh it. As a result, hours do not rise. Thus, a
researcher looking at these simulated data through the lens
of a model that ignores human capital would conclude
there is no inter-temporal substitution whatsoever in labour
supply, yet we know that in the true model that generates
the simulated data there is inter-temporal substitution.92
In a dynamic life-cycle model, simulating the behaviour
of an agent over the whole life (including the initial period)
requires not only the first order conditions as in (114), but
a ‘full solution’ of the dynamic optimisation problem. Full
solution methods are discussed in detail in a number of
references, including Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), Keane
and Wolpin (1994) and Geweke and Keane (2001). A full
solution requires constructing the value function at every
point in the state space, which in the present case means at
every possible level of human capital and savings. To see
this, let’s take the value function for the simple two-period
model (104) and extend it to a multi-period setting (with
uncertainty):
The value function now has a t subscript as it is specific to
time period t, as opposed to being a lifetime value function.
The arguments of the value function, which determine a
worker’s current state, are human capital, assets, the
human capital rental rate and tastes for work.
The first term on the right-hand side of (117) is utility at
time t, as opposed to time t = 1 in equation (104). And the
time t = 2 term on the right-hand side of (104) is replaced by
the expected present value of utility in all periods from t +
1 until the terminal period T. For expositional simplicity I will
assume that uncertainty arises from only two sources: the
rental rate Rt and tastes for work βt evolving stochastically
over time.93 As is common in these types of models, I assume
the stochastic terms are independent over time.94
The notation Et{· | (Kt+1, At+1)} indicates that the
expectation is taken conditional on next period’s state
variables Kt+1 and At+1. How can the worker take an
expectation at time t based on variables dated t + 1? The
model is set up so that human capital and assets evolve
deterministically. That is, the current human capital and asset
(117)
how a consumer will respond to various shifts in budget or asset accumulation constraints, such as those arising from changes in wages or in tax
policies…To form predictions for such responses, it is necessary to introduce sufficient assumptions to provide for a complete…formulation of the
lifetime optimization problem…which, in addition to a function for preferences, requires a full specification for a consumer’s expectations regarding
current and future opportunities…Given a particular formulation for the lifetime optimization problem, one…[can conduct]…simulation analysis
which involves numerically solving the consumer’s optimization problem for the different situations under consideration. 
The numerical procedure that MaCurdy describes here is what I refer to as a ‘full solution’ of the optimisation problem. 
90 Keane (2009c) develops an estimation method that involves estimating the distribution of stochastic terms that enter first order conditions. 
91 Indeed, Keane (2009b) argues that, in a model with human capital, tax changes cannot be viewed as inducing exogenous changes in after-tax wages
because the worker’s labour supply response to the tax change affects his/her wage, rendering the wage change endogenous.
92 Shaw (1989) admits that her model actually provides a rather poor fit to the data because hours for youth do in fact exhibit a moderate rise in the first
several years after they enter the labour market. She attributes this to factors omitted from the model. Note, however, that it is the very large experience
return in her model that drives this result, by causing the opportunity cost of time to greatly exceed the wage at t = 1. 
93 Uncertainty, and hence the need to take an expectation of the time t + 1 outcome, may arise for a number of other reasons. For instance, wage uncertainty
may also arise because there is some stochastic component to how human capital evolves, as in (115). And asset uncertainty may arise because there is
some stochastic component to how assets evolve (i.e. interest rates are stochastic). All of these features may be incorporated fairly simply, but they would
complicate the exposition. 
94 Stochastic terms such as tastes for work are often assumed to consist of a part that is constant over time and a part that is stochastic. The constant part
is no different from any other utility function parameter (i.e. η or γ).
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level, when combined with today’s choices of work hours
and consumption, determine the next period’s human
capital and assets with certainty. Thus, given (Kt, At, Ct, ht),
the worker knows the resulting (Kt+1, At+1) with certainty.
And these variables, in turn, help to predict future utility
flows. For example, higher hours of work today (holding
consumption fixed) will tend to generate higher values of
human capital and assets at the start of t + 1, and this will
increase the expected present value of utility from t + 1 to
the terminal period.
In contrast to human capital and assets, I have assumed
that the stochastic shocks to human capital rental rates and
tastes for work are independent over time. As a result, Rt
and βt do not help to predict Rt+1 and βt+1. Hence, they are
excluded from the conditioning set, as they do not help to
predict future utility flows. Crucially, however, in forming
the expected value of future utilities, the worker must
average over all the possible realisations for rental rates and
taste shocks.
Obviously, then, the expected present value on the right
side of (117) is a very complicated object. One constructs
these objects using a ‘backsolving’ procedure. Note that in
the terminal period we have simply:
That is, since there is no future beyond T, we have a simple
static problem. Given wT = RTKT and AT, the consumer
chooses consumption and hours of work to maximise 
utility at time T subject to the static budget constraint 
CT = wT hT (1 – τT) +AT where AT are assets at the start of
period T.95 The backsolving procedure starts by calculating
VT(KT, AT, RT, βT) for every possible state (KT, AT, RT, βT) at
which the worker might enter period T.
The solution to such a static problem for any particular
state (KT, AT, RT, βT) is, of course, trivial. It is given by the
equation:
which can be easily solved for the optimal hT via an 
iterative search procedure.96 Once the optimal hT has been
determined, the optimal CT is obtained from the budget
constraint, and these are both plugged into (118) to obtain
VT(KT, AT, RT, βT) at that particular state point.
A problem arises, however, because the number of possible
levels of human capital, assets, the rental rate and tastes for
work at the start of period T is extremely large, if not infinite.
Thus, it is not computationally feasible to literally solve for
VT(KT, AT, RT, βT) for every possible state (KT, AT, RT, βT).
Keane and Wolpin (1994) develop an approach to this problem
that has become quite commonly used in the literature on
dynamic models. The idea is to obtain an approximate (rather
than exact) solution to the optimisation problem.
The Keane and Wolpin (1994) method is simply to solve
for VT(KT, AT, RT, βT) at a finite (and relatively small) subset
of the possible state points. Denote these solutions by
VT(K
d
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d
T, R
d
T, β
d
T ) for d = 1,…,D. One then runs a regression
of the VT(K
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Once we have fit this regression, we can use it to
predict or interpolate the value of ET–1{VT(KT, AT, RT, βT) |
(KT, AT)} at any desired state point (KT, AT), including, most
particularly, at values of (KT, AT) that were not amongst
those used to fit the regression. Thus, once we have fit 
this interpolating regression, we may then proceed as if 
ET–1 {VT(KT, AT, RT, βT) | (KT, AT)} is known for every
possible state (KT, AT).
Let’s denote the interpolating function that approximates
VT(KT, AT) by:
We need to assume that π T is a smooth differentiable
function of KT and AT (e.g. a polynomial) for the next step.
For expositional convenience, let’s assume the π T function
is the following simple function of KT and AT:
The next step of the backsolving process is to move
back to period T – 1. At that point we have that:
But if we substitute our approximating polynomial for the
expectation term on the right we obtain simply:
Now this is actually a simple problem to solve. Substituting
in the laws of motion for assets and human capital, which
I will assume is simply Kt+1 = Kt(1+αht), we obtain:
(118)
(119)
 
where 
(120)
 
(121)
95 For exposition simplicity I am assuming that the end of the working life T corresponds to the end of life, and that there are no bequests. Hence, the worker
consumes all of his/her remaining assets at time T. In a more general model, the worker might value carrying assets into T + 1 as savings for retirement
and/or to leave bequests. These extensions can be handled by adding to (118) an additional term f(AT+1) that represents the value of assets carried into
period T + 1. 
96 As an aside, it is notable that the basic idea of the life-cycle model with human capital—that working hard today will improve one’s prospects tomorrow—
is one which ordinary people would find quite intuitive. Yet one often hears academic economists argue that workers can’t possibly behave as if they solve
dynamic optimisation problems because the mathamatics involved is too daunting. On the other hand, I can’t ever recall hearing an academic economist
argue that people can’t possibly behave as suggested by a static labour supply model because they can’t solve an implicit equation for hours such as (119).
I suspect that most people are not very good at solving implicit equations. Perhaps the idea is that most people are sufficiently familiar with Roy’s identity
that they can choose their indirect utility functions so as to give themselves simple linear labour supply functions.
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Notice that finding the optimal values of CT–1 and hT–1 is
now just like a static optimisation problem. We have the
first order conditions:
Solving these two equations with two unknowns is numerically
not much harder than solving for hours in equation (119).
Thus, given the interpolating function π T (KT,AT)we have
a simple way to solve for VT–1(KT–1, AT–1, RT–1, βT–1) at any
state point (KT–1, AT–1, RT–1, βT–1) that might arise at T – 1.
The next step of the approximate solution method proposed
by Keane and Wolpin (1994) is to solve for VT–1(KT–1, AT–1,
RT–1, βT–1) at a finite subset of the possible state points.
Denote these solutions by VT–1(K
d
T–1, A
d
T–1, R
d
T–1, β
d
T–1) for 
d = 1,…,D. One then obtains a new interpolating function
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d
T–1,
AdT–1, R
d
T–1, β
d
T–1) on a flexible function of the (K
d
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Using this interpolating function, we can write the
(approximate) value functions at time T – 2 as:
Notice that this is exactly like equation (121), the expression
for the (approximate) value functions at time T – 1, except
that we have a new polynomial with different coefficients.
The first order conditions for CT–2 and hT=2 will look exactly
like (122), except with different π parameters. Thus, we
can keep repeating the above steps until we have obtained
an approximate solution for every period back to t = 1.
The approximate solution consists of the complete set
of interpolating functions πt(Kt, At) for t = 2,…,T. Using these
interpolating functions we can solve simple two equation
systems such as (122) to find the optimal choice of a
worker at any point in the state space. In particular, using
π2(K2, A2) we can solve for optimal labour supply and
consumption in period t = 1, the first period of the working
life. As I discussed earlier, this is what first order conditions
alone do not allow one to do. Furthermore, by drawing
values for the taste shocks and rental rates and repeatedly
solving equations such as (122) over time, one can simulate
entire career paths of workers. This in turn, enables one to
simulate how changes in tax rates would affect the entire
life-cycle path of labour supply and consumption, as one
can re-solve the model and simulate career paths under
different settings for the tax parameters.
To my knowledge there are only two papers that have
used full solution methods to estimate dynamic life-cycle
labour supply models that include both human capital
investment and savings. These are Keane and Wolpin
(2001) and Imai and Keane (2004).
Keane and Wolpin (2001) set up a model where a
person, from age 16–65, decides every period whether to
work and/or attend school either full-time, part-time or not
at all. The choices are not mutually exclusive (e.g. a youth
might work part-time while attending college). Somewhat
unusually in the literature on life-cycle models, the authors
use a model with three decision periods per year (the two
school semesters and the summer). They allow for the fact
that youth could work summers to finance school. The
model is fit to panel data from the 1979 cohort of the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). This
contains people who were 14–21 years old in January 1979.
The sample used in estimation consists of 1,051 white
males who are followed from when they first reach age 16
until 1992. The maximum age attained in the sample is 30.
The NLSY79 collected comprehensive asset data beginning
in 1985, making it possible to estimate a model that
includes savings. A key feature of the Keane and Wolpin
(2001) model is that, while it includes savings, it also 
allows for liquidity constraints (i.e. an upper bound on
uncollateralised borrowing). The model fits data on assets,
school attendance and work from age 16–30 quite well.
The focus of the Keane and Wolpin (2001) paper is not
on labour supply, it is on school attendance decisions. But the
paper is of interest here because it assumes a CRRA utility
function in consumption, and so it provides an estimate of
the key preference parameter η which governs income
effects and inter-temporal substitution in consumption.
Keane and Wolpin (2001) obtain η ≈ –0.50, which implies
weaker income effects, and less curvature in consumption
(i.e. a higher willingness to substitute inter-temporally), than
much of the prior literature. Keane and Wolpin (2001, 
p. 1078) discuss how failure to accommodate liquidity
constraints may have led to a downward bias in estimates of
η in prior work.97 Notably, Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2003)
present extensive experimental evidence, as well as evidence
from field auction data, in favour of η ≈ –0.4 to –0.5. Bajari
and Hortacsu (2005) estimate η ≈ –0.75 from auction data.
All of these estimates are closer to the Keane and Wolpin
(2001) estimate of –0.5 than to the larger negative values
obtained in most prior literature on consumption.
The model in Imai and Keane (2004) is in most respects
very similar to the model that I used to exposit full solution
methods for life-cycle models. The main difference is that
Imai and Keane (2004) use a much richer specification for
the human capital production function. Their specification
is designed to capture the empirical regularity that wages
grow much more quickly with work experience for high
wage workers than for low wage workers. Thus, as in Shaw
(1989), they specify a function that allows hours of work
 
(122a)
(122b)
(123)
97 Specifically, in the absence of constraints on uncollateralised borrowing, one needs a large negative η to rationalise why youth with steep age-earnings
profiles don’t borrow heavily in anticipation of higher earnings in later life.
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and human capital to be complements in the production of
additional human capital, and their estimates imply that
they are indeed complements. The parameters of the
human capital production function are also allowed to
differ by education level.
Another difference is that in Imai and Keane (2004) the
rental rate on human capital is assumed to be constant.
Instead, they allow human capital to evolve stochastically,
similar to equation (115). Finally, Imai and Keane (2004) set
the terminal period T at age 65, but unlike the simple
expositional model above, they include a terminal value
function V66(A66) which captures the fact that workers
value having assets to carry into retirement.
Like Keane and Wolpin (2001), Imai and Keane estimate
their model using white males from the NLSY79. They
argue that the NLSY79 is preferable to the PSID for this
purpose because of its comprehensive asset data. The men
in their sample are aged 20–36 and, as the focus of their
paper is solely on labour supply, the men included in the
sample are required to have finished school. Due to the
computational burden of estimation they randomly chose
1000 men from the NLSY79 sample to use in estimation.
People are observed for an average of 7.5 years each, and
not necessarily starting from age 16.
Imai and Keane (2004) allow for measurement error in
observed hours, earnings and assets when constructing the
likelihood of the data given their model. They use a ratio
wage measure, but account for the resultant denominator
bias in an internally consistent way when forming the
likelihood. Given that all outcomes are assumed to be
measured with error, construction of the likelihood is fairly
simple. One can (i) simulate career histories for each
worker, and then (ii) form the likelihood of a worker’s
observed history of hours, earnings and assets as the joint
density of the set of measurement errors necessary to
reconcile the observed history with the simulated data.98
Imai and Keane (2004) estimate that γ = 0.26. In a
model without human capital this would imply a Frisch
elasticity of (1/γ) = 3.8, which implies a much higher
willingness to substitute labour inter-temporally than in any
estimation we have discussed so far, with the exception of
MaCurdy (1983). Imai and Keane explain their high
estimate of inter-temporal substitution based on the logic
of Figure 7.4, which, as I discussed earlier illustrates why
the failure to account for human capital will lead to severely
downward biased estimates of (1/γ).
Indeed, Imai and Keane show that if they simulate data
from their model, and apply instrumental variable methods
like those in MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986) to estimate
(1/γ), they obtain estimates of 0.325 (standard error =
0.256) and 0.476 (standard error = 0.182), respectively. This
exercise demonstrates that the model generates life-cycle
histories that, when viewed through the lens of models that
ignore human capital, imply similarly low inter-temporal
elasticities of substitution to those that had been obtained
in most prior work. In other words, the model does not
generate data that show an oddly high level of positive co-
movement between hours and wages compared to the
actual data.
As further confirmation of this point, the authors report
simple OLS regressions of hours changes on wage changes
for both the NLSY79 data and the data simulated from their
model. The estimates are –0.231 and –0.293, respectively.
This shows two things: (i) the model does do a good job of
fitting the raw correlation between hours changes and
wage changes observed in the data; and (ii) a negative
correlation between hours changes and wage changes in
the raw data is perfectly consistent with a high willingness
to substitute labour inter-temporally over the life-cycle.
What reconciles these prima facie contradictory
observations is the divergence between the opportunity
cost of time and the wage in a world with returns to work
experience. In particular, Imai and Keane (2004) estimate
that from age 20–36 the mean of the opportunity cost of
time increases by only 13 per cent. In contrast, the mean
wage rate increases by 90 per cent in the actual data, and
86 per cent in the simulated data. Thus, the wage increases
about 6.5 times faster than the opportunity cost of time. As
indicated in the ‘back of the envelope’ calculations based
on equations (109) or (110) these figures imply that
conventional methods of calculating (1/γ) will understate
the opportunity cost of time by a factor of roughly 6.5.99
Imai and Keane (2004) also estimate that η = –0.74.
Note that their estimate of η implies a somewhat lower
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption
than the Keane and Wolpin (2001) estimate of η ≈ –0.5 (i.e.
(1/η) = 1/(–0.74) = –1.35 versus 1/(–0.5) = –2).100 But η is
still less negative than in most prior estimates, again
implying weaker income effects, and a higher willingness to
substitute consumption inter-temporally, than much of the
prior literature.
To put the Imai and Keane estimates of γ and η in a
familiar context, we can follow MaCurdy’s (1983) method
and calculate what they imply for the behaviour of a worker
with such preferences living in a static world. Intuition
suggests that this method may be approximately correct for
calculating the effect of a permanent unanticipated tax
change on a worker far enough into the life-cycle that the
human capital return part of the opportunity cost of time is
fairly small relative to the wage rate. The results in
Heckman (1976) suggest this occurs in the 40s, and the
simulations in Imai and Keane are consistent with this (i.e.
at age 45 the return to human capital makes up only 15 per
cent of the OCT). In this static context, the implied
98 Keane and Wolpin (2001) first developed this approach to forming the likelihood in dynamic models. 
99 It is interesting that French (2005), in a study of retirement behaviour, also obtains a rather large value of (1/γ) = 1.33 for the inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution for 60-year-old participants in the PSID. As both Shaw (1989) and Imai and Keane (2004) note, human capital investment is not so important
for people late in the life-cycle. For them, the wage will be close to the opportunity cost of time, and the bias that results from ignoring human capital
will be much less severe.
100 Recall that the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption will measure the drop in current consumption in response to an increase in the
interest rate (i.e. the willingness to sacrifice current consumption for higher future consumption).
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Marshallian elasticity with respect to a permanent wage
increase would be (1 + η)/(γ – η) = 0.26/(0.26 + 0.74) =
0.26 and the Hicks elasticity would be 1/(γ – η) = 1/(0.26 +
0.74) = 1.0.
However, simulations of the Imai and Keane model
suggest this intuition is not particularly helpful. Specifically,
I have used the Imai and Keane model to simulate the
impact of a permanent unanticipated 10 percentage point
tax on labour earnings for men at age 45, 50, 55 and 65,
respectively. Under a scenario where the revenue is simply
thrown away, the estimated labour supply effects are –1.1 per
cent, –2.3 per cent, –5.3 per cent and –9.5 per cent
respectively. Only at age 50 is the impact roughly what the
Marshallian elasticity would suggest.
I have also used the Imai and Keane model to simulate
the effect of a permanent 10 per cent tax rate increase
(starting at age 20 and lasting through to age 65) on labour
supply over the entire working life. If the revenue is simply
thrown away the model implies that average hours of work
from ages 20–65 drops from 1,992 per year to 1,954 per
year, a 2 per cent drop. If the revenue is redistributed as a
lump sum transfer labour supply drops to 1,861 hours per
year, a 6.6 per cent drop. I’ll treat this as a reasonable
approximation to the compensated elasticity with respect
to permanent tax changes implied by the model.
As we would expect, however, the effects are very
different at different ages, as Table 7.5 indicates. As we see
in the table, tax effects on labour supply are slowly rising
from age 20 to about age 40. Starting in the 40s, the
effects on labour supply start to grow quite quickly, and by
age 60 effects are very substantial. Thus, in response to a
permanent tax increase, workers not only reduce labour
supply, but also shift their lifetime labour supply out of
older ages towards younger ages.
Imai and Keane (2004) also simulate how workers
would respond to a 2 per cent temporary and unanticipated
wage increase. This generates primarily an inter-temporal
substitution effect, as such a short-lived wage increase will
have a small effect on lifetime wealth (at least for relatively
young workers). For a person at age 20 the increase in the
hours is only 0.6 per cent, which, in contrast to the
estimate of (1/γ) = 3.8, would seem to imply rather weak
inter-temporal substitution effects. The answer lies in the
fact that, according to the Imai and Keane (2004)
estimates, at age 20 the wage is less than half of the
101 In the solution, workers ignore the effect of their own actions on P, as each worker makes a trivial contribution to total government revenue. Thus,
workers continue to solve equations (105)–(107). 
102 As I indicated earlier, these are the only two dynamic life-cycle models for men that include both labour supply and asset accumulation and that are
estimated using a full solution method.
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opportunity cost of time. As we would expect, the strength
of the substitution effect rises steadily with age, and at age
60 the increase in hours is nearly 4 per cent, and at age 65
it is about 5.5 per cent. It is important to bear in mind that
these are lower bounds on the Frisch elasticities, as,
particularly at older ages, the wealth effect of a one-period
wage increase may be considerable.
Finally, in another paper (Keane 2009b), I use the Imai
and Keane (2004) and Keane and Wolpin (2001) estimates
of the preference parameters γ and η to calibrate the simple
two-period model of equation (17), and then use this to
provide some simulations of the welfare cost of income
taxation. To do this I augment the model to include a public
good P that is financed by taxation, as in:
where λf(P) indicates people value the public good. The
government provides the same level of the public good P
in both periods, and the government budget constraint
requires that the present value P + P/(1 + r) equals the
present value of tax revenues. The benevolent government
sets the tax rate optimally to equate marginal utility of
consumption of the public and private goods.101
Given that we have a two-period model we can think of
each period as twenty years of a forty-year working life
(e.g. 25–44 and 45–64). The real annual interest rate is set
at 3 per cent, giving a twenty-year interest rate of r = 0.806,
and the discount factor is set to ρ = 1/(1 + r) = 0.554. I set
the initial tax rates τ1 = τ2 = 0.40. The wage equation is
similar to (103), but augmented to include a quadratic in
hours and to accommodate depreciation of skills. The wage
equation parameters are calibrated so that the simulations
are consistent with roughly 33–50 per cent wage growth
for men from age 25–45, which is comparable to what
Geweke and Keane (2000) find in the PSID.
Table 7.6 summarises some of the main results from
Keane (2009b). The table presents welfare losses from a
proportional flat rate income tax, relative to a lump sum tax,
expressed as a fraction of consumption, under a number of
parameterisations of the simple two-period model. The top
panel presents results with the CRRA curvature parameter
for consumption (η) set at –0.75, the value estimated by Imai
and Keane (2004), while the bottom panel presents results
for the value of –0.5 estimated by Keane and Wolpin
(2001).102 Each panel presents results for several values of
the CRRA curvature parameter in hours (γ), from a value of
4, which implies little inter-temporal substitution in leisure,
up to a value of 0.25, which implies an inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution of labour supply of 4, close to the
Imai and Keane (2004) estimate.
Under the column labelled ‘uncompensated elasticity’
the table reports simulated total labour supply elasticities to
(123)
Table 7.5 Effects of a 10 Per Cent Tax on Earnings on
Labour Supply at Various Ages
Tax plus lump 
Age Pure tax (%) sum redistribution (%)
20 –0.7 –3.2
30 –0.7 –3.3
40 –0.9 –4.2
45 –1.2 –5.7
50 –2.1 –8.7
60 –9.1 –20.0
20–65 (total hours) –2.0 –6.6
permanent tax changes.103 Note that very high values of the
Frisch elasticity (1/γ) are consistent with very modest
uncompensated elasticities. For example, in the η = –0.75,
γ = 0.25 case, which corresponds to the Imai and Keane
(2004) estimates, the simulated uncompensated elasticity is
a modest 0.205. (Interestingly, this is almost identical to the
uncompensated elasticity that I obtained when simulating a
permanent tax increase in the Imai-Keane multi-period
model.)104 But the welfare cost of proportional income
taxation is still substantial (i.e. 13–35 per cent, depending
on the measure).
The welfare cost of income taxation is calculated for
three cases: (i) where utility is log(P), where P is the amount
of the private good, (ii) where it is 2P0.5, and (iii) where it is
linear in P. This covers a range of degrees of curvature in
consumers’ utility from the public good, ranging from more
than that for the private good to less. The welfare losses in
the three cases are equivalent to 13 per cent, 19 per cent
and 35 per cent of consumption, respectively.
Even if we reduce (1/γ) to the much more modest value
of 1, in which case the uncompensated elasticity is only
0.133, the welfare losses in the three cases are 9 per cent,
11 per cent and 19 per cent of consumption, respectively.
Thus, it appears that large welfare losses from income
taxation are quite consistent with existing (small) estimates
of labour supply elasticities.
7.4 Conclusion
The literature on male labour supply is vast, and the
number of contentious methodological issues is sizeable. It
is therefore impossible to arrive at a simple summary. One
very crude way to summarise the literature is to provide a
table that reports all the elasticity estimates from all the
papers I have discussed. I do this in Table 7.7. In many ways
such a table is useless because it makes no attempt to
weigh studies based on their relative merits (quality of data,
soundness of approach, etc.). Thus, Table 7.7 in effect
ignores all the important issues I have been talking about in
section 7.3.
On the other hand, Table 7.7 is useful for answering the
following question: Is there a clear consensus in the
literature on male labour supply that the Hicks elasticity is
small? Recall the quote in section 7.1 where Saez, Slemrod
and Giertz (2009) indicated that, ‘…with some exceptions,
the profession has settled on a value for [the Hicks]
elasticity close to zero’.105 But, as we see in Table 7.7, the
mean value of the Hicks elasticity across the twenty-one
studies reviewed here is 0.30. (Note that seven studies do
not estimate this parameter.)
As we have seen, a value of 0.30 for the Hicks elasticity
is large enough to generate substantial welfare costs of
taxation. For instance, Ziliak and Kniesner (2005) obtain a
Hicks elasticity of 0.33, and simulations of their model
imply substantial welfare costs from progressive taxation.
And Blomquist (1983) and Blomquist and Hansson-
Busewitz (1990) obtain Hicks elasticities of only 0.11 and
0.13, respectively, yet they also simulate substantial welfare
costs from progressive taxation (i.e. 12 per cent and 16 per
cent of revenue, respectively, compared to only 2 per cent
or 5 per cent under a flat rate tax). Similarly, Ziliak and
Kniesner (1999) obtain a Hicks elasticity of 0.13, yet also
simulate large welfare losses from taxation. Based on these
results, one would have to conclude that a Hicks elasticity
of 0.30 is quite large enough to generate substantial
welfare losses.
Table 7.7 also shows us that the Hicks elasticity
estimates from individual studies range from 0.02 to 1.22,
with eight estimates exceeding 0.25. Interestingly, the
other thirteen estimates fall in a tight range from 0.02 to
0.13. Thus, the distribution of the estimates across studies
has a very odd shape (see Figure 7.5). It is interesting that
the distribution exhibits a large gap between 0.13 and the
next highest value of 0.27. Regardless, I think it would be
difficult to look at Figure 7.5 and conclude there is a broad
consensus within the economics profession that the Hicks
elasticity is close to zero—unless, that is, one believes that
all the studies bunched up in the 0.02 to 0.13 range are
credible while all those in the 0.27 plus range are flawed. 
103 It is important to note that the compensated and uncompensated elasticities reported in Table 7.6 are not the traditional Marshallian and Hicks
elastictities. Instead they are generalisations of these formulas that apply for the dynamic case with human capital, as given in Keane (2009b).
104 The Hicks elasticity of 0.81 in Table 7.6 is also fairly close to the value of 0.66 that I obtained when simulating a tax increase with the proceeds distributed
lump sum in the Imai-Keane multi-period model.
105 At that point I didn’t note that the authors were specifically referring to the Hicks elasticity, as I had not yet defined the different elasticity concepts. 
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Table 7.6 Summary Results for Welfare Losses from Proportional Income Taxes
Uncompensated Compensated Welfare loss (C*)
γ elasticity elasticity f(P) = log(P) f(P) = 2P0.5 f(P) = P
η = –0.75 0.25 0.205 0.811 13.35 19.03 35.33
0.5 0.176 0.698 11.42 15.47 27.57
1 0.133 0.530 8.92 11.46 19.36
2 0.088 0.350 6.22 7.62 12.18
4 0.052 0.206 3.87 4.59 6.98
η = –0.5 0.25 0.532 1.054 12.16 23.08 59.27
0.5 0.445 0.884 11.38 18.11 41.62
1 0.318 0.633 9.30 12.83 26.23
2 0.197 0.392 6.43 8.07 14.90
4 0.110 0.220 3.88 4.62 7.88
Notes: All results are for α = 0.008. C* = percentage consumption gain needed to compensate for tax distortion (starting from proportional tax world).
106 For example, Kosters (1969) does not account for endogeneity of wages, Ashenfelter and Heckman (1973) do not account for taxes, MaCurdy, Green
and Paarsch (1990) and Triest (1990) use ratio wage measures that would lead to denominator bias, Blundell and Walker (1986) do not instrument for
full income, and so on. 
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Figure 7.5 Distribution of Hicks Elasticity of
Substitution Estimates
Note: This figure contains a frequency distribution of the twenty-one estimates
of the Hicks elasticity of substitution discussed in this chapter.
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I think such a position would be untenable, particularly as
we can point to important flaws in all the studies in the
0.02–0.13 range (just as in all empirical work).106
The notion that there is consensus on a low Hicks elasticity
may stem in part from a popular perception (which is a
misconception) that the piecewise-linear budget constraint
methods developed by Burtless and Hausman (1978), Wales
and Woodland (1979) and Hausman (1980, 1981) have been
discredited, and that the high estimates all come from use of
these methods. But as I have discussed, a careful reading of
literature suggests that this is not the case. These methods
have sometimes produced low estimates of the Hicks
elasticity, while alternative methods have sometimes
produced high estimates. There isn’t an obvious connection
between the methods adopted and the result obtained.
Indeed, as the careful study by Eklöf and Sacklén (2000)
showed, divergent results across studies can be much
better explained by the data used than by the particular
empirical methods employed. In particular, they find that
studies that use ‘direct wage measures’ (i.e. a question
about one’s wage rate per unit of time, such as hourly or
weekly or monthly) tend to get much higher estimates of
labour supply elasticities than studies that use ‘ratio wage
measures’ (i.e. annual earnings divided by annual hours).
Table 7.7 Summary of Elasticity Estimates
Authors of study Year Marshall Hicks Frisch
Static models
Kosters 1969 –0.09 0.05 –
Ashenfelter-Heckman 1973 –0.16 0.11 –
Boskin 1973 –0.29 0.12 –
Hall 1973 n.a. 0.45 –
8 British studiesa 1976–83 –0.16 0.13 –
8 NIT studiesa 1977–84 0.03 0.13 –
Burtless-Hausman 1978 0.00 0.07–0.13 –
Wales-Woodland 1979 0.14 0.84 –
Hausman 1981 0.00 0.74 –
Blomquist 1983 0.08 0.11 –
Blomquist-Hansson-Busewitz 1990 0.12 0.13 –
MaCurdy-Green-Paarsch 1990 0.00 0.07 –
Triest 1990 0.05 0.05 –
van Soest-Woittiez-Kapteyn 1990 0.19 0.28 –
Ecklöf-Sacklén 2000 0.05 0.27 –
Dynamic models
MaCurdy 1981 0.08b – 0.15
MaCurdy 1983 0.70 1.22 6.25
Browning-Deaton-Irish 1985 – – 0.09
Blundell-Walker 1986 –0.07 0.02 0.03
Altonjic 1986 –0.24 0.11 0.17
Altonjid 1986 – – 0.31
Bover 1989 0.00 – 0.08
Altug-Miller 1990 – – 0.14
Angrist 1991 – – 0.63
Ziliak-Kniesner 1999 0.12 0.13 0.16
Pistaferri 2003 0.51b – 0.70
Imai-Keane 2004 0.20e 0.66e 0.30–2.75f
Ziliak-Kniesner 2005 –0.47 0.33 0.54
Average 0.03 0.30 0.83
Notes: Where ranges are reported, the mid-point is used to take means. a = average of the studies surveyed by Pencavel (1986). b = effect of surprise
permanent wage increase. c = using MaCurdy Method 1. d = using first difference hours equation. e = approximation of responses to transitory wage increase
based on model simulation. f = age range. n.a. denotes not available.
This is because the denominator bias inherent in taking the
ratio biases the wage coefficient in a negative direction.
This pattern can be seen quite clearly in Table 7.7.
Specifically, of the eight studies that obtain ‘large’ values for
the Hicks elasticity (i.e. those in the 0.27 plus range), six use
a direct wage measure (Hall 1973; Hausman 1981; van
Soest, Woittiez & Kapteyn 1990; MaCurdy 1983107; Eklöf &
Sacklén 2000; Ziliak & Kneisner 2005), one works with
shares to avoid ratios (Wales & Woodland 1979), and one
models the measurement error process to take denominator
bias into account in estimation (Imai & Keane 2004).
So far I have argued that the existing literature supports
an estimate of the Hicks elasticity of at least 0.30, and
perhaps higher if one puts more weight on studies that
have used direct wage measures.108 However, a second
point I have stressed is that the failure of prior literature to
account for human capital has almost certainly caused
downward bias in estimates of labour supply elasticities.
The effect of human capital is to dampen the response of
younger workers to changes in their wage rates. This is
because, for them, the wage is a relatively small part of the
opportunity cost of time. It is also very important to
consider the return to work experience. This notion is quite
intuitive: young workers are often willing to work long
hours at relatively low wages in order to increase their
chances of advancement, and hence their future wages.
Aside from leading to downward bias in estimates of
wage elasticities, human capital also has important
implications for tax policy. The conventional wisdom is that
a temporary tax increase (or wage reduction) should have a
larger effect on current labour supply than a permanent
increase. This is because of inter-temporal substitution, that
is, workers can substitute their labour towards periods
when wages are high. But once we consider human capital
it becomes possible that a permanent tax increase can have
a larger adverse effect on current labour supply than a
temporary tax increase. This is because the permanent tax
increase reduces not just the current wage but also the
return to human capital investment. It reduces one’s future
reward for current work.
Another key point that I have emphasised is that the
‘labour supply elasticities’ reported in the labour supply
literature are in most cases hypothetical objects. Specifically,
authors typically report elasticities relevant for changes in
hypothetical straight line budget constraints. This tells us
something about the shape of people’s indifference curves
for consumption versus leisure. But in the real world, budget
constraints tend to be non-convex at the low end (i.e.
effective tax rates of over 100 per cent due to fixed costs of
work and welfare benefit withdrawal rates) and progressive
at the middle to high end. Reported elasticity estimates do
not reveal how people will respond to specific tax and
transfer program changes given real world tax systems—
determining this response requires model simulation.
In this regard, I gave a specific example where large
changes in the benefit withdrawal rate of a welfare program
would have essentially no effect on labour supply; perhaps
leading researchers to conclude that program recipients were
unresponsive to economic incentives such as after-tax wage
rates. But I showed in this same example that the labour supply
of recipients would be extremely responsive to small changes
in their pre-tax wage rates, changes in fixed costs of work, or
the provision of work bonuses. I argued that this example was
not merely academic but is, in fact, an accurate description of
why the US welfare caseload dropped so dramatically in the
mid to late 1990s after being so seemingly immune to
changes in program rules over the previous thirty years.
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